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Inside Political Parties: Factions, Party Organization and Electoral Competition
Giovanna M. Invernizzi
How do parties organize, and do parties’ organizational differences matter? Differ-
ent organization patterns are empirically associated with varying electoral performance,
voters’ participation, policy-making, and party systems’ shape and stability. Despite the
empirical relevance of party organization, theoretical scholarship has overwhelmingly fo-
cused on other functions of parties — namely the electoral one, simplifying the political
world for voters, and the policy-making one in the legislative arena. The papers in this
dissertation advance a new theoretical agenda on the organization of political parties,
generating insights that I test with novel data. The main contribution of the disserta-
tion is to treat party organization as an endogenous rather than exogenous variable. This
approach allows to generate novel insights on how the electoral environment influences
the way parties organize, and outcomes such as parties’ electoral performance and the
process of party system stabilization.
The first paper conceives the internal organization of a party as being driven by fac-
tional competition. What brings opposing factions to engage in sabotage rather than
enhance the party image, and what strategies can parties adopt to contain it? The pa-
per introduces a model of elections in which intra-party factions can devote resources to
campaign for the party or to undermine each other and obtain more power. The party
redistributes electoral spoils among factions to motivate their investment in campaigning
activities. The model shows that sabotage increases when the stakes of the election are
low — e.g., in consensus democracies that grant power to the losing party — because
the incentives to focus on the fight for internal power increase. It also suggests that the
optimal party strategy for winning the election in the face of intra-party competition is
to reward factions with high powered incentives when campaigning effort can be easily
monitored, but treat factions equally otherwise. Finally, the model shows that, when a
party weakens electorally, factions’ incentives move from campaigning for the party to
sabotaging each other to obtain electoral spoils. A testable implication of this result is the
emergence of political scandals triggered internally as a product of factional sabotage.
The second paper tests this empirical implication using original data on judicial in-
vestigations of Italian MPs involved in various misbehaviors. Judicial investigations of
politicians are a fundamental component of politics, often leading to scandals. Yet, empir-
ical evidence of the strategic determinants of judicial investigations is intrinsically hard to
gather, a problem that has significantly limited the study of this important phenomenon.
The paper studies the politics behind judicial investigations leveraging new data on pros-
ecutors’ informants in 1125 episodes of misbehavior of Italian MPs involved in different
crimes (1983-2019). Results provide evidence in favor of a political use of denunciations
for corruption crimes: when a party weakens, the likelihood that political enemies de-
nounce past misbehavior of members of the weakened party increases, suggesting that
the political use of denunciation is elastic to changes in the electoral performance. The
timing of past misbehavior is crucial: members of weakened parties are more likely to be
accused of misbehavior that happened a long time before the accusation, which further
supports the conjecture that accusations are politically motivated.
The third paper moves to the topic of party organization in the presence of multi-
party competition. It conceives of the choice over party organization as parties’ decision
to form different types of alliances. Despite being pervasive, little is known about the con-
ditions facilitating different forms of pre-electoral alliances. The paper presents a model
of electoral competition in which parties can form alliances before elections, and decide
how binding these should be. Parties face a dynamic trade-off between insuring them-
selves against large shifts in public opinion and allowing flexibility to respond to future
changes in voters’ preferences. The model shows that more binding alliances such as
mergers emerge in equilibrium when electoral volatility is high; otherwise, parties form
more flexible pre-electoral coalitions. It also suggests that some power concentration is
needed for alliances to emerge in equilibrium, whereas parties run alone under consen-
sual democracies that share power among all parties.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
“As institutions, parties enjoy a general disrepute, yet most of the democratic world
finds them indispensable as instruments of self-government, as means for the organiza-
tion and expression of competing viewpoints on public policy.”
– V.O. Key, Southern Politics In State and Nation.
Political parties serve three main functions (Key, 1955): the first one is in the electorate,
simplifying voters’ electoral choice and generating symbolic loyalties. The second func-
tion is in office, where parties create and organize government majorities, implement
policies and organize dissent. The third function relates to parties as organizations: how
leaders are recruited for offices, how interests are articulated and aggregated, and all the
activities that create the formal structure of political parties.
Theoretical scholarship has generally focused on parties in the electorate and in gov-
ernment at the expense of parties’ organization, especially outside the legislative field.
However, recently growing empirical work has highlighted variation across countries
and over time in the way parties organize (e.g., candidate selection, factions’ formal
recognition, party’s decision-making processes, mergers), linking party organization to
outcomes such as electoral success and voter participation.
In light of this evidence, it is important to analyze the determinants of parties’ strate-
gic decisions of adopting different organizational changes, which is precisely what this
dissertation is concerned with. As the theoretical chapters of the dissertation will show
in detail, treating party organization as an endogenous variable allows to reach a better
understanding of the effects of various institutional changes. For example, the first paper
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studies how different portfolio allocation rules affect factions’ incentives to sabotage each
other in a given party, and how changes in electoral institutions affect such incentives.
Ignoring how institutional changes condition the choice over different allocation rules
could lead to reach empirically biased conclusions.
Throughout the following chapters, I develop a novel theoretical framework to study
how parties organize. This setting motivates a large set of unanswered questions. For
example, when should we expect parties’ rules to foster cooperation, and when to al-
low internal competition? What are the consequences of parties’ organization choices
for electoral competition, policy outcomes, and party system stability? Together, the pa-
pers in this dissertation advance an agenda on the organization of political parties which
produces substantively important implications for outcomes such as intra-party politics,
electoral competition, and policy implementation.
The main methodological contribution of the dissertation is to consider the way par-
ties organize as an endogenous variable, rather than exogenous as is typically done in the
literature (with few exceptions, that will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent
chapters). I do so with three papers: the first (“Electoral Competition and Factional Sab-
otage”) proposes a model of electoral competition to analyze how intra-party organiza-
tional choices affect the incentives of actors operating within the party. The second paper
(“Politics by Denunciation”) uses novel data from Italy to test the empirical implications
of the first. The third paper of the dissertation (“Does Electoral Volatility Beget Strong Al-
liances?”) moves to the question of alliances in multi-party systems. The paper analyzes a
model of inter-party organizational choice, where parties can form pre-electoral coalitions
and merge into new political entities, to argue that different organizations crucially de-
pend on factors of the electoral environment such as electoral volatility and institutional
power sharing. The remainder of this introduction highlights the methodological and
substantive contributions of the dissertation.
2
1.1 A Novel Framework of Intra-Party Organizational Choice
Despite the lack of a clear definition in the literature, the term “party organization” typ-
ically alludes to the organizational structure implemented by a party from the bottom to
the top — i.e., from its members, factions and currents, all the way to its leadership —
and to the way these structures interact with each other (Duverger, 1959).
A recently growing literature has brought attention to the study of party organization.
In particular, several empirical studies have emphasized patterns in the way parties orga-
nize across countries and over time (Katz and Mair, 1994, Poguntke et al., 2016, Scarrow,
Webb and Poguntke, 2017). This variation in party organization is empirically associated
with several outcomes of interest. The rules for candidates’ selection, whether factions
are formally recognized within parties, the centralization of parties’ decision-making pro-
cesses and party mergers are linked to outcomes such as parties’ electoral performance,
voters’ participation, policy-making and the shape and stability of party systems.
As the next chapter presents more in depth, the literature has also analyzed the ef-
fect of different configurations of party organization on portfolio allocation among party
factions in countries with highly factionalized parties such as Italy (Mershon, 2001b,a,
Ceron, 2014) and Japan (Leiserson, 1968, Ono, 2012). The common trait of these papers is
that they all consider party organization as exogenous. However, the evidence connect-
ing party organization to crucial electoral outcomes warns us against considering party
organization as an exogenous variable. Rather, it motivates researchers to treat it as an
endogenous variable decided by strategic actors. In this dissertation, I propose a formal
framework to study intra-party organizational choices that considers parties’ strategic
decisions of adopting organizational changes to achieve electoral success.
The framework allows to study which conditions of the electoral environment (e.g.,
political institutions, polarization) trigger different organizational choices, and how these
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affect parties’ electoral performance. The internal organization of a party shapes the be-
havior of the actors operating within it. Disregarding how features of the electoral envi-
ronment feed back into parties’ internal organization can lead to empirically understate
the consequence of institutional changes.
I develop this framework in the first paper, “Electoral Competition and Factional Sab-
otage,” which proposes a model of electoral competition where parties are internally di-
vided into factions that compete over rents and ideological positioning. A party’s internal
organization is conceptualized as the way factions are organized given the competitive
environment in which the party operates. That is, parties change their internal organi-
zation by promising factions different rewards depending on whether the party wins or
loses the election.
The model conceives a party’s internal organization as being driven by factional logics,
taking a stance against the unitary actor assumption that characterizes most formal work
in political science. Factions have always been an essential component of political parties,
and critical for determining their internal organization. Party members differ in their
views on party strategy and policy preferences. Since individual members are typically
not able to gain control over the party, factions emerge as a way for individuals with
similar preferences and goals to gain influence over internal decision-making.
This process then generates a public good provision problem within the party. On
the one hand, factions need to cooperate and work together for the party in order to
win elections and obtain electoral spoils. On the other, factions face the temptation to
free-ride on this public good provision, and fight each other to gain a larger share of the
spoils. Parties take into account factions’ incentives, and design their internal institutions
to maximize their electoral goals.
What strategies do parties typically adopt to motivate factions? The first paper presents
the case of the Italian Christian Democratic Party (DC) and the Japanese Liberal Demo-
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cratic Party (LDP), historically identified as the most stable factionalized parties across
democratic systems. In both examples, factions’ relative power determined the distribu-
tion of electoral spoils, the main driver of factional action. In the DC case, the spoils al-
location method followed an explicit formula according to which cabinet positions were
distributed among factions in proportion to the number of party members each faction
had (Venditti, 2016). The allocation of cabinet positions in the LDP consisted of dividing
the electoral spoils proportionally among factions and giving a premium to the largest
factions (Browne and Kim, 2003, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 2009).
Motivated by this evidence, I formalize party organization by analyzing different in-
centive schemes that reward factions’ electoral campaigning effort. The model studies
how different forms of party organization affect factions’ incentives to sabotage each
other. Furthermore, the model allows to study how changes in the electoral environment
affect the equilibrium party organization and, in turn, factions’ incentives. Such changes
might be institutional (e.g., electoral reforms) or non-institutional (e.g., an increase in ide-
ological polarization), and have implications that I discuss in what follows.
1.2 The Electoral Environment: Power Sharing and Ideological Polarization
The framework presented in the first paper allows to study several questions of interest.
In the model, factions decide how much to invest in campaigning activities to support
the party — e.g., constituency service that increases party valence —, and how much
to sabotage each other to obtain more power within the party. The model then focuses
on what external conditions facilitate or prevent factional sabotage, which widely affects
most parties.
One set of results show that factional sabotage varies with inter-party power-sharing.
In equilibrium, factions work more for the party as the political system resembles a ma-
joritarian democracy (that is, as inter-party power-sharing decreases). Conversely, the
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more the system reflects a consensus democracy, granting power to the losing party, the
more factions sabotage each other, as the incentives to focus on the intra-party contest
increase. Several constitutional design scholars warn against certain features of winner-
take-all electoral systems (Tsebelis, 1995, Powell Jr, 2000, Golder and Ferland, 2017). The
model suggests to consider the overlooked element of intra-party incentives generated
by institutions when comparing different democratic systems.
Results also show how the organization of a party and factions’ behavior are affected
by opposing parties, and by party ideological polarization. An increase in polarization
corresponds in the model to an increase in the level of divergence between two competing
parties’ platforms. As polarization increases, I find that factions in both parties campaign
more for the party: this is because polarization raises the electoral stakes (the cost of
electoral defeat), thus increasing factions’ incentives to work for the party and reducing
intra-party sabotage.
However, when one of the parties has an electoral advantage given by its platform’s
proximity to the median voter’s preferences, an increase in polarization affects differently
the more moderate (advantaged) and the more extreme (trailing) party. In particular, fac-
tions in the moderate party campaign more than those in the more extreme party, which
engage more in sabotaging activities. Thus, the model suggests that — in the presence
of electoral imbalance — intra-party competition should be more severe in trailing par-
ties and when parties weaken electorally, a proposition tested in the second paper of the
dissertation (“Politics by Denunciation”) with novel data from Italy.
The theoretical analysis of the first paper leaves unanswered several questions con-
cerning the optimal internal organization parties should adopt. Because the model anal-
yses a general equilibrium where two strategic parties (and factions within parties) best
respond to each other’s party organization, several simplifying assumptions on the latter
are warranted. In particular, the model assumes that factions’ participation constraints
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are always satisfied and that parties choose among a set of anonymous incentive schemes
— i.e., the rewards offered to factions do not depend on the faction’s identity.
In a related paper not included in this thesis, “Power Sharing, Mobilization, and Party
Organization,” with Carlo Prato, we consider a broader set of incentive schemes parties
can choose from, and analyze how parties’ optimal internal organization changes with the
electoral environment. A party organization determines the degree of intra-party power
sharing, which can be empirically measured with indicators such as leadership autonomy
or candidate selection’s centralization.
The paper identifies conditions under which winner-take-all institutional settings pro-
duce egalitarian internal party organizations, thus documenting an inverse relationship
between inter-party power sharing and intra-party power sharing. This result, we show,
only holds for parties with low baseline electoral strength, and it implies that we should
expect larger parties to have, ceteris paribus, less internal power sharing. This is consistent
with empirical evidence documenting that leadership positions in larger parties (both in
terms of members and legislators) display higher autonomy (Poguntke et al., 2016).
Another implication of the model is that, averaging across parties within the same
political system, intra-party power sharing should be higher in systems with lower inter-
party power sharing. These systems are characterized by institutions such as dispropor-
tional electoral rules, weak legislative checks on the executive (no confidence require-
ment), no separation of origin between executive and legislative, and simple majority
requirements (as opposite to super-majority) for the adoption of key legislative decisions.
1.3 Testing Predictions with Novel Data: the Italian Party System
The model in the first paper predicts that, when a party weakens electorally, factions’ in-
centives move from campaigning for the party to sabotaging each other to obtain a higher
share of the party’s electoral spoils. A testable implication of this result is the emergence
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of political scandals triggered internally as a product of factional sabotage. Besides re-
sulting from the opposition’s attacks, political scandals can emerge as a consequence of
intra-party competition, where party insiders leak information on copartisans’ misdeeds
in order to gain power within the party. If factional competition can trigger the outbreak
of scandals, then the model suggests that these are more likely to emerge when parties
weaken, as factions are engaged in a contest for power.
I test this implication in the second paper of my dissertation, “Politics by Denuncia-
tion,” with Andrea Ceron, where we study political scandals through their denunciation
using original data on judicial investigation of Italian MPs involved in various misbehav-
iors. The paper provides novel evidence that political enemies can strategically trigger
judicial investigations of MPs.
Judicial prosecution of politicians constitutes a prominent source of political scandals.
While the opinion that political enemies initiate judicial investigations (typically by leak-
ing crucial information) is popular, empirical evidence is intrinsically hard to gather. Data
on judicial investigations is often limited to whether an investigation took place or not,
and whether it ended in a conviction. As for political enemies, typically what is observ-
able is their reaction to the investigation, for example through public statements con-
demning the investigated politician.
We take advantage of a unique source of data on political corruption to study the
political nature of judicial investigations. We hypothesize that political attacks through
investigations depend on the electoral performance of the accused MP’s party. These
attacks could be initiated by members of opposing factions within the same party who
seek opportunities to achieve more power through internal sabotage, as implied by the
first paper. Alternatively, it could be that members of opposing parties use investigations
for their political gain, either because they benefit from replacing the attacked MP with
an ally, or because they benefit from weakening the opposing party’s reputation.
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Italy represents an unparalleled opportunity to study the politics behind judicial in-
vestigations for several reasons. First, the high number of parties (on average, ten for
each legislation) and factions (on average, three for each party). Second, the high number
of general elections held in the period covered. Third, and most importantly, the rich de-
tails included in the investigation documents. Our dataset is composed of 1125 “requests
to proceed” with an investigation against an MP sent by public prosecutor offices to the
Chamber of Deputies from 1983 to 2019. The uniqueness of the data we collected lies in
the revelation of the source (or whistle-blower) — often another politician — behind the
investigation, thanks to which we can provide evidence in favor of a political use of de-
nunciations. Among the RAPs in our dataset, 398 specify in the official document that the
whistle-blower is another politician or a member of a political organization or association.
A recent literature has tried to understand the strategic determinants of political scan-
dals. The second paper contributes to the literature by providing the first existing dataset
that investigates politically-driven denunciations where the identity of political whistle-
blowers is known. This allows to trace the political process underlying judicial investiga-
tions of politicians, which typically lead to scandals.
In line with our hypothesis, we find that the use of denunciation is elastic to changes
in the electoral odds: MPs whose parties weaken electorally are more likely to suffer
scandals that are initiated by political enemies.
More broadly, the evidence in the second paper allows us to derive some insights on
the sustainability of party systems. The loss of popularity of mainstream Italian parties
made (political and non-political) investigations possible, which in turn resulted in the
dissolution of the existing party system. Judicial activity investigating MPs became a
salient issue after 1992, when the Mani Pulite (Clean Hands) judicial inquiry shed light
on the illegal links between politics and business and revealed the political corruption
permeating the political system, which resulted in the Tangentopoli corruption scandal
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and in the end of the First Republic.
A widely shared view is that the endeavor undertook by the Italian public prosecu-
tors was only possible because of the profound crisis that affected the dominant political
parties of the First Republic.1 Indeed, the Italian political system started to face broad
transformations in the 1980s. After decades of party system stability and dominance of
the Christian Democracy, new cleavages transformed the political space, opening oppor-
tunities for new populist parties such as the Northern League which partially originated
as a reaction to the “cartelization” that characterized the First Republic. The Tangen-
topoli investigation and the resulting crisis of the Italian party system would not have
been possible in the previous balance of power that characterized parties in most of the
First Republic.
1.4 From Intra-Party to Inter-Party Organization Choice
Most of the empirically documented dispersion in parties’ organization structure takes
place in multi-party systems. When elections involve more than two parties, forming
electoral alliances becomes a fundamental aspect of party organization. Empirically, most
multi-party systems are extremely “liquid” (Powell Jr, 2000, Golder and Ferland, 2017):
parties form and leave temporary coalitions at all times. The two main right-wing Spanish
parties recently formed a pre-electoral coalition before the 2020 regional Basque Country
elections to prevent the division of the right-wing vote and avoid the Socialist Party’s
majority. Similarly, recent evidence from Mexican and Finnish local elections shows that
parties form pre-electoral alliances to remove entrenched incumbent parties from office
(Frey, López-Moctezuma and Montero, 2021, Hortala-Vallve, Meriläinen and Tukiainen,
2021).
1 Cf. Andrea Pamparana’s documentary, ‘Mani Pulite’, which provides a collection of interviews of sev-
eral influential sources connected to the investigations and the political events of those years.
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Besides forming temporary coalitions, parties also merge into new entities. The merger
between the Progressive-Conservative (PC) and the Canadian Alliance parties in 2003
created a new right-wing formation that altered the Canadian party system. The Italian
political landscape completely changed in 2007, when mergers occurred across the entire
ideological spectrum. The first merger occurred within the Left between April and Oc-
tober 2007, when the Democratici di Sinistra — the largest of the successor parties of the
former Partito Comunista Italiano — merged with La Margherita to form the Democratic
Party (PD). A few months later, Berlusconi’s Forza Italia merged with the right-wing Al-
leanza Nazionale to form the Popolo della Libertà in November. These movements affect
parties’ electoral success and the stability of party systems.
Despite the evidence showing that parties across the world are increasingly seen to
join forces before election — adopting various governance configurations — the existing
theoretical literature essentially treats political parties as fixed. This is unfortunate, as
understanding different forms of inter-party cooperation is crucial for anticipating how
party systems might develop.
In the third paper of the dissertation, “Does Electoral Volatility Beget Strong Alliances?
A Theory of Multi-Party Competition,” I present a model of electoral competition in
which parties can form alliances before elections. The choice over party organization is
formalized with parties’ decision of forming different types of alliances. Parties can join
flexible alliances, such as pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) which allow them to keep their
separate identities, or more binding ones such as mergers, whereby constituent parties
form new political entities.
This framework allows to study which conditions of the electoral environment (e.g.,
electoral volatility, power sharing institutions) trigger different organizational choices,
and how these affect parties’ electoral performance. The main intuition of the model is
that parties’ organizational choice over different forms of alliances crucially depends on
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electoral volatility, which reflects the extent to which voters’ preferences change between
subsequent elections.
The fundamental trade-off that parties face in the model is dynamic. On the one hand,
mergers insure constituent parties against unfavorable shifts in the electorate’s prefer-
ences, while at the cost of losing the opportunity to join more advantageous coalitions
in the future. On the other, alliances that allow parties to maintain their identity offer
flexibility to respond to future changes in voters’ preferences.
Intuitively, the model shows that when electoral volatility is low enough (e.g., when
voters are highly partisan), in equilibrium parties form flexible alliances such as PECs.
Conversely, as voters’ preferences become more volatile, parties choose to form strong al-
liances such as mergers. This result is in line with the empirical observation that mergers
are more likely to form in the early years of democratic regimes, which are characterized
by electoral instability (Kitschelt et al., 1999, Ibenskas and Sikk, 2017).
Results also show how this central trade-off varies with inter-party power sharing (Li-
jphart, 1984). In particular, at least some degree of power concentration is needed to trig-
ger mergers and pre-electoral coalitions. Intuitively, under consensual democracies that
share power among all parties, minority parties do not need to join pre-electoral alliances
to have their voices heard in the policy-making process. However, as power gets increas-
ingly concentrated in the hands of the winner of the election, parties need to join forces
and both PECs and mergers can emerge in equilibrium. Examples of a decrease in power
sharing are changes in the electoral system (e.g., from proportional to winner-take-all),
or institutional changes holding fixed the electoral system’s proportionality (e.g., from
legislative-executive balance to executive dominance).
Finally, the third paper provides novel insights for the study of party system stability.
The literature has often linked electoral volatility to unstable party systems, and several
studies even use measures of electoral volatility as an indicator of party system instabil-
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ity (for an overview, see Tavits, 2008). However, by assuming that a volatile electorate is
responsible for system instability, this approach overlooks endogenous changes in party
organization as a reaction to electoral volatility. Similarly to the theoretical framework
introduced in the first paper, this model suggests to take into account parties’ strategic
organizational choices to avoid omitted variable bias when evaluating the relation be-
tween electoral volatility and party system stability.
1.5 Gathering Takeaways
The main methodological contribution of this dissertation is to analyze party organiza-
tion as an endogenous response of strategic actors to the electoral environment in which
they operate. This approach generates substantively important insights that can be sum-
marized as follows.
First, various theoretical results in the dissertation highlight the importance of con-
sidering variation in party organization in the study of institutional change, and in par-
ticular of institutional power sharing. For instance, consider an increase in inter-party
power sharing. The model in the first paper shows that such an increase leads to less co-
operative factions that sabotage each other more. Such a change might also lead to more
centralized internal party organizations, highlighting an inverse relation between inter-
party and intra-party power sharing institutions. Furthermore, the third paper shows
that, when moving to organizational choices across parties, an increase in power sharing
can deter the formation of pre-electoral alliances.
Second, the papers in this dissertation contribute to our understanding of party sys-
tem stability. The first paper shows that factional competition should increase as parties
weaken electorally. This finding is consistent with the high levels of intra-party compe-
tition, and resulting corruption scandals, which doomed the Christian Democratic party
and contributed to end the Italian First Republic. It is also consistent with the evidence
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in the second paper showing that weakening parties induce politicians to engage in pol-
itics by denunciation, triggering the dissolution of the existing party system. Finally,
the third paper provides novel insights and implications for the process of party system
stabilization. Binding alliances such as mergers can reduce excessive party system frag-
mentation by forming parties that are stable in time. By considering how factors such as
electoral volatility and institutional power sharing affect the formation of mergers and
pre-electoral coalitions, the paper suggests when to expect a party system to stabilize.
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Chapter 2: Electoral Competition and Factional Sabotage
Sabotage is an undeniable fact of party life. Examples abound across different times
and places. Intra-party sabotage permeated one of the most highly factionalized parties
of all times, the Christian Democratic party (DC) that ruled Italy from the aftermath of
World War II until the 1990s, contributing to its demise in 1994.1 This intense factional
competition constituted a fundamental root of the corruption that caused the end of the
Italian “First Republic” (Golden and Chang, 2001). More recently, a leaked internal report
provided evidence of factionalism and sabotage that took place during Jeremy Corbyn’s
four-year tenure as leader of the Labour Party.2 In the wake of the evidence, several
members of Corbyn’s faction maintained that the party would have won in 2017 absent
sabotage.3
Democracy works differently in the presence of factional competition than in the ab-
sence. Warring factions take away resources that parties can otherwise devote to elec-
toral competition, thereby affecting electoral results and final policy outcomes.4 Despite
the pervasiveness of factional competition across a variety of political systems, little is
known about the conditions facilitating sabotage, or the strategies parties adopt to con-
1 The party imploded as a consequence of “Tangentopoli,” one of the biggest corruption scandals of all
times (Waters, 1994).
2 See Mason, R. (2020) ‘Hostility to Corbyn curbed Labour efforts to tackle antisemitism, says
leaked report,’ The Guardian, 12 April. Link to original report: https://cryptome.org/2020/04/Labour-
Antisemitism-Report.pdf.
3 Link to Labour Party MP’s tweet: https://twitter.com/RichardBurgon/status/1249461680834256898.
4 Since the American Founding Fathers, several authors have regarded factions as potentially danger-
ous. In Federalist 10, Madison outlines the dangers that factionalist interests can pose to political unions
(Madison, 1787). Similarly, V. O. Key, as cited in Boucek (2009), blamed factions for encouraging favoritism
and graft among elected officials (Key, 1949).
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tain it. Identifying these conditions is necessary to understand better political parties,
and ultimately the sustainability of political systems. Does an increase in party polariza-
tion alleviate or exacerbate factional competition? What are the institutional features of
the electoral system that help to promote cooperation among factions? Given factions’
incentives, how do party rules change to limit sabotage and foster cooperation?
To answer these questions, the paper introduces factional competition in a model of
elections between two parties. The model identifies features of the electoral environment
that alleviate intra-party sabotage, and shows how the party organization changes to limit
it, thus maximizing the chances of winning the election. Features of the competitive en-
vironment such as ideological polarization and electoral institutions affect factions’ in-
centives to sabotage each other instead of mobilizing towards the party’s common good.
Factions’ incentives are taken into account by the party, which changes its organization
accordingly.
What strategies can parties adopt to motivate factions? Historically, within both the
Italian DC and the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) — identified as the most
stable factionalized parties across democratic systems (Bettcher, 2005) — factions’ relative
power determined the distribution of electoral spoils, the main driver of factional action.
In the DC case, the spoils allocation method followed an explicit formula according to
which cabinet positions were distributed among factions in proportion to the number of
party members each faction had.5 Motivated by this evidence, this paper formalizes the
concept of party organization by analyzing different incentive schemes that reward the
electoral campaigning effort of factions. In the model, factions decide how much to invest
in campaigning activities to support the party — e.g., constituency service that increases
party valence —, and how much to sabotage each other to obtain more power within the
5 The method refers to the “Cencelli Manual”, which since then became a common political idiom (Ven-
ditti, 2016). Section 2.1 illustrates the relevance of the manual, and describes in more detail the Italian and
Japanese factions.
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party. Sabotage is defined as a range of activities that increase a faction’s relative power
within the party and produce negative externalities against other factions.
The goal of each party is to win the general election. Party platforms are fixed, and
parties incentivize factions to invest in campaigning activities to increase the odds of win-
ning. Each party controls electoral spoils (e.g., cabinet positions, assignment to commit-
tees) and distributes them among factions without leaving resources on the table. The
share of electoral spoils obtained by each party is determined by the amount of power-
sharing of the electoral environment (Lijphart, 1984): majoritarian democracies concen-
trate power in the hands of the winning parties, while in consensual democracies re-
sources are more evenly shared with minority parties.
Factional investment in campaigning activities is only imperfectly observable. Often
parties need to make organizational decisions based on imperfect measures of factional
performance (e.g., the party vote share in a given district or the number of members each
faction brings to the party). These performance indicators result in an internal ranking of
factions, based on which the party distributes electoral spoils. The ranking depends on
both campaigning effort and sabotage: the faction ranking higher could be the one that
worked more for the party or the one that focused on undermining the other faction.
Different features of the competitive environment might encourage a faction to obtain
more power by investing more in sabotage than campaigning effort. To capture which
of the two activities is more profitable to achieve a higher internal ranking, the model
introduces a parameter representing the relative effectiveness of sabotage to rank higher
within the party. This parameter refers to institutional and non-institutional factors that
make factions’ campaigning effort harder to reward by the party. For instance, having fac-
tions tied to electoral strongholds makes it easy for a party to reward campaigning effort,
by observing electoral performance in a given area. In this case, campaigning is “more
effective” than sabotage in achieving a high ranking. In the absence of such indicators
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(for example, when factions overlap geographically), the party might be constrained to
rely more on other measures that lend themselves to sabotage, such as the number of
members brought to the party by each faction.6
To maximize the chances of winning, each party specifies how much of the party’s
spoils are distributed to factions according to the internal ranking. In line with the empir-
ical evidence, I assume that parties commit to the internal ranking for rewarding factions.7
The rewards that the party can choose span from low-powered — i.e., both factions are
equally rewarded, independently of the ranking indicator — to high-powered — i.e., the
faction ranking higher obtains all the party spoils. When campaigning effort is more effec-
tive than sabotage to achieve a high ranking, choosing high-powered incentives amounts
to reward the faction that probabilistically invested more in campaigning activities, while
low-powered incentives discourage campaigning. Conversely, when sabotage is more
effective than campaigning activities, high powered incentives encourage sabotage.
The first set of results show that factional sabotage varies with inter-party power-
sharing. In equilibrium, factions work more for the party as the political system resembles
a majoritarian democracy (that is, as inter-party power-sharing decreases). Conversely,
the more the system reflects a consensus democracy, granting power to the losing party,
the more factions sabotage each other, as the incentives to focus on the intra-party contest
increase. Several constitutional design scholars warn against certain features of winner-
take-all electoral systems (Tsebelis, 1995, Powell Jr, 2000, Golder and Ferland, 2017). This
result underscores the overlooked element of intra-party incentives generated by institu-
tions when comparing different democratic systems.
Factions’ equilibrium behavior changes with ideological polarization as well. I distin-
6 In order to increase their relative number of party memberships, factions of the Italian Democratic
Party used to engage in sabotaging activities such as impeding subscriptions to competing factions.
7 This assumption closely reflects portfolio allocation in both the Italian DC and the Japanese LDP, as
Section 2.1 illustrates.
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guish between polarization across parties and polarization across factions within the same
party, and show that the two have different implications. When parties’ platforms are dis-
tant from each other and the median voter is moderate, factions in the more extreme party
sabotage more than those in the moderate party, which instead campaign more to win the
election. Intuitively, a higher probability of victory is associated with a higher expected
payoff for factions in the moderate party, which invest more resources in campaigning.
However, when factions in the same party are ideologically distant, the extreme faction
invests more in campaigning than the moderate one. This happens because the stakes
of the election are greater for the more extreme faction, which suffers a higher ideologi-
cal cost from losing than the moderate one, which is ideologically closer to the opposing
party. This prediction resonates with the UK Labour party in the 2017 campaign, where
Corbyn’s faction devoted substantial resources to campaigning for the party, while the
moderate Labour MPs engaged in public hostility against Corbyn’s faction and its poli-
cies.
Given factions’ incentives, which rewards does the party choose in equilibrium? Intu-
itively, when campaigning effort is more effective than sabotage to obtain a high internal
ranking, high powered incentives are optimal: the faction with the highest internal rank-
ing obtains more electoral spoils. The method of allocation of cabinet positions in the
Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) before the 1994 electoral reform is consistent
with this prediction.8 Yet, sabotage could be more efficient than campaigning to obtain
a high internal ranking in some situations. In the Italian DC case, for instance, it was
easier for factions to deny cards to the opposing faction than to bring new members to
the party (Venditti, 2016). When this is the case, the party knows that the better-placed
faction is the one that (probabilistically) sabotaged more, and in equilibrium incentives
8 The method consisted in dividing proportionally the electoral spoils among factions and give a pre-




The model produces several empirical implications on the effect of electoral institu-
tions on intra-party competition. First, it suggests that an increase in inter-party power-
sharing can exacerbate competition within parties. Such change might refer to the elec-
toral system (e.g., from winner-take-all to proportional), or an institutional change hold-
ing fixed the electoral system’s proportionality (e.g., from executive dominance to legislative-
executive balance). Second, features of the electoral systems such as the use of preference
votes — where voters can indicate a preference for candidates on the ballot — can increase
the visibility of factional campaigning effort and its relative effectiveness to rank higher
within the party.9 The literature on personal vote states that the use of preference votes in-
creases intra-party competition at the individual candidate level (Carey and Shugart, 1995),
although Carroll and Nalepa (2020) show that electoral systems in which parties have
less control over member’s electoral rank can encourage greater policy agreement. This
model suggests that intra-party competition could be reduced at the factional level, thus
uncovering potential omitted variable bias in the correlation between weak parties and
open list PR systems.
This paper provides a novel theoretical framework to understand how factional com-
petition shapes the life of a party — its internal institutions, campaigning capacity, and
policy platforms. As such, it relates to the theoretical literature analyzing the role of fac-
tions within parties (Persico, Pueblita and Silverman, 2011, Dewan and Squintani, 2016,
Izzo, 2018). In addition to providing a new framework for the analysis of intra-party or-
ganization, the model advances this literature by studying intra-party sabotage, which
empirically is often driven by factional divisions (Zariski, 1965, Brass, 1966, Cox and
Rosenbluth, 1994, Mershon, 2001b, Balán, 2011, Nellis, 2019).
9 As argued in Section 2.5, by observing candidates’ preference votes the party could condition factions’
rewards on the number of preference votes that factions’ candidates get. This in turn could incentivize
factions to campaign for the party.
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While most of the existing theoretical literature on intra-party organization focuses on
primaries (e.g., Adams and Merrill, 2008, Serra, 2011, Ting, Hirano and Snyder Jr, 2018),
this model conceptualizes a party’s internal organization as the degree of power-sharing
among its factions. As such, the model closely relates to a small theoretical literature
studying party organizations alternative to primaries. In a seminar contribution, Cail-
laud and Tirole (2002) compare primaries to hierarchical internal organizations and study
their effect on electoral effectiveness in majoritarian elections; Crutzen, Castanheira and
Sahuguet (2010) extend this framework to embed the analysis of intra-party organization
into an electoral setting with two parties competing for office. In the context of propor-
tional representation systems, Buisseret et al. (2017) study how political parties structure
candidate selection by ranking candidates on lists. I contribute to this literature by for-
malizing with contract theory tools the agency relation among the central party leader-
ship and factions within parties. Second, I embed this framework in a probabilistic voting
model of electoral competition, where electoral imbalance is endogenously provided by
intra-party competition among factions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 provides a historical
account of factional dynamics in the Italian Christian Democratic party and the Japanese
Liberal Democratic Party. Section 2.2-2.4 describe the model and its results. Section 2.5
proposes some empirical implications and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.1 Portfolio Allocation Within Parties: Factions in Italy and Japan
This section provides a brief historical account of the Italian Christian Democratic
Party (DC) and the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Both parties based the dis-
tribution of cabinet portfolios on factions’ relative power: in the DC case, the allocation
method followed an explicit rule named “Cencelli manual” (Venditti, 2016).
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2.1.1 Italian Christian Democratic Party
The Cencelli manual is a weight calculation method invented in 1968 by Massimiliano
Cencelli. The method was adopted to calculate how many ministries and undersecre-
taries the DC would get in the upcoming election, and it was used to assign offices to
factions for decades. The calculations of all the governments formed after 1968 are col-
lected in hundreds of pages with factional denominations as they form, break up and
recompose, their absolute and percentage weight, the final number of ministries and un-
der secretaries, and finally the names of ministries and under secretaries of all the formed
governments.
Figure 2.1, taken from the original manual, provides an illustration of the method.10
The baseline for calculating a faction’s relative weight is given by the percentage of party
members belonging to each faction (in the picture, the bars).11 Based on the percentage
obtained, the party assigns cabinet positions to each faction (triangles). Thus, it is clear
that factions are incentivized to obtain as many memberships as possible and, as history
shows, by any means.
The Cencelli Manual reflects the phase of highest internal fractionalization of the DC
(the 1960s-70s), with factions fighting each other to obtain more seats (Sartori, 1971). His-
torical accounts of sabotage inside the party were closely related to the widespread phe-
nomenon of “membership card inflation” (Venditti, 2016), which plagued the party since
the 1960s. A common way used to inflate membership cards was to assign memberships
to individuals who either were unaware, dead, or had emigrated.12 Another — perhaps
more straightforward — sabotaging technique was to impede subscriptions to competing
10 The original table is reported in the Appendix.
11 In the model, this percentage corresponds to the outcome of an internal ranking of factions, which
depends on their choice of effort and sabotage.
12 In 1976, two DC senators revealed that more than 50% of membership cards were false, “corresponding
to people who either did not exist or never asked to be members of the party” (Venditti, 2016).
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Figure 2.1: Portfolio Allocation Rule in Italian Christian Democracy (1973). The bars
represent the percentage of party members belonging to each faction composing the DC in
1973. Based on this percentage, the total number of cabinet positions is divided among the
party factions. The triangles show the total number of members of each faction obtaining
a cabinet position.
factions with delays and procedural complications (Venditti, 2016).13 These sabotaging
activities affected the electoral performance of the DC, which saw its power gradually
reduced until the party’s demise in 1994.
A critical member of the old faction Dorotea, Giuseppe Zamberletti, defined the man-
ual as “the organization chart of the Christian Democratic company.” The party is de-
scribed as a holding company, where more membership cards have the right to more
power, regardless of other factors such as valence, honesty, and administration quality.
All the governments closely followed the Cencelli manual in assigning office positions.
13 To understand how widespread these phenomena were, it is worth looking at what happened in 1976,
when the party took two measures: the first forced all party representatives to immediately accept requests
of registration to the party, while the second increased the membership fee. Consequently, the DC members
that year dropped by 360,000 units (21.2%), and newly registered members increased from 6.1% to 15.1%.
This event provides evidence that there was indeed a membership card inflation and many obtained a card
that was before denied by competing factions.
23
If the proportions were not correct (i.e., not following the manual’s predictions), the pe-
nalized factions would jeopardize the government while officially pretending to be loyal.
Indeed, there have been occurrences of “franchi tiratori” — MPs voting against the gov-
ernment in secret votes because excluded from power-sharing in violation of the Cencelli
manual (Venditti, 2016).
2.1.2 Factions in the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party
While the manual employed by the Italian DC is a unique case of portfolio distribution
that relies on explicit mathematical calculations, other parties rely on similar measures to
quantify the value of cabinet posts and assign them to internal factions. One prominent
example is the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP): before the electoral reform of
1993, government formation and portfolio allocation were internally decided among fac-
tions (Sartori, 2005, Kohno, 1992, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 2009).
The early LDP factions were personalistic organizations aimed at electing party lead-
ers, and factional size fluctuated considerably with the leaders’ retirement or death. In
time, turnover decreased until defections from factions almost ceased: after 1972, politi-
cians’ fates were tied to the chosen faction until retirement, and changing faction was
rare. Moreover, from the 1980s onwards factions were not personalistic anymore; rather,
the leader became increasingly seen as an agent for the faction (Bettcher, 2005). Being co-
hesive and stable, factions acted as unitary actors and the party leadership as a selectorate
maximizing factions’ collective good.
The allocation of cabinet positions in the LDP consisted of dividing the electoral spoils
proportionally among factions and giving a premium to the largest factions (Browne and
Kim, 2003, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 2009). Since the late 1960s, the number of ministe-
rial positions obtained by each faction has corresponded closely to their relative strength
within the party (measured by factions’ membership in the Diet), and by the mid-1980s
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this method of portfolio allocation was strictly applied. Despite having the opportunity
to revise the proposal of cabinet posts (by asking for a leadership change, leaving the
party, or calling for a vote of no-confidence), no disagreement ever happened (Adachi
and Watanabe, 2007). Moreover, historically no cabinet formation required more than
three days, which is a surprisingly short period given that the average length of gov-
ernment formation process in Western Europe is 28 days (Ecker and Meyer, 2015). This
evidence suggests how portfolio allocation was a contract stipulated among LDP factions
before the realization of the electoral outcome.
Intra-party conflict frequently happened within the LDP, especially before the elec-
toral system’s reform in 1994, which decreased the district magnitude to a single-member
district. Before 1994 too many candidates from different factions were selected to run in
each district, and competition was so destructive that the term tomodaore (going down to-
gether) was coined to refer to the problem of overnomination, which often led to failure to
elect as many representatives as a unified party could have elected (Cox and Rosenbluth,
1996, Nemoto, Pekkanen and Krauss, 2014).
2.2 The Model
Consider a probabilistic model of electoral competition between two parties, left and
right. There are three players in the left party: two factions denoted by L1, L2 and a
party leader L (she). Players in the right party are denoted by R1, R2 and R respectively.
Denote left’s preferred platform by xL ∈ R, which is implemented when the party wins
the election (the same holds for right). Both platforms (xL, xR) are common knowledge
and fixed.14 There exists a representative voter, denoted by V , who votes for left or right.
The voter’s ideal point is denoted by xV . Without loss of generality, let xV = 0, and
xL < xV < xR. For exposition purposes in what follows I will refer to party left (the
14 The latter assumption is relaxed in Subsection 2.4.1, which analyses endogenous platforms.
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description of actors in right is analogous).
A faction is a unitary team of politicians who share the same ideological preferences:
let xLi denote the policy preferred by faction Li, where i = 1,2. I start by assuming that




lax this assumption in Section 2.4. Each faction can use its resources to increase the party
electoral chances by exerting campaigning effort, denoted by eLi , and/or to sabotage the
other faction, aLi . Both actions are costly: C(e
L
i ) = (e
L
i )




sumption of convex costs reflects the decreasing returns associated to each activity: while
initially it is easy to find compromising material to sabotage the other faction and good
slogans to convince voters, at the margin more resources are needed to have a substantial
impact on the campaign.
The goal of the model is to understand which circumstances encourage campaigning
effort and which encourage sabotage: in order to do so in a tractable way, the total amount
of sabotage is assumed to be equal to aLi = 1 − e
L
i — that is, all the resources that are not
used to promote the party are invested in damaging the rival faction (this assumption
is relaxed in the Appendix). The binding budget constraint together with convex costs
implies that a positive level of sabotage is cost efficient: the focus will be on how the
equilibrium investment in effort and sabotage changes with parameters of interest.
The party leader — who stands for the party organization — only cares about winning
the election.15 The leader incentivizes factions to invest in campaigning for the party by
promising rewards contingent on the electoral outcome. Rewards depend on the total
amount of electoral spoils, normalized to one: the winning party gets a share of spoils α,
where α ∈ [1/2,1], and the losing party gets (1 − α). The parameter α refers to the degree
of inter-party power-sharing (Lijphart, 1984, Herrera, Morelli and Palfrey, 2014). I use the
15 The party leader can be thought of representing the central party organization. As such, the leader
does not have ideological preferences and is above factions. Subsection 2.4.1 discusses how the leader would
tailor the party policy platform to factions’ preferences if she belonged to a particular faction.
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short-hand “majoritarian democracies” to refer to systems with high α, and “consensus
democracies” to refer to systems with low α.
The party leader does not directly observe factions’ campaigning effort: L observes
a relative ranking indicator that can take two values, sL ∈ {1,2}. When sL = 1 faction
L1 is ranked higher than L2, and vice-versa when sL = 2. Both campaigning effort and
sabotage help factions to rank higher. Formally, the probability that faction L1 obtains a
higher rank than L2 is:
ρL1 = Pr{s













The parameter γ ∈ R+, which is common knowledge, reflects the relative effectiveness of
sabotage to rank higher: when γ > 1 sabotage is more effective than effort in achieving
a high internal ranking, while for γ < 1 investing in campaigning effort is more effec-
tive than sabotage.16 The parameter φ is a normalization ensuring that the probability is
bounded. The probability that faction L2 obtains a higher rank is simply ρL2 = 1 − ρ
L
1 .
Based on the indicator sL , the leader distributes among factions the share of electoral
spoils obtained contingent on the party winning (α) or losing the election (1−α) by assign-
ing a premium to the faction that ranks higher within the party (e.g., faction L1 if sL = 1). For-
mally, L assigns πLv to L1 if the left party wins, and πLd if it loses (the subscript v stands for
victory, while d for defeat). Premia are assumed to be non–negative — that is, the leader
can “punish” factions at most with zero incentives. Importantly, this assumption is moti-
vated by real-world instances where party leaders are de facto constrained by the existing
16 The parameter γ refers to institutional and non-institutional factors that make factions’ campaigning
effort more difficult to monitor and reward by the party. Section 2.5 presents some examples.
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measures of factional performance and have no other choice but to abide by them.1718
Rewards for factions in left satisfy the following budget constraint:
πLv + 2bLv = α (2.2)
πLd + 2b
L
d = 1 − α,
where bLv and bLd are baseline prizes offered to both factions in case of party victory and
defeat respectively. Given the leader’s budget constraint assumption (2.2), the value of




v = (α − πLv )/2 and the only relevant
choice for L is the vector of premia (πLd , π
L
v ).19 The leader chooses (πLd , π
L
v ) to maximize the
probability of winning the election, which is increasing in factions’ campaigning effort
and determined in equilibrium by the voter’s choice.
The voter’s payoff has two components: the first is a standard quadratic loss from
the distance from parties’ platform, the second depends on party’s valence, which refers
to all those attributes that are valued independently of ideology. Factions’ campaigning
activities such as constituency service increase the party’s appeal to voters by increasing
its valence. Formally, V ’s realized payoff if left wins is:







+ eL1 + e
L
2 . (2.3)
17 In the Italian DC case for instance, the leadership knew that a faction’s relative higher ranking —
corresponding to more membership cards brought to the party — was a symptom of its higher investment
in sabotaging activities, but still could not punish factions for bringing more members to the party.
18 The Appendix relaxes this assumption showing that results are robust to a setup where leaders can
punish the higher-ranked faction with a negative premium (i.e., rewarding the lower-ranked faction).
19 Given the budget constraint assumption, L’s incentive scheme can also be interpreted as the share of
spoils offered to each faction under the event of party victory and defeat. I distinguish between baseline
prizes and premia to reflect real instances of incentives used by parties. For instance, Browne and Kim
(2003) note that in the Japanese LDP “the more numerous positions, notably in the cabinet, were allocated in close
proportion to a faction’s membership in the Diet, whereas scarcer positions [...] were balanced among the very largest
factions”.
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Finally, before the election an exogenous shock that favors party R affects the voter’s






. I assume that ψ is small enough
to ensure a bounded probability of victory for both parties. The parameter ψ can be
interpreted as the importance of the electoral campaign: as ψ increases, the support of
the shock shrinks and factional campaigning activities (as well as party policy platforms)
become more salient to the voter.
Let πL = (πLd , π
L
v ) and eL = (eL1 , e
L
2 ). The payoff of faction Li can be expressed as:
uLi (e








− C(eLi ) − C(1 − e
L
i ), (2.4)
where x∗ ∈ {xL, xR} is the winning party’s platform, and the reward RLi (π
L,eL) is a func-
tion of the incentive scheme πL (which depends on factions’ effort eL).20 The expected
rewards from electoral victory and defeat are, respectively:
RLi (π
L,eL)|v = bLv + ρLi (e
L)πLv , (2.5)
RLi (π




That is, Li is rewarded with πLv (πLd ) only when it ranks higher than the other faction
(which happens with probability ρLi ), and the size of the reward is determined by the
electoral institutions (bLv + πLv > bLd + π
L
d , as α > 1/2).
The timing of the game is as follows: first, leaders announce an incentive scheme con-
tingent on the electoral outcome. Second, factions decide how much resources to invest
in campaigning and sabotage. Finally, elections are held, and prizes are distributed ac-
cording to the contract. A strategy for L maps from the internal ranking sL to an incentive
scheme (πLd , π
L
v ). For L1 and L2, a strategy is a mapping from the set of incentives to an
20 Notice that the reward function RLi (π
L,eL) also depends on πR and eR, which affect the incentive
scheme πL (this is omitted from the notation above for parsimony.
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allocation decision eL1 , e
L
2 (and analogously for R1 and R2). The voter votes for the party
that gives her the higher payoff. The solution concept is Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.
2.3 Equilibrium Analysis
In what follows I start by computing the voter’s decision, which determines the prob-
ability of each party winning the election. Given this winning probability, the expected
payoff of each faction is derived as a function of the other factions’ decision, and for each
possible incentive scheme offered by the leader. Finally, I compute the incentive scheme
chosen by the party leader, and characterize the equilibrium of the game.
The voter prefers party left if:
uV (eL1 , e
L
2 ; x




The probability that left wins the election is the probability that V prefers left. By the











L ) − uV (eR1 , eR2 ; xR) ] . (2.6)


































where the first term (expected payoff from winning the election) does not include an
ideological cost because xL1 = x
L . Notice that eL1 has two effects on factions’ expected
payoff: first, campaigning increases the party’s electoral chances via higher pL(e). Second,
eL1 enters the probability of ranking higher within the party (ρ
L
1 ): this component reflects
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the strategic tension faced by factions.
Depending on the value of γ, the probability of ranking higher could be increasing or
decreasing in campaigning: this follows from (2.1) and the assumption aLi = 1− e
L
i . When
γ < 1, campaigning effort helps winning the election and improves the odds of being
assigned a positive premium by the leader. The trade-off between campaigning effort
and sabotage arises when γ > 1: while sabotage increases the odds of a high internal
ranking (hence a higher share of spoils), campaigning helps the party to win the election.
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pLπLv + (1 − pL)πLd︸                          ︷︷                          ︸
Internal Incentive
]
+ 1− 2eL1 = 0, (2.7)
where the first term represents the marginal return of effort on winning the election while
keeping the competition inside the party fixed, and the second term corresponds to the
marginal return of effort on ranking higher within the party holding the electoral in-
centives fixed. The first term is always positive — i.e., factions’ campaigning always
improves the party’s electoral chances in the election. The sign of the internal incentive
term depends on whether sabotage is more effective than campaigning: when γ < 1 the
internal incentive term is positive (campaigning helps towards achieving a high rank-
ing), whereas it is negative when γ > 1 (sabotage is more effective than campaigning for
ranking higher).
The Appendix shows that each faction’s objective is concave, which implies that the
first-order condition above identifies the solution to the faction’s maximization problem.
The solution of the system of first-order conditions, one for each faction in each party,
determines factional effort as a best reply to the other factions’ efforts, for both incen-
tives schemes (πLd , π
L
v ) and (πRd , π
R
v ). For ease of notation, the following analysis refers to
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equilibrium effort as eL∗1 (and analogously for the other factions).
The leader chooses premia to maximize the probability of winning the election, which
is increasing in campaigning effort. Substituting the value of the voter’s realized payoffs



















How can the leader give each faction stake in the party’s electoral success? Let cam-
paigning effort be more effective than sabotage (γ < 1). The first result below shows that
in this case the leader gives the highest feasible premium (all the electoral spoils) to the
faction ranking higher, and the second faction is not rewarded (i.e., incentives are high
powered). By doing so, the leader increases factions’ incentives to campaign. Conversely,
when sabotage is more effective than campaigning effort (γ > 1) a positive premium to
the faction ranking higher incentivizes sabotage. In this case, the leader’s optimal strat-
egy is to set zero premia: that is, both factions receive an equal share of spoils for all the
election outcomes (hence incentives are low powered).
The first result derives the equilibrium when no party has an ex-ante electoral ad-
vantage over the other due to policy platforms. Since xL < 0 < xR, the assumption of
no electoral advantage means that either both parties’ platforms coincide with xV (i.e.,
xL = xR = 0), or that platforms are equidistant from it (xL = −xR). The assumption will be
relaxed in the next section, which analyses the equilibrium for any policy platforms such
that xL < 0 < xR. While less general, this first result is valuable because it yields a simple
closed-form solution for the equilibrium effort and intuitive comparative statics.
Proposition 2.1. Equilibrium without ex-ante Electoral Advantage. Suppose xL = −xR.
Then, the optimal incentives offered by L in equilibrium (and, symmetrically, by R) are (πL∗d , π
L∗
v ) =
(0,0) if γ > 1, and (πL∗d , π
L∗












if γ > 1
5 − γ + 2ψ
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if γ < 1
(2.9)
Proof. Unless otherwise stated, all proofs are collected in the Appendix. 
When sabotage is more effective than campaigning effort in achieving primacy within
the party (γ > 1) the leader’s optimal strategy is not to reward it, hence incentives are low
powered — i.e., the equilibrium incentive scheme has zero premia. Conversely, when
γ < 1 the equilibrium incentive scheme features high powered incentives. Intuitively, in
this case the incentives to exert campaigning effort arise from both the election and the
internal ranking indicator, while sabotage only hurts factional welfare. Hence, the party
leader designs the internal contest such that the faction with the higher internal ranking
is rewarded with the highest feasible premium (all the electoral spoils) — contingent on
the electoral outcome — and the second faction is not rewarded. By doing so, the leader
increases factions’ incentives to campaign for the party. This result is in line with standard
intuition from contest theory suggesting that the effort-maximizing incentive scheme is a
winner-take-all contest — i.e., high powered incentives are optimal in contests where the
probability of winning is increasing in effort (Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983).
The expression for the equilibrium campaigning effort eL∗ in Proposition 2.1 allows
us to directly check how factions’ campaigning effort changes in equilibrium with (i) the
amount of power sharing of the institutional setting (1 − α), (ii) the importance of the
electoral campaign (ψ), and (iii) parties’ ideological extremism (xL, xR).
Corollary 2.1. Electoral Environment. For all γ:
(i) factions’ campaigning effort (eL∗) increases with the importance of the electoral campaign
(ψ),
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(ii) eL∗ decreases with the proportionality — or amount of power granted to minorities — of
the institutional setting (1 − α).
The proof follows by inspection of the closed-form solution for equilibrium effort in
Proposition 2.1. Intuitively, when the support of the aggregate shock gets smaller (higher
ψ), the electoral outcome depends less on the random component and more on factional
campaigning effort. As a consequence, factional effort is more effective in influencing the
voter’s decision. Perhaps less intuitively, factional campaigning effort in equilibrium is
strictly increasing in α (or alternatively, factional sabotage is strictly decreasing in α): as
the power granted to minority parties increases (as α goes down), in equilibrium factions
invest more resources in sabotaging each other and less in campaigning for the party. In
the limit (α → 1/2), winning the election provides the same electoral spoils as losing,
which leads factions to focus on the competition within the party.
The effect of α on campaigning suggests a simple yet neglected relation between
inter-party and intra-party competition. Constitutional design scholars typically focus
on the incentives that institutions produce at the party level (Lijphart, 1984, Powell Jr,
2000): majoritarian democracies are associated with adversarial fights for power, con-
sensual democracies with bargaining and compromise across parties. Proposition 2.1
suggests that an institutional change in the electoral stakes can also affect competition
within parties. Notice that a change in α might refer to a change in the electoral system
(e.g., from winner-take-all to proportional), or to an institutional change holding fixed the
electoral system’s proportionality (e.g., from executive dominance to legislative-executive
balance). As such, the result applies to two-party as well as multi-party systems.
A similar mechanism could also arise through an increase in polarization, for which I
resort to the following working definition: polarization increases if xL decreases and xR
increases by the same amount, thus holding xL + xR constant.21 This ensures that any
21 Notice that this condition is trivially satisfied when no party has an ex-ante electoral advantage.
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increase in polarization does not change the identity of the (ex-ante) advantaged party,
and allows us to focus exclusively on the level of divergence between party platforms
(xL − xR). By increasing the stakes of the election, party polarization can motivate factions
to campaign for the party.
Corollary 2.2. Polarization. For all γ, factions’ campaigning effort (eL∗) increases with ideolog-
ical polarization: as the distance between xL and xR increases, factions invest more resources in
campaigning effort and less in sabotaging activities.
To see how polarization can affect factional behavior consider factions’ payoff from
losing the election in the following two cases. First, when xL = xR = 0, the ex-ante
probability of victory for each party is the same and factions do not suffer any ideological
cost from losing the election. When xL = −xR and xL, xR , 0, parties’ ex-ante winning
probability does not change but now factions suffer a cost from losing the election —
which is increasing in xL − xR. This increasing cost in turn implies that, as ideological
polarization increases, factions invest more resources in campaigning effort (refraining
from sabotaging each other), in order to avoid a costly unfavorable electoral outcome.
2.3.1 Introducing Electoral Imbalance
One question that arises when parties are heterogeneous in their ex-ante winning
probability is which factions campaign more for the party between those in the leading
and trailing party. To answer this question, I relax the assumption that party platforms
are equidistant from the voter’s preferred platform, thus allowing for ex-ante electoral
imbalance in parties’ electoral prospects.
The next result establishes the consequences of party ideological extremism on fac-
tional campaigning effort and parties’ electoral prospect, for any platform xL, xR such
that xL < 0 < xR. The first part of Proposition 2.2 generalizes the effect of polarization to
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the case of general platforms, showing that the comparative statics highlighted by Corol-
lary 2.2 continue to hold.
The second part of the result focuses on the difference between total campaigning
effort in left and right (2eL∗ − 2eR∗). When platforms are not equidistant from the median,
an increase in platforms’ extremism affects campaigning effort in equilibrium through an
additional channel: the change in the odds of winning the election. The result shows that,
when γ < 1, an increase in a party’s extremism — defined as the distance between the
party platform and the voter’s preferred platform — leads its factions to campaign less
than the other party’s factions. The next result assumes without loss of generality that the
ex-ante winning probability of left is lower than right: |xL | > |xR |.22
Proposition 2.2. Ideological Extremism.
(i) For all γ, factional campaigning effort in both parties (eL∗, eR∗) increases with polarization.




/∂ |xR | < 0 for all
xL . When γ > 1, factions in both parties campaign equally.
The intuition for the first part of Proposition 2.2 is analogous to that of Corollary 2.2:
when polarization (xL − xR) increases, factions’ expected payoff from losing decreases
because of the ideological loss they suffer. This in turn increases the marginal return from
exerting campaigning effort, to avoid the unfavorable event of an electoral defeat.
Proposition 2.2(ii) shows that, when γ < 1, factions in the moderate party campaign
more than those in the extreme party. Because γ < 1, in equilibrium incentives are high
powered (πL∗d = π
R∗




v = α). Since α > 1/2, the expected payoff from the
election is lower for L1, L2: i.e., the internal incentive term in the faction’s first-order con-
dition is lower for L1, L2 as in equilibrium pL(e∗) < 1/2. As xL moves away from xV , the
22 In the Appendix I derive the vector of equilibrium effort choices as the unique solution (in closed form)
of the system of factions’ first-order conditions. The closed form solution is omitted from the main text as
it does not provide further intuition than (2.9). The Appendix also shows that the equilibrium incentive
scheme is the same as the one derived in Proposition 2.1, when factions are equidistant from xV .
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left party’s expected payoff from the election decreases (via a lower winning probability),
which induces its factions to campaign less for the party. Conversely, factions in the more
moderate party campaign more in equilibrium, and the difference in parties’ total effort
is increasing in the extremism of the trailing party’s platform. Hence, trailing parties are
more likely to be hornets’ nests, with factions investing in sabotage rather than working
for the party.
Proposition 2.2(ii) also suggests that factional incentives to sabotage increase as the
party weakens. This prediction offers an unexplored explanation of observed empirical
patterns of intra-party competition. Golden and Chang (2001) identify political fights
within the Italian DC party as one of the main causes of the corruption scandals involv-
ing the party deputies. Plausibly, the increased political competition resulting from the
steady rise of the left and the associated loss of spoils faced by DC factions contributed to
increasing factional sabotage: as the stakes of the election decreased, the appeal of secur-
ing internal power became more important to factions.23 This explanation is consistent
with the high levels of intra-party competition, and resulting corruption scandals, that
doomed the DC party and contributed to end the Italian “First Republic”.
Finally, when γ > 1 all the premia are set to zero in equilibrium, and eL∗ = eR∗ re-
gardless of the distance between policy platforms. With zero premia, the internal incentive
term in the faction’s first-order condition is equal to zero, and the incentive to campaing
exclusively arises from the external incentive. The latter depends only on the difference
between the two party platforms and is the same for factions in left and right. Thus, when
γ > 1 and |xL | > |xR | both parties’ factions exert the same amount of campaigning in equi-
librium — even though left’s ex-ante winning probability is lower than the one of right —




/∂ |xL | in equilibrium is equal to zero.24
23 In particular, the rise of the left was triggered by the Socialist Party becoming more moderate in the
1970s and 1980s.




Finally, notice that belonging to an underdog party is always costly for factions. Let
WL be the welfare of factions in the left party, where
WL(xL) = pLα + (1 − pL)
[








(1 − e1)2 + (1 − e2)2
2
. (2.10)
Remark 2.1. Factions welfare is strictly decreasing in |xL |.
Ideological extremism hurts factional welfare via two channels: it decreases the prob-
ability of succeeding in the election and it increases the stakes of losing via a higher ideo-
logical cost.
So far I assumed that factions in the same party — having the same ideological prefer-
ences — suffer the same ideological cost for losing the election, and Proposition 2.2 shows
how campaigning effort in equilibrium changes across parties with ideological distance.
The next section relaxes this assumption and shows how campaigning effort changes as
a function of each faction’s ideological extremism.
2.4 Factions’ Ideological Heterogeneity
This section relaxes the assumption of factions’ homogeneous preferences within the
party. Without loss of generality, let faction L1 be more extreme than L2 (xL1 < x
L
2 <
0). I assume that the policy platform implemented by a party corresponds to the simple
average of its factions’ ideological bliss points, i.e., xL = (xL1 + x
L
2 )/2 (and symmetrically
for xR). Later in this section I relax this assumption and consider policy platforms as
weighted averages of factions’ bliss points, where the weights depend on factions’ relative
power.25 This assumption is based on the empirical observation that, comparing factions’
eR∗
)
/∂ |xL | < 0 generalizes for all values of γ. By allowing the party to punish the faction ranking higher
(rewarding the faction ranking lower) when γ > 1, negative premia create the same incentive to campaign
as high powered incentives in the case γ < 1.
25 In this extension weights are decided by the party leader, who can reward the higher ranking faction
with “policy concessions” (granting more influence in the party platform).
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ideal points with the overall party position, factions bound the party in its platform choice
(Ceron, 2012).
The next result illustrates the equilibrium when factions of the same party differ in
ideology, showing how polarization within parties affects factional incentives to campaign
for the party.
Proposition 2.3. Heterogeneous Factions. In equilibrium, ideologically extreme factions cam-
paign more than moderate ones, which instead devote more resources to sabotage. The equilib-
rium incentive scheme is analogous to the homogeneous case: (πL∗d , π
L∗
v ) = (0,0) if γ > 1, and
(πL∗d , π
L∗
v ) = (1 − α,α) if γ < 1.
Proposition 2.3 demonstrates that when factions in the same party do not share the
same ideological position, the extreme faction invests more in the electoral campaign than
the moderate one, which sabotages more instead. Intuitively, the moderate faction L2 is
ideologically closer to right’s bliss point than the extreme one L1, thus suffering a lower
cost for losing the election. As a consequence, L2 invests more resources into sabotaging
the rival faction.
This result underscores the different effect that ideological polarization produces within
and across parties. Proposition 2.2 has shown that, when parties are polarized, factions
in the more extreme party sabotage more than factions in the leading, moderate party. In
contrast, Proposition 2.3 shows that, when factions within the same party are polarized,
the more extreme faction invests more in campaigning than the moderate faction. Intu-
itively, as a faction becomes more extreme the expected payoff of both factions decreases
(via a lower winning probability), leading to a reduction in campaigning by both factions.
Yet, campaigning decreases asymmetrically: the extreme faction campaigns more because
the stakes of the election are greater, suffering a higher ideological loss from losing.
This logic is consistent with the different behavior of the extreme and moderate fac-
tions of the Labour Party during the 2017 UK electoral campaign. There is evidence that
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the Labour Left “largely relied on positive campaigning and mobilized grassroots ac-
tivism to an extent rarely seen before, ensuring that it inspired new voters” (Bell, 2018).
For example, the grassroots movement “Momentum” helped the Labour Party win 32
new seats in the 2017 election, even supporting moderate candidates.26 Conversely, mod-
erate Labour MPs extensively engaged in sabotage against Corbyn’s campaign, as re-
cently described in an internal report of the Labour Party.27
The reader might wonder why the leader would commit to using the ranking indicator
at all in this case, given that she would be strictly better off rewarding the faction which
exerted more effort (the more extreme faction, in equilibrium). That is, L would want to
design a non-anonymous contract that punishes sabotage more for the moderate faction.
However, non-anonymous incentive schemes are typically not feasible: this assumption
is not realistic in all those cases where leaders are constrained by party legal rules and
formal procedures, which are the same for all factions and are decided ex-ante. Yet, if
the leader could decide over the party policy platform, she would be able to reward the
moderate faction through a policy concession, that is, setting the party platform closer
to the moderate faction’s preferred position. The next section analyses this possibility,
showing that leaders could tailor policies to factional preferences to increase the party’s
electoral chances.
2.4.1 Policy Concessions as Incentives to Factions
How can parties tailor policies to factional preferences in order to increase electoral
chances? Typically, party manifestos weigh factions’ preferred platforms based on their
share of votes gained during congresses (Levy, 2004, Ceron, 2012, Lo, Proksch and Slapin,
26 See Lott, R. (2019) ’Inside Momentum, Labour’s Secret Weapon’, Vice, 18 November.
27 The report describes a “hyper-factional atmosphere” where more right-wing senior Labour staff ac-
tively seek to sabotage the work of those on the party’s left, referring to them contemptuously as “Trots”
(2020 Labour Antisemitism Report, Section 2.1.3.i).
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2016, Dewan and Squintani, 2016). The following extension adds this feature to the model.
While the baseline model assumes that both factions have the same weight in deter-
mining the party platform, this section endogenizes the weight of each faction, asking
which policy weight the party adopts in equilibrium. Let the party leader L choose —
in addition to premia — how much to weigh the preferred policy of the faction ranking
higher, where the policy weight is denoted by λ ∈ [1/2,1]. Formally, a strategy for L is
now defined by an incentive scheme (πLd , π
L
v ) and a policy weight (λ).
The timing of the game remains unchanged: first, L announces an incentive scheme
(πLd , π
L
v , λ). Second, factions decide how much resources to invest in campaigning and
sabotage. Finally, elections are held, and premia (πLd , π
L
v ) as well as policy concessions
(determined by λ) are distributed. The voter compares the same party platforms — i.e.,
simple averages of the factional bliss points — as in the baseline model. That is, the voter
does not anticipate the post-electoral bargaining process that takes place within parties
when comparing parties’ platforms. Notice that policy concessions are meted out once
the internal ranking is revealed, which happens after the electoral outcome is known.
These assumptions imply that λ affects factions’ decision only through their expected
reward.28
To see how λ affects factions’ decision, it is convenient to express faction L1’s expected
reward from electoral victory as
RL1 (π








28 The fact that policy concessions can only be post-electoral together with the voter’s naïvete assumption














That is, the policy incentive consists in a lower policy cost of ranking higher (and a higher
cost of ranking lower), conditional on winning the election. Conversely, L1’s expected
reward from losing the election does not depend on λ — and is therefore equivalent to the
baseline model (2.5) — because the implemented policy platform in the event of electoral
defeat is chosen by right.
Recall from Proposition 2.3 that the ideologically extreme faction campaigns more
than the moderate one in equilibrium, as the latter suffers a lower ideological cost from
losing the election. This difference is crucial for the next result, which shows that under
certain conditions the leader might reward sabotage with policy concessions.
Proposition 2.4. Policy Concessions. Let |xL1 − x
L
2 | > 0. When γ > 1, in equilibrium the leader
rewards sabotage contingent on electoral victory by setting λ∗ = 1, and premia are (πL∗d , π
L∗
v ) =
(0,0). When γ < 1, the equilibrium premia are (πL∗d , π
L∗
v ) = (1 − α,α), and there exists d′ such
that if |xL1 − x
L
2 | < d
′, then λ∗ = 1; if |xL1 − x
L
2 | ≥ d
′, then λ∗ = 1/2.
Proposition 2.4 states that, when γ > 1, L rewards the strongest faction by setting the
party platform equal to the faction’s preferred policy. When sabotage is more effective
than campaigning to achieve a higher internal ranking, the faction that ranks higher is the
one that (probabilistically) sabotages more (Proposition 2.3). In this case, setting a posi-
tive premium corresponds to rewarding sabotage, and the equilibrium premia (πL∗d , π
L∗
v )
are set to zero as in the baseline model. In equilibrium, the leader promises a policy
concession contingent on victory to the faction for which the ranking is higher, by setting
λ∗ = 1. This motivates the moderate faction L2 — which in equilibrium is more likely to
obtain the policy concession — to campaign more for the party and less against the other
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faction.
To understand why this is the case, it is key to note that, when the relative ranking
indicator rewards sabotage, the more extreme faction campaigns more in equilibrium
(eL∗1 > e
L∗




1 . That is, the internal contest among factions
is not a coin flip anymore: the moderate faction L2 has more chances to win the premium
than L1. In this case, a policy concession incentivizes L2’s equilibrium effort, to increase
the party’s chances of victory. Crucially, the extreme faction’s effort is always greater than
the moderate one in equilibrium. This implies that, even if eL∗2 increases under λ
∗, ρL2 > ρ
L
1
and L2 still ranks higher in equilibrium.
When γ < 1, the extreme faction (which campaigns more in equilibrium) is more likely
to rank higher than the moderate one, as campaigning is more effective than sabotage. In
this case, a high λ incentivizes factions to campaign in order to rank higher thus moving
the party platform closer to their bliss point. This clearly helps the party win the election
via higher campaigning. Indeed, when the ideological distance between L1 and L2 is low
enough, the leader sets λ∗ = 1 to maximize total effort.
Suppose now that |xL1 − x
L
2 | is high enough: in this scenario, a high λ reduces the
appeal of electoral victory to the moderate L2 by shifting the party platform to the extreme
xL1 . When the distance between factions’ bliss point is high enough, the loss from the
moderate faction’s sabotage outweighs the gain in campaigning of the extreme faction,
and the leader sets low powered incentives, choosing not to reward any faction with a
policy concession.
Finally, Proposition 2.4 suggests how the equilibrium incentive scheme would vary if
the leader had ideological preferences. Suppose that L shares the same ideological pref-
erences of the extreme faction L1, and suppose that γ > 1. In this case, the leader would
trade-off a lower ideological cost by decreasing λ — because in equilibrium the moderate
L2 is more likely to rank higher — and a higher probability of victory by increasing λ,
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via higher total effort. Thus, by allowing leaders to share ideological preferences with
factions, the forces highlighted in Proposition 2.4 would still be at work, but the leader
would have to weigh the incentive to increase the probability of victory of the party with
her ideological cost of rewarding with policy concessions a platform distant from her own
bliss point.
2.5 Empirical Implications
This section discusses the empirical implications of the model’s findings for the study
of factions and party organizations. I first analyze the implications of institutional mi-
nority rights’ protection and polarization on factional behavior. I then turn to the im-
plications for the internal organization parties should adopt. Finally, I discuss potential
operationalizations of sabotage.
Institutional System and Sabotage. Corollary 2.1 predicts that intra-party sabotage should
increase as the system of government tends to a consensus democracy, granting more
power to losing parties. As minority parties obtain a higher share of electoral spoils,
factions become more incentivized to sabotage each other (rather than investing their re-
sources to promote the party in the general election) in order to obtain a higher share
of the spoils. Hence, we should expect sabotage to be empirically associated with par-
ties’ representation in government, with whether seats are reserved for small parties and
how easy it is to start a new party, with electoral thresholds for parliamentary represen-
tation, with the electoral system (proportional vs. majoritarian), and other institutional
constraints such as whether the system is unicameral vs. bicameral, or centralized vs.
federalist (Lijphart, 1984).
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Polarization and Electoral Security. Proposition 2.2 suggests that an increase in party
polarization leads to less sabotage, as factions face a higher ideological cost from losing
the election. Moreover, when parties have different ex-ante electoral chances, intra-party
sabotage should be more pervasive in trailing parties. While polarization increases cam-
paigning effort for both parties’ factions via an increased cost of losing the election, the
amount of campaigning in equilibrium varies with parties’ electoral security. In particu-
lar, campaigning is less valuable to factions in trailing parties, who are less likely to win
the election. Hence, we should expect factions in trailing parties to sabotage more.
Variation in Sabotage Relative Effectiveness. The model shows that the party choice
of incentives changes with γ, the relative effectiveness of sabotage to achieve a higher
ranking within the party. The parameter γ can refer to institutional and non-institutional
features of the environment that make factional campaigning effort harder to reward by
the party: the electoral system (e.g., list flexibility) is an example of the former, factional
geographical dispersion of the latter.
An increase in factional geographic dispersion (e.g., a shift from factions’ geographical
separation to their overlap) could be represented in the model by an increase in γ. If fac-
tions are associated with geographic strongholds, the party can attribute its vote share in a
given district to the local faction’s campaigning activities, and consider it when designing
the incentive scheme. Ceteris paribus, a change to factions that overlap geographically
corresponds to an increase in sabotage’s relative effectiveness, as it becomes harder to
associate campaigning effort to each region’s vote share.
The parameter γ can also capture features of the electoral system, such as the use of
preference votes. There is considerable variation in list flexibility among proportional rep-
resentation systems, with a majority of countries adopting a closed list system. A shift
from closed to open list — which can be represented in the model as a decrease in γ —
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could make sabotage less effective than campaigning. This happens when candidates
mainly obtain preference votes by campaigning effort rather than by sabotaging activ-
ities. Intuitively, the party observes its candidates’ preference votes, and knows each
candidate’s faction. The party equilibrium incentive scheme can then move from low-
powered to high-powered incentives — rewarding factions for their preference votes —
reducing factions’ equilibrium investment in sabotage as a result.
The literature on personal vote suggests that moving from a closed list to an open
list PR system should increase competition among candidates in a party: looking at the
individual candidates’ incentives, an open list system implies the need to obtain prefer-
ence votes, often fighting rivals within the party (Carey and Shugart, 1995, Bräuninger,
Brunner and Däubler, 2012). While the incentive to compete within the party increases
at the individual candidate level, the model shows that the incentive to sabotage could be
reduced at the faction level. Hence, by considering factions instead of individual candi-
dates as unit of analysis, empirical scholars might uncover potential omitted variable bias
in the correlation between weak parties and open list PR systems, controlling for a novel
moderating variable — that is, the equilibrium party organization which affects factions’
decision to sabotage.
Finally, observed party organizations are consistent with the model’s implications.
The method of allocation of cabinet positions in the LDP (before the electoral reform in
1994) was to divide the electoral spoils proportionally among factions and give a pre-
mium to the “mainstream faction” (Browne and Kim, 2003, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth,
2009). This method corresponds in the model to high powered incentives, which are
optimal when effort is more effective than sabotage. Similarly to preference votes, the
Japanese SNTV electoral system allowed the party to condition the faction’s reward on
the the elected party members’ identity — the mainstream faction obtaining the premium
was, in fact, the faction with the most winning candidates.
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Empirical Challenge: Measuring Intra-Party Sabotage. Existing empirical research has
focused on negative campaigning against opposing parties, but rarely on measuring intra-
party dissent. One implication that can be derived from the model is the emergence of
political scandals triggered internally as a product of factional sabotage. Besides resulting
from the opposition’s attacks (Dziuda and Howell, 2021), political scandals can emerge
due to intra-party competition, where party insiders leak information on co-partisans’
misdeeds in order to gain power within the party (Balán, 2011). If factional competition
can trigger the outbreak of scandals, then Proposition 2.2 suggests that these are more
likely to emerge when a party weakens electorally.
A possible way to measure political scandals is to consider charges of malfeasance
against parliament members, often resulting in corruption scandals. In most democracies,
before proceeding with a judicial investigation of a legislator, public prosecutors need
to ask official permission from the legislative body to lift the immunity of the involved
deputy. For instance, in Italy, these requests to proceed — richieste di autorizzazione a
procedere (RAP) — are sent to the Chamber of Deputies, and from 1948 the Italian judiciary
made more than 5000 requests to parliament to proceed with MPs’ investigation.
Golden and Chang (2001) find that the number of RAPs against DC deputies is pos-
itively related to intra-party competition, proxied by the number of preference votes re-
ceived by DC candidates in a district and divided by the total number of list votes re-
ceived by the party in the same district. Furthermore, the public availability of the re-
quests allows to delve deeper into the political motives of the investigations. Indeed,
several requests include the “leaker” identity, who is often another politician. Analyzing
RAPs from 1983 to 2019, Invernizzi and Ceron (2020) identify the leaker’s political affil-
iation, and provide evidence of a political use of denunciations. The paper shows that
when a party weakens, the likelihood that political enemies denounce past misbehavior
of members of the weakened party increases, suggesting that the political use of denun-
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ciation is elastic to changes in the electoral odds. In some cases, they show, these political
enemies belong to the same party — but to a different faction — of the accused MPs.
These findings provide further evidence in favor of the hypothesis that factional sabotage
should increase as parties weaken.
2.6 Conclusion
In their efforts to win office, political parties strategically change their internal organi-
zation. One potent tool used by parties is the allocation of electoral spoils among party
members, who typically form factions to achieve their policy positions. This paper cap-
tures with a formal model the relation of agency among the party leadership and factions.
The model formalizes with contract theory tools the allocation of electoral spoils among
competing factions. This agency framework is embedded in a general equilibrium model
of elections, which allows studying how electoral stakes affect intra-party competition.
The baseline model shows that factions’ contests over electoral spoils can be positive
or destructive depending on several features of the competitive environment. First, as
the power granted to minority parties increases, factions invest more resources into sab-
otaging each other and less in mobilizing for the party. Conversely, when the stakes of
the election increase — via polarization or institutional changes — factions invest more in
campaigning for the party. This finding improves our understanding of alternative demo-
cratic systems by highlighting the often neglected effect of different electoral institutions
on intra-party competition.
The model also shows the effect of ideological polarization on intra-party competition.
As polarization increases, factions in both parties campaign more for the party to avoid
a costly electoral defeat. While factions in the moderate party campaign more, those in
the more extreme party engage in sabotage. Thus, the model suggests that — in the pres-
ence of electoral imbalance — intra-party competition should be more severe in trailing
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parties and when parties weaken electorally. The latter result is consistent with empiri-
cal evidence of political use of denunciation against Italian MPs belonging to weakened
parties.
Anticipating factions’ incentives, the party can limit sabotage by rewarding factions
for their campaigning effort. When factions’ campaigning effort can be monitored and re-
warded easily, the party encourages competition among factions through a winner-take-
all contest for electoral spoils. When, on the other hand, sabotage is more effective than
campaigning effort to achieve internal power, the party distributes electoral spoils among
factions in an egalitarian way to discourage destructive competition. An extension endo-
genizes party platforms as part of the leader strategy, showing that the leader might want
to reward factions with policy concession to increase the party electoral chances.
The model shows how incentives change when parties have to cope with imperfect
signals of effort, in the presence of sabotaging activities. The same approach can be ex-
tended to compare the efficiency of different incentive schemes within political parties.
In particular, the analysis of a proportional contest function — that is, a proportional
allocation of electoral spoils relative to each faction’s own performance rather than fac-
tions’ relative performance — is perhaps one of the most promising research avenues that
emerge from this model’s findings. This would shed light on the question of which is the
optimal party structure to win elections.
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Chapter 3: Politics by Denunciation
“Apart from the Punic Wars, for which I was too young, I’ve been blamed for every-
thing that’s happened in Italy but I never filed a lawsuit, for a simple reason, I have a
sense of humor. There is another thing I have: a large archive, given I have not much use
for fantasy, and everytime I speak about this archive, who must shut up, as if by magic,
start to be silent.”
– Giulio Andreotti, Il Divo
Political scandals –– typically defined as “corruption revealed” (Thompson, 2013, Lowi,
2018) –– are a fundamental component of politics, shaping political events and voters’
opinions. The political consequences of revealing a corrupt political environment reach
far: scholars have hypothesized that the deterioration of citizens’ political support ob-
served in Western democracies during the past decades is connected with the increased
number of political scandals (Bowler and Karp, 2004, Thompson, 2013). The end of the
Italian “First Republic” was indeed triggered by Tangentopoli, the corruption scandals dis-
closed during one of the major judicial investigations of all times (Waters, 1994), which
took place in 1992-1994 and involved several political parties and politicians. For instance,
Giulio Andreotti — one of the most influential politicians of the Italian First Republic,1
whom the quote is attributed to — was involved in a decade-long judicial trial under
charges of corruption and collaboration with the Mafia. The trial generated a major scan-
dal, and Andreotti’s acquittal is still questioned by many.2
1 Andreotti has received the highest number of government assignments in the history of the Italian
Republic.
2 Cf. “Giulio Andreotti,” The Times, May 7 2013: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/giulio-andreotti.
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Judicial prosecution of politicians constitutes a prominent source of political scandals.
While the opinion that political enemies initiate judicial investigations is popular, empiri-
cal evidence is intrinsically hard to gather. Data on judicial investigations is often limited
to whether an investigation took place or not, and whether it ended in a conviction. As
for political enemies, typically what is observable is their reaction to the investigation,
for example through public statements condemning the investigated politician. This pa-
per takes advantage of unique data on political corruption to study the political nature
of judicial investigations. By leveraging new data on the source of judicial investigations
against Italian MPs involved in different crimes (1983-2019), we provide evidence that
scandals are the result of politics by denunciation.
The measure of judicial investigation against MPs is the “request to proceed” (Richi-
esta di Autorizzazione a Procedere, hereafter RAP) sent by public prosecutor offices to the
Chamber of Deputies. In these 36 years, public prosecutors have sent to the Parliament
hundreds of requests to lift immunity of the involved MPs, all of which are publicly avail-
able. We are interested in the strategic use of these investigations for political purposes.
While not all RAPs necessarily result in scandals, on average they hurt politicians’ repu-
tation (Chang, Golden and Hill, 2010). Thus, it is reasonable to expect political enemies
to strategically initiate RAPs against MPs for their political gain.
The Italian data represent an unparalleled opportunity due to the rich details included
in the investigation documents. The uniqueness of our data consists in the revelation of
the source (or whistle-blower) — often another political actor — behind the investigation,
thanks to which we can provide evidence of a political use of denunciations.3 Our dataset
is composed of 1125 requests involving 451 MPs: 597 RAPs refer to allegations of corrup-
tion and 528 to opinion crimes. Examples of the latter include slander, defamation or
3 Examples of political actors include other MPs, local politicians, head or members of political associa-
tions.
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incitement to disobey the law.4 Among these RAPs, 398 specify in the official document
that the whistle-blower is another politician or a member of a political organization or
association.
The main question we ask is: how politically-driven are denunciations? We expect
political denunciations to be tied to the electoral performance of the accused MP’s party.
On the one hand, it could be that a party loss of electoral support opens the door to at-
tacks from politicians that might benefit from denouncing past misbehavior of members
of the weakened party. These attacks could be initiated by members of opposing parties
who benefit from replacing the attacked MP with an ally (Dziuda and Howell, 2021), or
by members of the same party who seek opportunities to achieve more power within
the party through internal sabotage (Invernizzi, 2020a). On the other, if a party is elec-
torally strong and hard to overcome with votes, enemies could try to defeat its members
in courts. In this case, political attacks would be more likely the stronger the attacked
party.
To test these alternative hypotheses we identify the vote share of the accused MP’s
party in the electoral district where the MP was elected. By comparing how this vote share
changes over time, we can identify when the party weakens. We include electoral results
from all the elections in the period covered (1979-2019).5 Results provide evidence in
favor of a political use of investigation of MPs for corruption charges. We find that, when
parties weaken, the likelihood of political denunciation of past misbehavior increases. This
result suggests that the political use of denunciation is elastic to changes in the electoral
odds: when a window of opportunity opens because of a poor electoral performance,
4 Cf. Chang, Golden and Hill (2010) for a similar classification.
5 The only exception is the 1994 election in the aftermath of Tangentopoli. After the corruption scandal,
traditional parties almost disappeared and new parties entered the electoral arena. This entirely different
party system makes it impossible to compare parties’ vote share before and after 1994. Notice that the
exclusion of this year from our analysis stacks the deck against the first hypothesis — according to which
we should expect more attacks to weakening parties — because we discard investigations related to parties
that were heavily electorally damaged by Tangentopoli.
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political opponents attack MPs belonging to the weakened party.
As hinted by Andreotti’s quote, politicians share compromising information that can
be used against each other (Tumber and Waisbord, 2004, Gambetta, 2018). Under normal
circumstances the threat of revealing such information is powerful enough to prevent
political enemies from blowing the whistle. Yet, when a favorable opportunity to bring
down an opponent emerges, politicians might reveal such dated information or dig dirt
into the MP’s past to find material for a public denunciation. To provide further evi-
dence that denunciations are politically driven, we investigate the timing of RAPs. We
hypothesize that, when the leaker is a politician, the RAP is presented later (with respect
to the crime) than when the denunciation does not come from a politician, and closer to
elections.
Results on the timing of investigations corroborate the “digging-dirt” conjecture: we
show that when the leaker is a politician, the time lag between the investigation and the
alleged misconduct is significantly longer (on average, one year) than when the request is
initiated by a non-political actor. We argue that this time lag is due to the political nature
of the denunciation: as our results on electoral security suggest, this opportunity might
present itself when the accused MP’s party weakens.
Our analysis distinguishes between RAPs for crimes of corruption and opinion (e.g.,
slander), showing that the political incentives for tactical denunciation only play a role for
the former type of allegation. When RAPs include allegations of corruption rather than
opinion crimes, the likelihood of having a political whistle-blower (when parties weaken)
is higher. Analogously, when dealing with corruption allegations initiated by political
leakers, the time elapsed from the alleged crime increases. This result is consistent with
the literature finding that revelation of corruption hurts politicians (Golden, 2006, Bågen-
holm, 2013, Fernández-Vázquez, Barberá and Rivero, 2016), despite its effect depending
on various elements, such as social capital (Nannicini et al., 2013), electoral and candidate
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selection rules (Ferraz and Finan, 2014, Rudolph and Däubler, 2016, Ceron and Mainenti,
2018), as well as voters’ traits and party system features (Sberna and Vannucci, 2013, Char-
ron and Bågenholm, 2016, Ecker, Glinitzer and Meyer, 2016, Fernández-Vázquez, Barberá
and Rivero, 2016). It is also consistent with the evidence that prosecuting politicians for
opinion crimes does not damage the party under attack (Van Spanje and de Vreese, 2015).
While we provide evidence of the strategic use of denunciation by politicians, clearly
there are other important mechanisms that play a role. The literature has shown evidence
of fumus persecutionis — i.e., the presumption that legal proceedings are based on an in-
tention to impede the politician’s activity — initiating from biased prosecutors (Gordon,
2009). Judicial behavior can be affected by political pressures, particularly when judges’
position depends on partisan elections and judges require the support of party leaders
(Hall, 1992, A. Huber and Gordon, 2004). Judicial decisions can be affected by ideology
even in contexts in which judges are not elected and their careers are independent of po-
litical institutions (Ceron and Mainenti, 2015). By providing evidence of the initiation
of the investigation process driven by hostile politicians we offer an additional channel
through which investigations could be exploited for political reasons.
A few studies have used data on RAPs as a measure of politicians’ misbehavior, fo-
cusing on Italy’s First Republic, which terminated in 1994. Chang (2005) shows that intra-
party competition and electoral uncertainty trigger political corruption. Consistently
with our findings on RAPs for corruption crimes, Chang, Golden and Hill (2010) find
that being investigated for a potentially serious crime decreases the probability of reelec-
tion of an MP in a subsequent term. Moreover, using data on RAPs, Nannicini et al. (2013)
show that this effect differs by electoral districts based on voters’ traits: in district with
higher social capital voters are more likely to hold politicians accountable for their alleged
misbehavior. Our data advances these previous studies by including information about
who initiates the process of investigation, and by extending the existing evidence to RAPs
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presented after 1994. Our findings suggest that the relationship between politicians’ un-
derlying corruption and RAPs is not necessarily monotone, as it varies with politicians’
incentives to leak incriminating information. Thus, future work should take these incen-
tives into account when using similar measures of corruption to make inferences about
underlying transgressions.
Our paper also relates to a recently growing literature on scandals. The existing em-
pirical literature has focused on the effects of political scandals’ revelation on different
outcomes, such as accountability (Ferraz and Finan, 2008, Nannicini et al., 2013, Chong
et al., 2015, Cavalcanti, Daniele and Galletta, 2018), candidates’ selection (Chang, Golden
and Hill, 2010, Cavalcanti, Daniele and Galletta, 2018, Asquer, Golden and Hamel, 2019),
politicians’ behavior (Cho and Kruszewska, 2018, Daniele, Galletta and Geys, 2020) and
the rise of populist parties (Foresta, 2020). A related literature has empirically scrutinized
predictors of scandals’ incidence such as divided governments, the number of topics cov-
ered by the media and low approval ratings (Nyhan, 2015, 2017), and dissent within the
government (Balán, 2011). We provide to our knowledge the first existing dataset that
investigates politically-driven denunciations where the identity of political whistleblow-
ers is known. This allows to trace the political process underlying judicial investigations
of politicians, which typically lead to scandals. As such, our paper relates to a recent
theoretical literature that studies the political conditions facilitating scandals’ emergence
(Gratton, Holden and Kolotilin, 2017, Dziuda and Howell, 2021, Ogden and Medina, 2020,
Invernizzi, 2020a).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.1 lays out our hypotheses.
Section 3.2 and 3.3 describe the Italian Political context and the data used. Section 4.2
presents the empirical analysis. Section 3.5 discusses the results and Section 4.5 concludes.
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3.1 The Strategic Determinants of Political Scandals
The view that judicial prosecutions of politicians can be initiated for political reasons is
firmly entrenched in politics. In Italy, several investigations involving powerful politi-
cians helped to foster this idea. The judicial trial that involved Giulio Andreotti from
1993 to 2004 under the accusation of corruption and collaboration with the Mafia left a
controversial legacy.6 In the aftermath of the verdict, which found Andreotti innocent,
the President of the Anti-Mafia Commission Luciano Violante concluded that politics is
“full of false conspiracies that are leaked for the only purpose of getting rid of political
enemies.”7
Investigations of crucial political leaders (e.g., Silvio Berlusconi) helped to radicalize
this idea in more recent years. The investigation of politicians is often accompanied by
scandals covered by the media, and related public protests against corruption. These can
(and do) compromise the involved politician’s career, even if declared innocent at the end
of the judicial trial. Against this backdrop, it seems reasonable to expect opportunistic
politicians to exploit investigations to achieve their political goals.
When should we expect judicial investigations to emerge as a consequence of political
calculations? We hypothesize that the electoral security of the accused party is a crucial
factor in politicians’ decision to engage in politics by denunciation. That is, we expect
political attacks through investigations to depend on the electoral performance of the
accused MP’s party. Our design allows to test for two alternative arguments that lead to
opposing hypotheses regarding the effect of electoral security. First, it could be that MPs
are more likely to receive political attacks when their parties weaken. Second, it could be
6 The judicial trial against Andreotti is commonly referred to as Processo del Secolo (trial of the century),
the outcome of which is still questioned by many (Jannuzzi and Ferrara, 2000).
7 Chamber of Deputies, May 11, 2003. Report: http://documenti.camera.it/Leg14/BancheDati/
ResocontiAssemblea/sed384/s470.htm
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that attacks are more likely to be directed towards successful parties, to inhibit their way
up.
The first argument is motivated by different mechanisms that have been recently ex-
plored by the formal theory literature: i) scandal fabrication by political opponents, and
ii) intra-party sabotage initiated by opposing factions.
First, scandals can be triggered by a political opponent who benefits from the elec-
toral replacement of a politician. Dziuda and Howell (2021) develop a theory of political
scandal revelation according to which two parties might learn about the misbehavior of
a politician, whom they are either allied or opposed to, and decide whether to publicly
unleash a scandal against him or not to convince voters to replace or keep the politician.
One of the results shows that scandals increase when the implicated politician is more
likely to be replaced by the opposing party, i.e., when electoral security of the allied party
decreases. Why is it the case? When the allied party weakens the stakes of the election
increase for both parties, as the allied party is more likely to suffer and the opposing
party is more likely to benefit from the sitting politician’s replacement. This increase in
the electoral stakes makes political opponents more likely to fabricate scandals.
Similarly, this argument might apply to multi-party competition, where political ac-
tors could fabricate scandals for their electoral benefit. The benefit can be direct — e.g.,
winning more votes as a consequence of a weaker rival — or indirect — e.g., giving a
coup de grâce to a party that suffered an electoral loss, in order to open new opportu-
nities in the long run (no matter which party will benefit from this strategy in the short
term). These opportunities can include: boosting electoral volatility, generating party sys-
tem instability and policy change or dismantling a party’s power in a certain local area of
the country (or at the national level).
Second, scandals might emerge as a consequence of within-party fights, in a quest
for internal power. Golden and Chang (2001) analyze corruption-related investigations
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against the Christian Democracy (DC) party in Italy during the First Republic, finding
that investigations are positively correlated with the level of intra-party competition. In-
vernizzi (2020a) provides a formal mechanism to understand when intra-party competi-
tion should lead to scandals, by studying a model of elections where parties are internally
divided into factions that can either help the party to win the election or sabotage each
other to obtain internal power. In equilibrium, factions in the trailing party invest more
resources than those in the leading party in sabotaging activities that might lead to po-
litical scandals. This happens because a lower probability of winning the election lowers
the expected payoff from victory and raises the salience of the competition internal to
the party. Similarly to the scandal fabrication argument, this result suggests that scan-
dals are more likely to emerge when parties weaken, yet as the result of denunciations by
same-party opponents rather than opposition parties.
Instead, the alternative argument suggests that political investigations should be used
more heavily against successful parties. This mechanism is especially appropriate to ex-
plain investigations initiated by political opponents in the same electoral district of the
accused MP, who are directly damaged by a successful opposing party and can only find
ways alternative to the polls to weaken a strong rival.
Based on these two mechanisms, we derive the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3.1 (Electoral Security). The likelihood that a RAP is initiated by a political actor
rather than a non-political one (a) increases (b) decreases as the party of the accused MP loses
electoral support.
Our next hypothesis investigates how political incentives are related to the timing of
investigations. If politicians attack their opponents with RAPs, when should we expect
them to do so? The literature provides empirical and theoretical evidence on the impor-
tance of timing of information release in elections. Gratton, Holden and Kolotilin (2017)
analyze a sender-receiver game connecting the timing of information release with voter
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beliefs prior to elections. The model derives an equilibrium in which fabricated scan-
dals are only released close to the election date, and empirical data on the release of US
presidential scandals confirm their equilibrium prediction.
Timing of message delivery has also been the subject of field and lab experiments. In a
study of the effect of phone calls by volunteers on voter turnout, Nickerson (2007) shows
that calls made during the final days prior to the election are most effective in mobilizing
voters. Similarly, Invernizzi (2020b) shows with a controlled experiment that recency bias
— i.e., the tendency of voters to follow information when it is provided close to the voting
decision — largely affects collective decision making.
Overall, the evidence from the literature suggests that in our setting it is plausible to
expect RAPs initiated by political leakers to be presented closer to the election, motivating
the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3.2 (Timing with respect to Election). When the investigation is initiated by a
political leaker, the RAP is presented closer to the election than when the investigation is not
political.
Furthermore, we hypothesize that — when investigations are triggered by political
enemies — we should observe a longer time lag between the MP’s alleged misconduct
and when the date of the RAP. When a politician becomes aware of the misconduct of
a political rival, she could decide whether to reveal such misbehavior immediately or to
keep the information for the time in which the scandal could be more profitably revealed.
Similarly, when a window of opportunity opens, political opponents might search into
the MP’s past to reveal evidence of corruption, which would result in more time elapsed
from the alleged misconduct.
One potential confounding factor is that credible political corruptions cases take long
to assemble. This would increase the time lag between the denounced events and when
the case is brought before the Chamber, simply because of feasibility constraints related
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to the legal process. However, this constraint should be equally binding for political and
non-political actors initiating an investigation. Hence, ceteris paribus, we should consider
a longer time lag for political rather than non-political actors as evidence of politicization.
Hypothesis 3.3 (Digging-dirt Process). When the investigation is initiated by a political leaker,
the time lag between the alleged events and the date of the RAP is longer than when the investiga-
tion is not political.
So far we implicitly assumed that denunciations produce negative electoral effects for
the party affected by the investigation. However, this is not always the case and depends
on the type of crime. While there is evidence that voters punish corrupt politicians, this is
not necessarily the case for politicians engaging in other crimes. For example, Van Spanje
and de Vreese (2015) show that hate speech prosecution against the Freedom Party in The
Netherlands actually enhanced that party’s appeal with positive effects in terms of elec-
toral performance. In a comparative analysis involving Belgium, France, Germany and
the Netherlands, Jacobs and Van Spanje (2020) found that hate speech prosecution did
not undermine the electoral performance of anti-immigration parties. Similar findings
apply to Finland as well (Askola, 2015). More generally, politicians charged with opinion
crimes might enjoy higher reputation among their constituencies, who share similar opin-
ions. Furthermore, prosecuted politicians can portray themselves as martyrs for freedom
of speech (Van Spanje and de Vreese, 2015), thus increasing their popularity among voters
who deem as illegitimate a trial based on opinions (Askola, 2015).
This evidence suggests that investigations related to corruption should be more dan-
gerous than those based on opinion crimes for the reputation of the involved politicians.
Chang, Golden and Hill (2010) show that this is indeed the case for Italian MPs when
allegations of wrongdoings are covered by the media: in particular, they show that ma-
jor crimes (often linked to corruption) reduce the likelihood of re-election for MPs hit by
a RAP investigation, while soft accusations of opinion crimes do not — despite the fact
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that minor charges involving opinion crimes are especially likely to arise during the pro-
cess of political campaigning. Thus, if only corruption crimes have the power to produce
damages, we hypothesize that we should observe evidence of strategic politicization of
investigations only with respect to corruption crimes.
Hypothesis 3.4 (Politicization of Corruption vs Opinion crimes). The political use of inves-
tigations (3.1 - 3.3) involves corruption crimes but not opinion crimes.
3.2 Background
Judicial activity investigating MPs is a salient issue in Italy, as public prosecutors have
played a prominent role in the Italian political system. Their popularity and impact
became particularly important after 1992, when the Mani Pulite (Clean Hands) judicial
inquiry shed light on the illegal links between politics and business and revealed the po-
litical corruption permeating the political system, which resulted in the Tangentopoli cor-
ruption scandal. This section goes over the most relevant institutional details concerning
electoral competition and the RAPs’ procedures, to shed light on how these institutions
might affect the political use of judicial investigations.
3.2.1 Italian Electoral and Party System
The time frame 1983-2019 was selected to have a balanced dataset covering both Italy’s
First Republic, which defines the political period starting from World War II and ending
with the elections of 1994, and the current Second Republic, which begins with the 1994
election under a new electoral and party system.
During the First Republic, Italy’s electoral system was based on proportional repre-
sentation. This proportional representation (PR) open-list system emphasized intraparty
competition among candidates (Carey and Shugart, 1995) and encouraged party faction-
alism (Chang, 2005). Depending on the district magnitude, voters were allowed to cast
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up to four preference votes. Therefore, the way in which candidates were elected from
a list was completely determined by the individual preference votes cast by the party’s
voters in a given district. The use of preference votes (and the related intraparty com-
petition between factions) was blamed as a source of corruption and vote of exchange
(?). At the local level, this produced a robust system of power in which the same parties
and candidates ruled for several years in certain areas of the country, taking advantage of
established local strongholds that secured them re-election and granted them power.
During most of this period, Italy’s multiparty system was dominated by the Christian
Democratic Party (DC), the Italian Communist Party (PCI), and a number of small yet
influential parties. In the 1980s, the Italian political system started to face broad transfor-
mations. After decades of party system stability and dominance of the DC, new cleavages
transformed the political space, opening opportunities for green, ethno-regionalist as well
as populist and radical parties which partially originated as a reaction to the “carteliza-
tion” that characterized the First Republic, and that were fueled by waves of corruption
scandals (often linked to parties’ public funding).
In 1993, an electoral reform modified the electoral system from pure PR to a mixed-
member system in which three-quarters of the Chamber seats (475) were allocated in
single-seat-district via plurality, and the remaining one-quarter (155) via party lists through
proportional representation. Together with the wave of judicial prosecution of corrupted
officials that involved most political parties, the new electoral law contributed to fun-
damentally change the party system of the First Republic. The DC, riven by scandals,
imploded and was replaced by the much smaller Italian People’s Party (PPI). More gen-
erally, the Italian political system — which had previously been dominated by parties of
the center — became polarized between parties of the right and left.8 A new electoral
8 The political center was left to be divided by various short-lived multiparty alliances: for example, at
the turn of the 21st century, the center-right House of Freedoms and the center-left Olive Tree.
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law (named Porcellum, later deemed unconstitutional) overturned this system in 2005 by
restoring full proportional representation. However, the law also allocated a number of
bonus seats in the Chamber of Deputies to the winning coalition — thus guaranteeing a
majority for the winners.
Our dataset includes general elections held from 1979 until 2018, to match the time
frame of investigations (1983-2019). More precisely, we match each MP affected by an
investigation to the results of his/her party in the district where the MP was elected: in
particular, we compare the last two elections before the RAP was sent in order to measure
the electoral performance of the party in that district.9
We are interested in knowing whether a negative performance of the party (i.e., a
declining vote share) in a given district triggers political RAPs, or whether these investi-
gations are more likely to take place when the MP’s party is performing well (3.1). Given
the incentives provided by the Italian electoral institutions, it is reasonable to expect that
political attacks (through RAPs) are aimed at weakening the party per se, rather than
winning the seat of the accused MP’s district. Indeed, neither the multi-member district
system of the First Republic nor the closed list (and single-member district) system of the
Second Republic suggest a zero-sum game logic whereby weakening a rival directly helps
to obtain a seat. Rather, given that the party is weakening in a certain district, it seems
plausible that political enemies attack the MP there — where the attack is more likely to
be consequential. This logic is coherent with the idea, outlined in the previous section,
that political enemies might initiate RAPs to benefit (either directly or indirectly) in the
long run.
9 We cover national elections held in 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013 and 2018, leaving
aside the 1994 for the reasons discussed above.
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3.2.2 RAPs: Rules and Procedures
The Italian judiciary is responsible for investigating crimes perpetrated by members of
parliament. MPs, however, are protected from prosecution by parliamentary immunity
unless that immunity is revoked. How does the judicial process work? In order to pro-
ceed with the investigation of an MP, the public prosecutor who is investigating the case
need to send a formal request (RAP) to the Chamber of Deputies, before proceeding with
the investigation. Once the request is received, the President of the Chamber forwards
the request to a special committee (“Giunta per le Autorizzazioni”). The committee is
composed of 21 deputies who evaluate the legitimacy of the request to proceed with the
investigation. Based on the committee’s report, the Chamber grants or denies the autho-
rization, and the final decision is communicated to the prosecutor.
Our dataset includes requests sent both before and after 1993, when a constitutional
reform changed the reasons to request the authorization from the Chamber of Deputies.
Before the reform, prosecutors were required to present all the judicial documents to the
Chamber, together with the request to lift immunity of the investigated MP. After the
reform, enacted in the aftermath of the Tangentopoli scandal, prosecutors do not need an
authorization from the legislative body for criminal proceedings against deputies.10 The
authorization is still needed for warrant of arrest, personal search, or other measures such
as wiretapping.
Figure 3.1 shows the number of RAPs that are presented in each legislative period
covered by our study (black bars). As one might expect, there is a clear drop in the overall
number of RAPs starting from the 12th legislature (which marks the beginning of the
Second Republic), which is a consequence of the 1993 constitutional reform that limits
the reasons to request such authorizations. Notice that observing fewer RAPs after 1993
10 Constitutional Law 3/1993, enacted on October 29th.
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does not mean that the number of investigations dropped as well. Notwithstanding the
procedural changes introduced by the reform, our analysis below shows that results are
not affected by it.11
Notice that RAPs measure allegations of MPs’ wrongdoing, not convictions. While there
is no data available on judicial convictions, we know that the Chamber failed to lift im-
munity for most deputies. The light bars in Figure3.1 display the number of RAPs that
are granted by the Chamber of Deputies in each legislative period. Only few RAPs are
conceded by the Chamber — especially during the First Republic — thereby allowing the
judiciary to proceed. This obviously implies that an even smaller proportion of these alle-
gations manages to reach the judicial stage. This might present an issue of measurement
validity if we used RAPs as a measure of MPs’ underlying corruption. Because our goal is
to provide evidence of the political use of RAPs, we do not need the final verdict: indeed,
there is evidence that RAPs compromise the involved politicians’ career even if declared
innocent at the end of the judicial trial.12
We collect data based on three fundamental sources, related to the RAPs. First, the re-
quest itself, which includes the name of the investigated MP and other information, such
as the type of crime, typically in a concise format. Second, the Chamber Committee’s
report about the RAP (Relazione della Giunta per le Autorizzazioni a Procedere), which sum-
marizes the information included in the RAP and grants (or denies) the authorization to
proceed with the investigation. Our final source is the minutes of the Committee meeting,
which allow to retrieve more information regarding the investigation, when this was not
included in the Committee’s report. Information about the leaker or how the investiga-
tion initiated was provided either in the original request, in the Committee’s final report
11 Our results remain virtually unchanged when including in our model a dummy variable to account for
requests sent after 1993.
12 It would be interesting to compare the outcome of judicial investigations for political vs. non political
RAPs. Observing a higher fraction of non-political RAPs granted would provide further evidence of the
extensive margin of “politicization” of the investigation process.
65
Figure 3.1: Frequency of RAPs presented (black bars) and granted (light bars) by legisla-
ture.
or in the minutes of the Committee meeting.13
3.3 Data
Over the period 1983-2019, public prosecutors submitted 726 RAPs involving 1,655 MPs
to remove their parliamentary immunity and proceed with their investigation. We build
our dataset based on these RAPs. For each legislative term, our unit of analysis is the MP
affected by each RAP. While a RAP could refer to multiple alleged crimes, each request
is related to a single investigation. Furthermore, while multiple crimes could be under
investigations in the same document, all of them refer to the same type (corruption or
opinion). When a RAP is directed to multiple MPs, each politician represents a separate
13 We include in the Appendix an original example (in Italian) of the Committee’s final report.
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observation in our dataset. Finally, each MP could be affected by different RAPs over time
and we created multiple observations accordingly.
In terms of episodes of alleged misbehavior, our data consists of 1125 episodes involv-
ing 451 MPs. We consider two types of crimes: corruption and opinion. Of the episodes
composing our dataset, 597 refer to corruption charges and 528 to opinion ones. We do
not consider 530 requests linked with other crimes such as private violence, murder and
participation to organized crime (Mafia or terrorism) because these charges follow specific
procedures that provide additional resources and opportunities to courts, thus minimiz-
ing the incentives for the political usage of RAPs. Specifically, the Constitution (art. 68)
indicates that prosecutors do not need authorization from the Chamber to prosecute an
MP if the crime requires mandatory arrest (“arresto obbligatorio in flagranza”), which
renders RAPs unnecessary.14
The list of corruption crimes includes information regarding requests to lift immunity
for MPs charged with public administration improprieties, such as misappropriation and
abuse of power, in addition to illegal party funding, which is frequently related to other
public administration crimes in Italy (Rhodes, 1997). Conversely, the list of crimes of
opinions include slander, defamation, insult, contempt or incitement to disobey the law.15
Figure 3.2 shows, for each legislature, the frequency of RAPs for corruption crimes
(black bars) versus opinion crimes (light bars). As one might expect, the 11th legislature
includes an exceptionally high number of corruption RAPs: this corresponds to the Tan-
gentopoli investigation, when 35 percent of deputies are named in RAPs for corruption
14 The penal code (art. 380) lists all the crimes requiring mandatory arrest, among which the participation
and promotion of Mafia organizations.
15 We code as opinion crimes charges listed in the following articles of the Italian penal code: 278, 290,
336, 368, 414, 415, 594, 595, 612, 656, as well as infringements of laws on defamation via press/mass media:
art. 13 and art. 21 law 47 (08/02/1948) or art. 30 law 223 (06/08/1990); we code as corruption crimes
charges related to articles 314, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 328, 333, 317-bis, 319-bis, 319-ter, and
319-quarter of the Italian penal code as well as infringements of laws on public funding of parties: art. 7
law 195 (02/05/1974) and art. 4 law 659 (18/11/1981)
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crimes.16
Figure 3.2: Number of RAPs presented by type of allegation and legislature.
To shed light on whether investigations are politically driven, we gather information
on the citizen whose contribution in the investigation is relevant to generate the RAP. De-
pending on the investigation, such crucial contribution might come from entrepreneurs,
police officers, public administration workers or managers, private citizens, or political
actors (MPs, local politicians, head or members of political associations, etc.).
Out of 1125 MPs investigated for corruption or opinion crimes, in 398 cases (35.4%)
the leaker is a political actor (175 times with respect to corruption and 223 times with
respect to crimes of opinion). Based on this, we build the variable Political Leaker, which
is a dummy equal to one when the leaker of the investigation (or at least one leaker in
16 The extraordinary number of corruption RAPs during the 11th legislature suggests that it is crucial to
control for the specific peculiarities of each legislature. To do so, we include in our model fixed effects by
legislative term. Notice also that our results remain virtually unchanged when including a dummy variable
to specifically account for requests sent during Tangentopoli, i.e., from 1992 to 1994.
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case of multiple leakers) is a political actor, and zero when no leaker is a political actor,
or when there is no clear leaker indicated in the RAP — the latter being usually the case
when the investigation is independently initiated by the police or the judiciary. Figure
3.3 plots, for each legislature, the frequency of RAPs initiated by a political leaker (black
bars) versus a non-political one (light bars).
Figure 3.3: Number of RAPs presented by type of leaker and legislature.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 What Drives Political Investigations?
We start by asking whether electoral concerns affect the likelihood that investigations are
initiated by a political leaker. Following 3.1, we expect that political leakers are motivated
by electoral concerns: when the MP’s party weakens/strengthens electorally, this opens a
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window of opportunity for political opponents to attack the deputy. To test this hypoth-
esis, we employ a logistic regression where the dependent variable is the likelihood that
a RAP is initiated by a political leaker. That is, of all the requests against MPs in our data
we analyze how many investigations were initiated by political leaker.17
Our main independent variable measures the electoral performance of a party in a
given district: for each MP hit by a RAP, ∆VOTi jt is equal to the difference between the
vote share of his/her party at time t − 1 and the vote share at time t, where t indicates the
last election before the RAP is sent. Higher (lower) values indicate that the party is losing
(gaining) support in the electoral district that elected the MP. Our baseline specification is
POLi jt = αt + β∆VOTi jt + γOPCi jt + δ∆VOTi jt · OPCi jt + εi jt, (3.1)
where ∆VOTi jt represents the electoral loss of MP i’s party in district j at time t. We ac-
count for the moderating role of different types of crimes testing the interaction between
∆VOTi jt and the dummy variable OPCi jt , which is equal to 1 when the RAP is related to
an opinion crime, and 0 for a corruption crime. POLi jt is a dummy which takes value 1
when the RAP against MP i in district j at time t is initiated by a political leaker. Finally
αt refers to time fixed effects (by legislative term).
Table 3.1 summarizes the results. Column 1 refers to the most parsimonious specifica-
tion, which only includes legislatures fixed effects.18 The likelihood of observing a RAP
related to an investigation driven by a political leaker (rather than a non-political one) is
higher when the electoral performance of the MP’s party is declining.19 Remarkably, the
17 As we discuss in Section 3.5, a related question that we do not consider in this study is whether losing
electoral support could trigger RAPs initiated by any actor (not only political ones).
18 The results are robust to using party fixed effects as well: see Table B.1 in Appendix. Finally, results are
also robust to adding district fixed effects: see Table B.2 in Appendix.
19 When testing the potential quadratic effect of the electoral performance we find no significant effect for
the quadratic term of electoral loss, suggesting that we are more likely to find political leakers only when
parties weaken and not when they are gaining support.
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significant coefficient of the interaction term suggests that this effect is conditional on the
type of crime and it holds only when dealing with corruption crimes.
The sign and significance of the interaction term remains unaltered even when adding
additional regressors. It could be that MPs belonging to stronger parties in a district are
immune to political attacks, even conditioning of an electoral loss. Column 2 adds as
controls the variable (i) Party Size, which is the percentage of votes that the MP’s party
obtained at the national level in the last election before the RAP was sent to the Chamber,
(ii) Government, which is a dummy equal to 1 when the politician hit by the RAP is a
member of a party in office, and (iii) External Support, which is equal to 1 if that party
was externally supporting the cabinet.
Similarly, accounting for the salience of corruption scandals in the political system
does not alter the impact of the MP’s party electoral loss. This is shown in the third
column, where we control for the variable Corruption Salience, which is based on the
hand-coding of legislative speeches, and records the saliency of the corruption issue in
parliamentary debates.20 From column 3 we notice that a one standard deviation increase
from the mean of Electoral Loss increases the likelihood of a RAP driven by a political
leaker by 7.1% (which corresponds to a 20.3% increase in relative terms); conversely, this
effect is no longer statistically significant for crimes of opinion.
The effect that (alleged) corruption crimes are exploited against MPs when their party
is weakening, while opinion crimes are not, underscores an interesting component of
the leaker’s incentives. Intuitively, if the purpose is to weaken an electoral adversary,
exposing a MP with a RAP (which is typically covered by the media) for corruption likely
20 More specifically, the variable Corruption Salience reports the average percentage of sentences pro-
nounced during each investiture debates of Italian government (almost every year) emphasizing the need
to eliminate corruption in political life. This variable varies across years, though on average the salience of
corruption in investiture debates is overall rather similar in the First and Second Republic. This variable is
built following a strategy similar to that of the Comparative Manifesto Project, applying such approach to
speeches delivered by party leaders during the investiture debates.(Ceron and Mainenti, 2018)
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Table 3.1: The Impact of Electoral Loss on Investigations Driven by a Political Leaker
(1) (2) (3)
Electoral Loss (∆VOTi jt) 0.041** 0.053** 0.053**
[0.020] [0.022] [0.022]
Opinion Crime 0.965*** 0.868*** 0.867***
[0.169] [0.192] [0.193]
Electoral Loss × Opinion Crime -0.050** -0.055** -0.055**
[0.028] [0.029] [0.029]








Legislative Terms FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 951 951 951
Notes: Logit estimations; coefficients reported. Dependent variable: dummy equal to one if the
member of Parliament received a request for removal of parliamentary immunity initiated by a
political actor. Standard errors are indicated in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
triggers a negative reaction from attentive voters. Displaying opinion crimes, on the other
hand, could simply reinforce the MP’s reputation among voters who likely share the same
beliefs (Van Spanje and de Vreese, 2015, Jacobs and Van Spanje, 2020).
Why, then, do politicians initiate more opinion RAPs, if not for hurting political ad-
versaries? The significant coefficient associated to the variable Opinion Crime means that
politicians tend to rely on this type of allegations: as we discuss in Section 3.5, opin-
ion RAPs are mainly exploited by politicians with the aim of mobilizing their electorate
(rather than weakening a rival’s reputation) and defending their own reputation against
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allegations. As such, charges of opinion crimes are especially likely to arise during the
process of political campaigning (Chang, Golden and Hill, 2010). For example, the modal
motive for initiating a political opinion RAP is defamation towards false accusations.21 Thus,
rather than being an attempt to bring down a political opponent, opinion RAPs often
reflect an attempt to defend one’s reputation against such attacks.
3.4.2 Are Political RAPs Released Closer to Elections?
If investigations reflect political motives, then MPs’ opponents could leak damaging in-
formation in the midst of the electoral campaign, when their damaging effect is arguably
stronger (3.2). The literature has provided evidence of the importance of timing of infor-
mation released during electoral campaigns, showing that scandals are indeed released
closer to elections (e.g., Gratton, Holden and Kolotilin, 2017); this suggests that in our
setting we should expect RAPs initiated by political leakers to be presented closer to elec-
tions.
To test 3.2, we employ an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the number
of days elapsed between the date of the RAP and the next election. The following is our
baseline specification:
Electioni jt = αt + βPOLi jt + γOPCi jt + δPOLi jt · OPCi jt + η∆VOTi jt + εi jt, (3.2)
where the main regressor of interest is the dummy POLi jt , which takes value 1 when the
RAP against MP i in district j at time t is initiated by a political leaker. POLi jt is interacted,
as before, with the type of crime: OPCi jt is a dummy for opinion crimes. ∆VOTi jt is the
electoral loss of MP i’s party in district j at time t, and αt refers to time fixed effects by
legislative term.
21 Section 3.5 provides an example of this type of RAPs.
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Table 3.2 summarizes the results, showing that having RAPs initiated by political leak-
ers does not affect the timing of the requests; the effect is not statistically significant for
either corruption or opinion crimes. The fact that we do not find evidence in favor of
3.2 is interesting; we conjecture that this might happen because the leaker does not have
complete control over the timing of the investigations (and obviously the timing of elec-
tions).
This null finding is plausible for two reasons. First, Italy is an outlier for the elevated
number of early elections, which might reduce the effectiveness of the strategic use of
judicial investigations. Second, even if the date of the election was certain, it would still
be difficult for a political opponent to forecast the amount of time needed for a scandal to
outbreak and have an electoral effect.
3.4.3 Additional Evidence of Politicization: the Digging-Dirt Process
In this section we investigate further the political use of judicial investigations. To do so,
we draw evidence from the timing of the RAPs. Our data includes the date of when the
request is presented to the committee and that of the alleged crime. In line with 3.3, we
expect that politicians who want to get rid of their political enemies take advantage of
judicial prosecutions by leaking incriminating evidence of old episodes of corruption.
To test our “digging-dirt” hypothesis, in our baseline specification we regress the vari-
able DAY Si jt — i.e., the number of days elapsed from the crime to the date of the RAP —
on our regressor of interest, i.e., the dummy indicating whether the leaker is political:
DAY Si jt = αt + βPOLi jt + γOPCi jt + δPOLi jt · OPCi jt + η∆VOTi jt + εi jt, (3.3)
where as before POLi jt is a dummy which takes value 1 when the RAP against MP i in
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Table 3.2: Political Investigations and Timing of Elections
(1) (2) (3)
Political Leaker 37.822 33.289 39.412
[28.175] [27.511] [26.846]
Opinion Crime 21.244 -44.056 -51.182*
[29.330] [31.481] [30.721]
Political Leaker × Opinion Crime 6.554 6.839 -5.368
[43.138] [42.063] [41.062]
Electoral Loss 6.813*** 6.149** 5.020**
[2.307] [2.424] [2.369]








Legislative Terms FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 933 933 933
Notes: OLS estimations; coefficients reported. Dependent variable: time (days) elapsed between
RAP and next election. Standard errors are indicated in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
district j at time t is initiated by a political leaker. POLi jt is interacted, as before, with the
type of crime: OPCi jt is a dummy for opinion crimes. ∆VOTi jt is the electoral loss of MP
i’s party in district j at time t, and αt refers to time fixed effects by legislative term.
Results from an OLS estimation are reported in Table 3.3. The coefficient of Political
Leaker clearly shows that political leakers do tend to dig back in time. The average time
between the alleged corruption crime and the political RAP is about 6 years. In line with
3.3, this time lag is significantly larger than for non-politically initiated corruption RAPs,
both statistically and substantively (433 days larger).
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By contrast, the elapsed time for opinion crime is about 2 years for non-political opin-
ion crimes and less than one year for political opinion crimes, which is consistent with
the frequent use of the latter during political campaigns. Among opinion RAPs, the dif-
ference between politically driven and non-politically driven ones is positive (+48 days)
but not statistically significant. The results are robust also when including the control
variables discussed above or when using party fixed effects.22
Our results in favor of the digging-dirt conjecture are further supported by qualita-
tive interviews to politicians involved in the Tangentopoli scandal.23 When asked about
the trial against Andreotti, Luciano Violante (PCI) — former Head of the Chamber of
Deputies — says that “despite the trial initiated in the 1980s, it was only triggered after the
Mani Pulite investigation, when traditional parties had already been dismantled.”24 Fur-
thermore, Violante highlights that entrepreneurs had been reporting corruption crimes
for ages, well before the rise of the Tangentopoli scandal, so that this scandal only re-
vealed a latent corruption that was already common knowledge.
Similarly, when discussing the Tangentopoli investigations, the former Head of State
Francesco Cossiga (DC) reports the words of a very famous businessman (name omit-
ted) claiming that “prosecutors charged him with crimes dating 4-5 years back in time, that
were clearly the result of wiretapping that began long before.”25 According to other interviews
(amongst them, the anchorman Enrico Mentana or the prosecutor Gherardo Colombo),
those judicial investigations initiated indeed only when all the main Italian parties started
to face an electoral crisis, losing voters’ support.26 This anecdotal evidence provides sup-
22 See Table B.3 in the Appendix.
23 Cf. Andrea Pamparana (2004) “Mani Pulite,” produced by Giovanni Di Clemente, published by Istituto
Luce. The interviews mentioned in this paper are available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rPaqLj_x6zY.
24 The original interview can be listened from minute 46 onwards.
25 The original interview can be listened from minute 11:30 onwards.
26 The original interviews can be listened from minute 13 onwards.
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Table 3.3: Political Investigations and Time Elapsed from Crime (Days)
(1) (2) (3)
Political Leaker 438.534*** 437.027*** 433.114***
[83.711] [83.898] [83.912]
Opinion Crime -1,001.306*** -1,015.158*** -1,012.175***
[86.864] [95.220] [95.204]
Political Leaker × Opinion Crime -396.995*** -395.678*** -385.596***
[127.729] [127.784] [127.950]
Electoral Loss -6.571 -6.250 -5.666
[6.527] [6.969] [6.979]








Constant 1,719.578*** 1,752.027*** 1,880.280***
[90.879] [125.721] [158.094]
Legislative Terms FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 907 907 907
Notes: OLS estimations; coefficients reported. Dependent variable: time elapsed between (alleged)
crime and RAP. Standard errors are indicated in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
port in favor of the argument that investigations against MPs are politicized.
3.4.4 Digging-dirt Closer to Elections?
While we find no evidence that political RAPs affect the timing of the requests with re-
spect to elections (Table 3.2), it could be that the incentive to release old compromising
information closer to an election is stronger for political opponents than for non-political
77
ones.
If denunciations are political, we might expect leakers to plan the timing of informa-
tion release to judicial authority such that the resulting RAPs fall closer to election dates.
By only searching among recent events, leakers might not find enough rumors of mis-
conduct to be used during the election campaign. Conversely, by digging-dirt back in
time, political leakers might take advantage of their rivals’ past misbehavior to generate
timely investigations against them closer to the election in order to damage their electoral
performance. Therefore, we might expect that RAPs initiated by political leakers refer to
events that took place further back in time than non-political RAPs, especially when these
investigations are disclosed closer to the election day.
Table 3.4 shows a three-way interaction involving Political Leaker, the type of crime
and Days to Election. The positive and significant interaction suggests that, when RAPs
involve corruption crimes, the difference in digging-back between political and non-political
leakers is more pronounced closer to election day.27 This result might be interpreted as follows.
As elections approach, political leakers might not find enough rumors of misconduct by
looking at recent events. Conversely, by digging-dirt back in time, they might exploit
their rivals’ past misbehavior to generate timely investigations against them in order to
damage their electoral performance.
The first panel of Figure 3.4 shows that RAPs related to corruption crimes that are
(i) sent closer to an election and (ii) initiated by a political leaker tend to refer to older
crimes; the marginal effect of a political leaker on the gap between the crime and the RAP
indicates that politically-initiated RAPs issued in the last month before election day date
approximately 680-700 days back in time compared to politically-initiated RAP issued
earlier during the legislature.28 Conversely, the marginal effects suggest that there are no
27 See also the marginal effects reported in Figure 2, in the Appendix.
28 See Figure B.1 in the Appendix for marginal effects.
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Table 3.4: Time Elapsed from Crime
(1) (2) (3)
Political Leaker 675.451*** 708.838*** 700.575***
[151.454] [145.165] [145.400]
Days to Election -0.051 -0.044 -0.011
[0.146] [0.148] [0.152]
Political Leaker × Days to Election -0.600** -0.636** -0.624**
[0.289] [0.277] [0.277]
Opinion Crime -1,021.163*** -1,116.021*** -1,103.354***
[139.831] [153.763] [154.285]
Political Leaker × Opinion Crime -674.005*** -636.482*** -617.722***
[218.516] [231.674] [232.434]
Opinion Crime × Days to Election 0.116 0.113 0.099
[0.172] [0.183] [0.183]
Political Leaker × Opinion Crime × Days to Election 0.590* 0.604* 0.584*
[0.327] [0.329] [0.329]
Electoral Loss -4.883 -4.577
[7.433] [7.439]








Constant 1,719.578*** 1,752.027*** 1,880.280***
[90.879] [125.721] [158.094]
Legislative Terms FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,021 892 892
Notes: OLS estimations; coefficients reported. Dependent variable: time elapsed between (alleged)
crime and RAP. Standard errors are indicated in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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differences between RAPs initiated by political or non-political leakers, when RAPs are
presented to the Chamber long before the election. In other words, when we are far from
the election, political leakers are no longer more willing to dig back in time compared to
non-political leakers. Even if a political leaker does not have a full control on the timing of
the RAP (as discussed above), we find evidence in favor of the idea that leakers attempt to
affect such process, digging dirt and releasing information especially when new elections
are approaching.
Figure 3.4: Predicted values of time elapsed from crime in days, for both corruption and
opinion crimes.
The second panel in Figure 3.4 shows that there is no effect for opinion crimes (the line
is flat and the marginal effect is never statistically significant). Notice that this difference
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does not seem related to the time needed for the crime to be statute barred. For instance,
both corruption and defamation (an opinion crime) are statute barred in the same amount
of time (6 years). Similarly, existing work suggests that opinion crimes can arise due to
the process of political campaigning (Chang, Golden and Hill, 2010). Our findings differ
as on average RAPs are sent closer to the election when they are related to corruption
crimes (471 days) rather than opinion crimes (841 days).
3.5 Discussion
3.5.1 Motives of Political Attacks
What brings political leakers to blow the whistle, thus initiating an investigation likely to
hurt a MP? This section provides some descriptive evidence of the motives behind these
political investigations. Because there is not enough information about political leakers
to perform a statistical analysis aimed at inferring their underlying motives, we report
examples of typologies that occur repeatedly in our data.
One possible driver of the political usage of RAPs is ideology. That is, it could be that
the use of RAPs is increasing in the ideological distance between the leaker and the ac-
cused MP. While ideological disagreement is certainly a plausible motive for initiating
an investigation, our data is based only on initiated RAPs, and therefore we cannot di-
rectly shed light on this mechanism. Yet in future work it might be possible to identify
the ideological stakes of the accuser side to have a picture of whether political leakers are
ideologically close or far from the accused MP. In particular, it would be interesting to
see whether political leakers and accused MPs belong to different parties or to the same
one. Furthermore, to the extent that factional struggle matters for initiating RAPs, we
should expect more leakers belonging to the same party of the accused MP in the First
Republic — when parties were highly factionalized and the electoral system incentivized
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intra-party conflict (Chang, 2005) — than in the Second Republic.
Second, it could be that RAPs are an indication of intra-party sabotage. Competition
among same-party factions was especially heavy in the Christian Democracy, where po-
litical corruption constituted a necessary evil to finance the exorbitant financial needs
for the electoral campaign of opposing factions through illegal resources. Resorting to
bribes was (and still is) extremely common in public procurement, which in our observa-
tions translates into several RAPs revealing a widespread financial network of kickbacks
among firms and politicians. A well known — and representative — example of extor-
tion and bribes directed to particular factions is the RAP initiated by Oscar Luigi Scalfaro
(DC) against Vincenzo Scotti, another prominent member of an opposing faction within
the DC.29 The request reveals that — in the aftermath of an earthquake that hit Naples
— the contractors tasked with the reconstruction of the infrastructures were forced to
pay large sums of money to Scotti’s faction in order to have their projects approved. This
money was then used to finance the Neapolitan faction’s expenses (and the electoral cam-
paign above all). The MP denied all the accusations, and the case was widely covered by
the media.30
Furthermore, RAPs could be used as campaigning tools by political opponents. This
frequently happens with opinion RAPs, used among competitors in the same electoral
district before elections. It is important to stress that, differently from corruption allega-
tions, opinion RAPs are typically used defensively. One recurrent motive for politicians
to initiate an opinion RAP is defamation towards accusing opponents. Political opponents
frequently accuse each other of being close to the Mafia or being elected thanks to the
29 More precisely, the information was gathered before the investigation by a special House
committee (Commissione Parlamentare di Inchiesta) chaired by Scalfaro. Link to original RAP:
http://legislature.camera.it/dati/leg11/lavori/stampati/pdf/37782.pdf.
30 One of the main national newspapers, La Repubblica, closely followed the case point-
ing out the weakness of Scotti’s defense to the prosecutors. Link to original article here:
https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1993/04/22/scotti.
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Mafia. To mention an example, on September 13, 1993 a request to proceed with the in-
vestigation of the deputy Giovanni Fava, elected in the district of Catania (Sicily), was
presented on behalf of the Socialist MP Antonio Salvatore (PSI), elected in the same dis-
trict. In the request, Fava is accused of publishing in the newspaper “Avvenimenti” (June
19, 1993) an article implying that the MP Salvatore interfered with the investigation of
a major Mafia boss, Nitto Santapaola, interceding for him with the prosecutor.31 These
mafia-related incidents are frequent among opinion RAPs, as politicians often attempted
to defend themselves from such accusations. Importantly, while mafia-related incidents
are the object of defensive RAPs, the same are not used offensively with the aim of bring-
ing down opponents. In fact, as already noted above, the prosecution of MPs investi-
gated for participation to Mafia organizations is independent of authorization to proceed
granted from the Chamber.
Finally, notice that, while political RAPs represent a minority of the observations in
our sample, we conjecture that at least some “non-political” RAPs are initiated on behalf
of politicians. That is, it is reasonable to believe that politicians want to engage in poli-
tics by other means without shouldering the costs of leaking the information themselves,
hence provide known incriminating information to a third party (or anonymously to the
prosecutors). In this sense, Andreotti’s quote and personal experience are suggestive: de-
spite having several political enemies, he was never involved in a RAP initiated by another
politician.32 Ultimately, it is not possible to empirically identify the political roots of non-
political RAPs with existing data, and it might well be that the politicization of judicial
investigation is even more pervasive than what our data shows.33
31 Link to original RAP: http://legislature.camera.it/dati/leg11/lavori/stampati/pdf/38242.pdf.
32 The RAP against Andreotti that gave rise to the “trial of the century” was based on the testimony of
the Mafia informant (pentito) Tommaso Buscetta.
33 We also believe that this observation is consistent with the main argument of the paper, which is that
scandals could be politicized and that the relationship between the emergence of scandals and the un-
derlying corruption is not necessarily monotone. Of course scandals could be even more politicized (i.e.,
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3.5.2 Limitations and Future Directions
In this paper we seek to understand when investigations against MPs are initiated by
other political actors. In order to do so, we base our dataset on all the RAPs sent by
judicial prosecutors over the period 1983-2019, and link these requests to parties’ electoral
performance over the same period. This allows us to show that corruption RAPs are more
likely to be initiated by political actors when the accused MP’s party weakens electorally.
That is, we show that conditional on parties losing vote shares there are more political
leakers that explicitly accuse an MP through a RAP. An interesting related question that
we do not consider is whether losing electoral support could trigger RAPs initiated by
any actor (not only political ones). In other words, in addition to the relative number
of political vs non-political RAPs, it could be that weaker parties receive more attacks
in absolute terms. Future work could explore this question by augmenting our dataset
to include all the MPs in a legislative term. This would allow to answer the question of
whether weaker parties are more likely to receive any RAP, in addition to the relative
number of political RAPs that we study.
A related important question concerns the determinants of parties losing vote shares.
While we are agnostic about what determines parties’ electoral decline, there are reasons
to exclude that denunciations cause electoral insecurity. Typically voters are informed of
MPs’ corruption by media coverage of the judicial inquiry that is initiated by — and does
not precede — RAPs. Without this knowledge, voters cannot internalize the informa-
tion on corruption in their vote, as media are the major source of information for voters
upon which effective accountability relies (Chang, Golden and Hill, 2010). Future work
could compare the timing of media coverage of corruption allegations with respect to the
corresponding RAP, to provide further evidence that RAPs constitute the first public an-
politicians could be behind other accusations as well), but we believe that our results provide a useful
reference for a lower bound of the effect.
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nouncement of the alleged misbehavior. Another reason to exclude reverse causality in
our context is the old nature of corruption allegations, which for political RAPs are on av-
erage older than five years. In other words, it is unlikely that voters keep MPs accountable
for corruption allegations that become known to the judiciary in a later electoral cycle.
Finally, are RAPs consequential, or likely to outbreak in scandals? Throughout the
paper we present anecdotal evidence that they do, being covered by the press after re-
quests are presented. Yet it could be interesting to systematically study the consequences
of RAPs. A simple measure of RAPs’ coverage suggests that this is indeed high. We
searched for corruption-related keywords in La Repubblica, Italy’s second most widely
read daily newspaper. In the period 1983-2019, the keyword “Request of Authorization
to Proceed” alone produced 1658 results. While we do not know the tone of the press, at
least this provides information of RAPs’ coverage. To provide further evidence, future re-
search should analyze the aftermath of denunciations, by showing how often each RAPs
leads to scandals, and with what consequences for the politician involved.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper studies political scandals through their denunciation, using original data on
investigations of Italian MPs from 1983 to 2019. Results provide evidence in favor of a
political use of investigations for corruption charges: when parties weaken, the likelihood
of political denunciation of past misbehavior by political rivals increases.
The literature has shown that, when allegations of corruption are covered by the press,
voters tend to punish politicians. While requests of authorization to proceed with the in-
vestigation of MPs represent a useful measure of the MPs’ underlying corruption, our
results suggest that sometimes these requests can be the results of politics “by other
means”— i.e., politicians might find advantageous to publicly denounce their cronies’
corruption for their political gains. Voters are most likely to make errors of inference
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when the MPs’ parties weaken, punishing alleged misbehavior that results from political
opponents’ attacks. This strategic use of investigations suggests to scale down the (par-
tially) positive effect of accountability found by the literature, at least when incentives for
political attacks are strong.
While we focus on Italian data for their richness, we believe that our findings are
informative for other countries as well. The investigation of members of the legislature in
most democracies is typically managed by the legislative institution itself. For example,
the U.S. House of Representatives created the House of Ethics Committee in 1964 with
the power to investigate and report evidence gathered to appropriate federal and state
judicial authorities. Between 1972 and 2012, 5.1% of all representatives who served in
the U.S. House of Representatives were subjected to a corruption investigation by the
Ethics Committee, for a total of 93 investigations (Praino and Graycar, 2018). Our findings
suggest that some of these investigations could be driven by political reasons.
While we do not systematically trace media coverage of each case of investigation,
an overall search for these in news’ archives suggests that they often results in scandals
affecting the investigated MP. Recently, the former Minister of the Interior Matteo Salvini
received a RAP for kidnapping that received massive coverage.34 In the last years other
investigations played a crucial role in everyday politics. For instance, Armando Siri, a
junior minister belonging to Salvini’s League, was forced to resign due to the pressure
of the Five Star Movement (partner of the League in the Conte first cabinet) when Siri
received a RAP concerning an investigation for money laundering. Similar examples can
be found in other periods of Italian history, particularly (but not only) throughout the
Tangentopoli scandal (when there was a daily media coverage of any investigation, even
at early stages). In light of this, future research could further contribute to explaining the
34 The RAP was related to the immigration crisis following Salvini’s decision to shut ports to a migrant
rescue ship.
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link between political leakers, judicial investigation and media coverage to shed light on
the role that judges and (sometimes partisan) journalists can have in damaging the image
of a politician and its party.
87
Chapter 4: Does Electoral Volatility Beget Strong Alliances? A Theory
of Multi-Party Competition
In multi-party systems, alternative future governments are often offered to voters by dif-
ferent configurations of pre-electoral alliances between political parties. A common way
for different parties to form an alliance in a given election is to support joint candidates,
while keeping their separate identities. For example, recent evidence from Mexican and
Finnish local elections demonstrates that parties are willing to form pre-electoral alliances
to remove entrenched incumbent parties from office (Frey, López-Moctezuma and Mon-
tero, 2021, Hortala-Vallve, Meriläinen and Tukiainen, 2021).
Alternatively, parties can join forces by merging into new political entities. Mergers
are a common alternative to pre-electoral coalitions. In Europe, for example, mergers
have occurred on average every third electoral period since World War II.1 Furthermore,
political leaders consider the option of merging even more frequently than what the num-
ber of occurrences suggests. For example, in the UK, mergers are an often discussed op-
tion, as indicated by frequent media reports about the advantages of a merger between
the UK Liberal Democratic Party and the Labour Party.2
Mergers lead to significant changes in the party system. The Italian political landscape
completely changed in 2007, when mergers across the ideological spectrum effectively
1 Ibenskas (2016) collected a dataset that considers 280 democratic elections in the postwar period in Eu-
ropean countries. Overall, the dataset includes 94 mergers formed by 216 parties. These mergers occurred
over 59 electoral periods and were predominantly formed by two parties.
2 Cf. Jenkins, S. (2019) ‘The Lib Dems helped the Tories to victory again. Now they should disband’, The
Guardian, 16 December: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/dec/16/lib-dems-tories-
split-vote-labour
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transformed the system into bipolarism, with two main competing electoral cartels.3 Sta-
ble pre-electoral alliances such as mergers facilitate the formation of durable parties and
can reduce party system fragmentation. The fusion leading to the formation of the Chris-
tian Democratic Appeal in the Netherlands helped to eliminate the cleavage between
Catholics and Protestants in the Dutch party system and substantially reduced party sys-
tem fragmentation. Outside Europe, the merger between the Progressive-Conservative
(PC) and the Canadian Alliance parties in 2003 created a new right-wing formation, sig-
nificantly altering the Canadian party system and subsequent voting behavior (Bélanger
and Godbout, 2010).
Despite the evidence showing that parties across the world are increasingly seen to
join forces before election — adopting various governance configurations — pre-electoral
alliances have not received much attention from the literature on electoral competition,
which typically treats political parties as fixed entities. This paper proposes a model of
elections in which parties can form pre-electoral alliances. Understanding the incentives
behind different configurations of alliances is crucial, as these can have significant conse-
quences on electoral outcomes, policy-making and the development of party systems.
What are the defining features that distinguish mergers from pre-electoral coalitions
(hereafter, PECs)? The first dimension of variation is the scope of parties’ cooperation
(Ibenskas and Bolleyer, 2018). Golder (2006, 28) defines a PEC as a “collection of parties
that do not compete independently in an election, either because they publicly agree to
coordinate their campaigns, run joint candidates or joint lists, or enter government to-
gether following the election.” Parties belonging to a coalition cooperate in specific areas
3 The first fusion occurred between April and October 2007, when the Democratici di Sinistra — the largest
of the successor parties of the former Partito Comunista Italiano — merged with La Margherita to form the
Democratic Party (PD). A few months later, Berlusconi’s Forza Italia merged with the right-wing Alleanza
Nazionale to form the Popolo della Libertà in November. Triggered by the creation of the PD, a smaller merger
occurred that same year between the parties of the radical left, which merged under the name of Sinistra
Arcobaleno.
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(e.g., electoral competition through the formation of joint lists of candidates), while still
competing with their separate identities in other areas (e.g., member recruitment). In con-
trast, mergers are defined as “the amalgamation of two or more independent parties into
a single party organization” (Ibenskas, 2016). This complete fusion implies that coopera-
tion becomes unrestricted: a merger entails an agreement to become a new organization,
which presupposes unrestricted and universal cooperation among the constituent parties.
The literature provides an intuitive analysis of the factors that should facilitate the
formation of mergers. On the one hand, mergers are less likely to form among highly
ideologically distant parties and when parties have established identities. On the other,
a highly disproportional electoral system encourages parties to merge to improve their
post-electoral legislative weight. However, very similar incentives drive parties’ choice
to join PECs, without relinquishing their own identity or party brand. When, and why,
do parties retain their separate identities rather than merge into a larger party?
I argue that parties’ choice over different forms of pre-electoral alliances crucially de-
pends on electoral volatility, reflecting the extent to which voters’ preferences change be-
tween subsequent elections. Electoral volatility can be thought as being inversely related
to partisanship: if voters are highly partisan, voters’ preferences are likely to stay con-
stant over time. Parties face a dynamic trade-off: while mergers insure constituent parties
against unfavorable shifts in the electorate’s preferences, these binding forms of alliances
come at the cost of losing the opportunity to join more advantageous coalitions in the
future. Conversely, alliances that allow parties to maintain their identity offer more flexi-
bility to respond to changes in voters’ preferences.
To analyze this trade-off, the paper introduces a model of multi-party electoral com-
petition where policy-motivated parties can form alliances before elections. In the model,
each party is associated with a different policy platform, or “brand.” While these brands
are fixed, parties can change the policy platform that voters evaluate by joining pre-
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electoral alliances. In particular, the platform resulting from an alliance is a convex combi-
nation of the constituent parties’ platforms. Besides competing alone and forming PECs
— whereby distinct parties run with a common platform — parties can constitute new
political entities by merging. A merger is a binding arrangement that solidifies the rela-
tive power constituent parties have at a given point in time. Conversely, PECs preserve
parties’ identities, allowing parties to be more flexible to changes in the electoral environ-
ment.
The model features a two-period game between three parties. In each period, parties
can form mergers or PECs (or run alone), and an election takes place. While mergers
persist in the future election, PECs are only temporary alliances that need to be rene-
gotiated in each period. This assumption reflects the empirical regularity that PECs are
often revisited: for instance, coalition candidates’ lists are typically renegotiated before
each election. In contrast, once a merger is formed there is a high cost for terminating it.
Indeed, mergers persist more easily across elections, as Figure 4.1 suggests.
When deciding which type of alliance to choose, if any, the main trade-off parties
face is between the flexibility provided by a PEC and the insurance against large shifts
in public opinion that a merger guarantees. Keeping separate identities allows parties
to respond to changes in voters’ preferences, which are modeled as a move of Nature in
favor of either party that takes place between elections. By merging, parties commit to
the relative power held at the time of the merger formation, which makes their electoral
performance less subject to large shifts in voters’ preferences.
The main result of the paper shows that when electoral volatility — i.e., the likelihood
of large shifts in voters’ preferences — is high enough, in equilibrium parties form strong
alliances such as mergers. Intuitively, if voters’ preferences shift too much in one direc-
tion, the advantaged party can govern alone; hence for high realizations of the shock the
centrist party risks being left out of power. Conversely, as voters’ preferences become
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Figure 4.1: Number of stable/unstable coalitions and mergers in the first six electoral
periods in 10 countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Source: Ibenskas and Bolleyer
(2018).
more stable, the centrist party values more flexibility and prefers to wait to form a more
advantageous coalition in the future. Electoral instability is often considered a character-
istic of the early years of democratic regimes (Kitschelt et al., 1999). This result provides
an explanation for the empirical observation that the frequency of mergers decreases as
democratic regimes mature (Ibenskas and Sikk, 2017).
How does this central trade-off vary with different electoral, legislative, and execu-
tive institutions? The model formalizes how the incentives to form alliances depend on
inter-party power sharing (Lijphart, 1984). The degree of power sharing depends on both
the rules mapping votes into seats (e.g., electoral rule proportionality) and the rules gov-
erning legislative decisions (e.g., the presence of super-majority requirements). Results
show that some degree of power concentration is a necessary condition for both PECs and
mergers to take place. For example, disproportional electoral systems can induce parties
to join forces by forming pre-electoral alliances to maximize their electoral chances (Olsen,
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2007, Rakner, Svåsand and Khembo, 2007, Bélanger and Godbout, 2010). Conversely, pre-
electoral alliances are not sustainable in consensual democracies that protect minority
parties, which feature parties running alone in equilibrium.
While PECs allow parties to campaign autonomously, mergers demand that parties
give up their ideological identities by forming new political entities that persist in the
future. If voters are uncertain about the exact location of parties’ platforms, different con-
figurations of alliances among the same parties might be evaluated differently from the
electorate. An extension of the model incorporates voters’ uncertainty by introducing
noise in the location of parties’ platforms. To capture the fact that “mergers reduce, or
even destroy, the information value of party labels for voters” (Ibenskas, 2016, 343), I as-
sume that mergers are associated with higher noise than PECs, and the noise is increasing
in the distance between the constituent parties’ bliss points. The main results are robust to
this setting when the noise associated with mergers is not too high. In contrast, mergers
are not sustainable in equilibrium for high values of ideological uncertainty.
The paper provides novel insights and implications for the process of party system
stabilization. The literature has often linked electoral volatility to unstable party systems.
Indeed, several studies even use measures of electoral volatility as an indicator of party
system instability.4 However, by implicitly assuming that a volatile electorate is responsi-
ble for system instability, this approach overlooks the fundamental choices of elites in the
determination of party system development (Tavits, 2008). This model suggests to take
into account parties’ strategic organizational choices to avoid omitted variable bias when
evaluating the relation between electoral volatility and party system stability.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.1 and 4.2 present the
baseline model and main results. Section 4.3 and 4.4 extend the baseline model to consider
alternative power sharing institutions and voters’ uncertainty over parties’ platforms.
4 Cf. Tavits (2008) for an overview on Western European and OECD countries.
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Section 4.5 discusses the results and concludes.
4.1 The Model
Consider a two-period game of electoral competition between three policy-motivated par-
ties: i = L,C,R. Each period features a proposal stage, which determines parties’ alliances,
and an election. Each party is associated with a preferred policy platform zi ∈ R, where
zl < zc < zr . There exists a continuum of voters, indexed by v, who vote for one of the
parties. Voters’ ideal points are uniformly distributed over a subset of the policy space,
Z ≡ [−a,a], whereZ ⊂ R.5 The ideal policy of voter v is denoted by zv ∈ Z.
The sequence of the proposal stage is as follows. First, the centrist party C proposes to
either L or R to form a merger, or doesn’t propose any merger. If C’s proposal to L (R) is
accepted, the merged party runs against R (L). If C’s proposal is rejected, or if no merger
is proposed, C proposes a PEC to either party, or doesn’t propose any PEC. If C’s proposal
to L (R) is accepted, the PEC formed by L,C (C,R) runs against R (L). If C’s proposal to
L (R) is rejected or if no PEC is proposed, parties compete with their separate identities.
After the proposal stage is completed, an election takes place, resulting in the adoption of
the policy preferred by the winner.
Notice that the proposal stage rules out the possibility of an alliance between L and
R. Besides being empirically rare, it is not clear which platform would emerge from an
alliance between two non-moderate parties at the opposite extremes of the ideological
spectrum, nor how to compute the resulting vote share. The sequence of the proposal is
empirically motivated by the flexible nature of PECs vis-à-vis mergers: C can propose a
PEC to either L, R after a merger proposal has been rejected, while it cannot propose a
5 This assumption is without loss of generality and is merely convenient for computing parties’ vote
shares.
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merger to L (R) after a merger proposal to R (L).6 However, having C proposing a PEC to
only one party or to both does not qualitatively change the results.
In what follows I formally define the policies that result from an alliance between party
L and C. The policies resulting from an alliance between C and R are defined analogously.
Denote by Vi,t party i’s vote share at time t, where t = 1,2. Suppose that L and C merge or
form a PEC in t. Then, the policy platform of the resulting party or PEC in t is a convex
combination of the constituent parties’ bliss points:
zmlc,t = z
pec
lc,t = λl,t zl + (1 − λl,t) zc. (4.1)
The weight λl,t ∈ (0,1) measures the relative electoral strength of the extreme party (L) in




+ φ(Vl,t − Vc,t), (4.2)
where the parameter φ ∈ R+ is small enough to ensure that λl,t ∈ (0,1). Equation 4.1 im-
plies that the policies resulting from PECs and mergers are equivalent in the same period.7
At the beginning of the second period (t = 2), an exogenous shock ξ favoring party
R affects all voters equally, where ξ is uniformly distributed in [− 1ψ ,
1
ψ ]. The support of
the shock represents electoral volatility: as ψ decreases, the support of the shock becomes
larger, and electoral volatility increases. Conversely, as ψ increases, the support of the
shock shrinks and the electoral outcome becomes more predictable.
After the shock is realized, if no merger formed in t = 1 the proposal and election
stages of the second period take place. To simplify the description of the equilibrium,
6 An alternative (less credible) bargaining protocol would allow C to make sequential merger proposals.
However, this would not qualitatively affect the main results.
7 The extension in Section 4.4 differentiates between the two types of alliances in the same period by
introducing noise in the location of parties’ platforms.
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I assume that mergers persist in t = 2 after being formed in t = 1. That is, constituent
parties cannot split in the period that follows the merger formation. This assumption is
motivated by the bureaucratic costs and the change in the electorate’s preferences that
mergers might cause. Typically, several legal requirements are needed for the registration
of a new party, which could impede the formation of a splinter party following a recent
merger (Hug, 2001). Voters’ preferences might also change because of the merger: pre-
vious supporters of the constituent parties might transfer their loyalties to the merged
party. Furthermore, voters might consider the members of the splinter party as noncred-
ible because of frequent changes in their party affiliation (Mershon and Shvetsova, 2013).
Because of electoral volatility, the policy resulting from a merger (or PEC) formed in
t = 2 is different from the policy resulting from a merger formed in t = 1 and persisting
in t = 2. This is because volatility changes parties’ relative vote shares and in turn the
weight each party has in the common platform. Crucially, while mergers “solidify” the
relative power parties have in t = 1 — which is given by each party’s vote share Vi,1 —
PECs are re-negotiated in t = 2, allowing parties to be flexible to changes in the electoral
environment which can alter their relative power.
Voters and parties have standard quadratic preferences over policies. Voter v’s real-








The implemented policy x̂t is the preferred policy platform of the winner of the elec-
tion, i.e., the party, PEC or merger with the majority of votes in t. If no party/merger/PEC
obtains a majority, the implemented policy is determined post-electorally by the party
chosen to be the formateur — i.e., the party that is awarded the opportunity to form a gov-
ernment. The baseline model assumes that the formateur is the one with the plurality of
votes, and that this dominant party (or coalition) can implement its preferred policy after
the election. Section 4.3 analyzes the case where the implemented policy is a compromise
96
among the policy positions of all the parties composing the parliament, without regard to
whether these parties are in government or opposition.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The first period proposal and election stages take place, and the policy outcome is
implemented.
2. Nature determines the realization of the shock to voters’ preferences.
3. If a merger occurred in the first period, the second period election takes place. If no
merger occurred in the first period, the second period proposal and election stages
take place, and the policy outcome is implemented.
I focus on subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies. For party C a pure strategy is a
proposal decision in t = 1 and, conditional on no mergers forming in t = 1, a proposal
decision in t = 2. For party L (R) a pure strategy is an acceptance decision in t = 1 and,
conditional on no mergers forming in t = 1, an acceptance decision in t = 2. Since no voter
is ever pivotal, I adopt the standard assumption that voters vote sincerely. Furthermore, I
assume that voters maximize their current period payoff in each election. Parties, on the
other hand, maximize their expected overall payoff, and each party evaluates the future
according to a common discount factor δ ∈ (0,1).
The following analysis assumes without loss of generality that C is weakly closer to L
than to R: |zc − zl | ≤ |zc − zr |. To avoid trivialities I also assume that in the first period i) no
party has an outright majority and ii) parties’ ideal points are such that C would obtain a
majority by forming either alliance (with L or R).8
8 Notice that these assumptions imply that parties’ platform at least partially overlap withZ in the first
period: i.e., zc ∈ Z, although zl and zr can lie outside ofZ.
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4.2 Analysis
I start by computing the voters’ decision in the second period, which determines the
vote share of each party. Given these vote shares, I analyze parties’ decision to form
a merger or PEC or to run alone. Given the second period outcomes, I compute the
expected payoff of each party from merging, forming a PEC or running alone in the first
period as a function of electoral volatility, and characterize the equilibrium of the game.
4.2.1 Pre-Electoral Coalitions
Let us analyze first what happens in the second period when no merger formed in the first
period. To compute party i’s vote share from running alone (Vi,2) it suffices to identify the
location of the voter who is indifferent between each pair of parties. Let vlc,2 denote the
ideal point of the voter who is indifferent between L and C in t = 2, where vlc,2 is located
at (zl + zc)/2. The voter who is indifferent between C and R, denoted by vcr,2, is defined
analogously. Then, the vote share of L is the CDF of the distribution of voters’ ideal points
evaluated at vlc,2. Since voters’ bliss points are uniformly distributed onZ, L’s vote share
is simply:
Vl,2 =
2a + zl + zc − 2ξ
4a
, (4.3)
which depends on the realization of the shock to voters’ preferences. A positive (negative)
realization of the shock shifts voters’ ideal policies to the right (left) thereby increasing the
vote share of party R (L) by |ξ |. Similarly, Vc,2 = (zr − zl)/4a = Vc,1 and
Vr,2 = 1 − Vl,2 − Vc,2 =
2a − zc − zr + 2ξ
4a
. (4.4)
The vote share of a PEC formed in the second period is derived analogously. Let Vpeclc,2
be the vote share of a PEC between L and C in t = 2. Similarly to Vl,2 (4.3), the PEC’s
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vote share is computed by finding the location of the voter who is indifferent between
zpeclc,2 = λl,2 zl + (1 − λl,2) zc and zr,2, which produces
Vpeclc,2 =
8a2 + 2a(zc + zl + 2zr − φzc + φzl − 4ξ) − φ(zc − zl)(zc − zr + 2(zl − ξ))
16a2
. (4.5)
Similarly, the vote share of a PEC between C and R is
Vpeccr,2 =
8a2 − 2a(zc + zr + 2zl − φzc + φzr − 4ξ) − φ(zc − zr)(zc − zl + 2(zr − ξ))
16a2
. (4.6)
Finally, recall that zmlc,2 = z
pec
lc,2 (4.1), which implies that the vote share of a merger formed







Given these vote shares, what determines parties’ choice in the second period? In
the proposal stage, parties compare the realized payoff from merging, forming a PEC,






cr,2, parties are indifferent between
merging and forming a PEC in t = 2. I assume that, when indifferent, party i chooses a
PEC. It follows that party i compares the realized payoffs from the two possible PECs to
that of running alone. These payoffs depend on the location of parties’ ideal points, and
on the realization of the shock to voters’ preferences.
The shock has a twofold impact on parties’ decision: first, it has a direct effect on
parties’ vote share, by swinging voters’ preferences in favor of either L or R. I denote this
the electoral effect. Second, by changing parties’ relative vote share, the shock indirectly
affects parties’ influence on the final policy of a PEC. I denote this the policy effect.
In what follows I define threshold values of the shock realization that determine which
of these two effects prevails in parties’ decision to form a PEC in t = 2. These values also
provide useful cutoffs to describe parties’ equilibrium behavior in the second period.
Definition 4.1. Let ξ(zl, zc, zr) be the value of ξ such that L’s vote share Vl,2 > 1/2 for ξ <
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ξ(zl, zc, zr). It follows from the expression of Vl,2 (4.3) that ξ = zl+zc2 .
Similarly, let ξ(zl, zc, zr) be the value of the shock realization such that R’s vote share Vr,2 > 1/2
for ξ > ξ(zl, zc, zr). It follows from the expression of Vr,2 (4.4) that ξ = zc+zr2 .
Let us first consider parties’ decision when ξ > ξ. When a party has the majority
of votes, the electoral effect trumps every other consideration: by running alone, R can
implement its preferred policy. Similarly, when ξ < ξ party L runs alone and wins, hence
the implemented policy is x̂2 = zl . Hence, for ξ < ξ (ξ > ξ ) L (R) rejects a PEC proposal
from C and in equilibrium parties run alone in the second period.
When ξ < ξ < ξ, no party obtains an absolute majority if all parties run alone, yet a
party that runs alone against a PEC could obtain a majority of votes. In particular, when
parties form PECs, it could be that (i) Vpeclc,2 > 1/2, (ii) V
pec
cr,2 > 1/2, or both. The following
definition derives values of the shock realization that define each of these occurrences.
Definition 4.2. Let ξpec(zl, zc, zr) be the value of ξ such that V
pec
cr,2 > 1/2 for ξ > ξ
pec(zl, zc, zr). It
follows from the expression of Vpeccr,2 (4.6) that
ξpec =
2a(zc + (zr − zc)φ + zr + 2zl) + φ(zc − zr)(zc + 2zr − zl)
8a + 2φ(zc − zr)
. (4.7)
Similarly, let ξ
pec(zl, zc, zr) be the value of ξ such that L’s vote share V
pec
lc,2 > 1/2 for ξ < ξ
pec(zl, zc, zr).




2a(zc + (zl − zc)φ + zl + 2zr) − φ(zc − zl)(zc + 2zl − zr)
8a + 2φ(zl − zc)
. (4.8)
Let us analyze C’s decision when ξpec < ξ < ξ
pec
. Definition 4.2 implies that for these
values of the shock realization both PECs would reach an absolute majority. Then, C’s
proposal determines which PEC is formed in equilibrium. Under the assumptions, both
L and R accept C’s proposal — as running alone would result in a certain loss — and in
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t = 2 a PEC is formed. Then, C’s decision determines whether the PEC is between L and




















The following results show how C’s decision changes with different values of the
shock realization and with the location of parties’ platforms. In particular, Lemma 4.1
shows that, as voters’ preferences shift in favor of R (L), the centrist party prefers a coali-
tion with L (R). Lemma 4.2 then shows that C prefers an alliance with the ideologically
closest party when voters’ preferences are stable (i.e., ξ = 0). Finally, Proposition 4.1 char-
acterizes the (second period) equilibrium alliance configuration based on the value of the
shock realization.






c (ξ) is strictly increasing in ξ.
Proof. All proofs can be found in the Appendix. 
When ξpec < ξ < ξ
pec
both PECs obtain a majority if formed. When this is the case,
Lemma 4.1 shows that the policy effect determines C’s proposal decision. To see why,
suppose that the shock realization is such that C is indifferent between the two coalitions.
Now, let the value of the shock realization increase. This increase leads to a higher (lower)
vote share of party R (L), which means that R (L)’s preferred policy weighs more (less) in
9 Running alone is strictly dominated for C, because it would result in the adoption of the policy pre-
ferred by the party with the plurality of votes.
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a PEC between C and R (L). Then, ceteris paribus, C would prefer to form a PEC with L.
Conversely, a lower value of the shock makes a coalition with R more appealing.
Whether C forms a PEC with L or R ultimately depends on the location of the plat-
forms zi. Let us first evaluate what PEC party C prefers when ξ = 0, i.e., when voters’
preferences are stable. In this case, C is indifferent between L and R (i.e., ∆pecc (0) = 0)
when zl and zr are equidistant from zc, and prefers the closer ally otherwise, as the next
result shows.
Lemma 4.2. ∆pecc (0) is strictly increasing in zr .
Since C is closer to L than to R by assumption, a corollary of Lemma 4.2 is that when
ξ = 0 party C prefers a coalition with L. Furthermore, Lemma 4.1 implies that when the
shock favors R (i.e., when ξ > 0), C continues to prefer an alliance with L.
The next definition derives the value of the shock realization, ξ̂, such that party C is
indifferent between proposing a PEC to L or R (i.e., ∆pecc (ξ̂) = 0) for any zi.
Definition 4.3. Let ξ̂(zl, zc, zr) be the value of the shock realization such that ∆
pec
c (ξ̂) = 0. It
follows from the expression of ∆pecc (4.9-4.10) that
ξ̂ =
a(φ + 1)(2zc − zl − zr)
φ(zl − zr)
− zc + zl + zr . (4.11)
It follows from Lemma 4.1 that C prefers to form a PEC with L (R) when ξ > ξ̂
(ξ < ξ̂). Whenever both PECs obtain the majority of votes (ξpec < ξ < ξ
pec
), the threshold
ξ̂ determines which of the two PECs form.
Figure 4.2 summarizes the implications of Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2, plotting the
region such that ∆pecc (ξ) > 0 as a function of ξ (x axis) and zr (y axis). Party L and C’s
preferred platforms are set respectively to zl = −0.6 and zc = 0.
When the electoral shock favors R (ξ > 0, right region), party C prefers to form a PEC
with L, unless R is ideologically close enough. When the shock realization favors L (ξ < 0,
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Figure 4.2: PEC decision. ∆pecc (ξ) as a function of the value of ξ (x axis) and zr (y axis).
The blue region corresponds to the values of ξ, zr such that C prefers a coalition with L
than with R (∆pecc > 0). The other parameters are set to zl = −0.6, zc = 0, a = 1 and φ = 1.5.
left region), party C prefers to form a PEC with R. This happens because the policy cost
effect from a PEC with L induces the centrist party to form a coalition with R (Lemma
4.1). This policy effect prevails whenever C could achieve a majority by forming a PEC
with both parties (i.e., when ξpec < ξ < ξ
pec
). Fix zr = 0.7. For these parameter values,
we have that ξpec = −0.17, ξpec = 0.24, and that ξ̂ = −0.03. Hence, in equilibrium a PEC
between C and R (C and L) forms for ξpec < ξ < ξ̂ (ξ̂ < ξ < ξ
pec
).
Finally, it could be that only one PEC has the absolute majority of votes in the second
period. Suppose that Vpeclc,2 > 1/2 and V
pec
cr,2 < 1/2.
10 If C were to propose a PEC to L, L
would reject because it could set its preferred platform by forming a minority government
after elections.11 Similarly, because L has a relative majority, a PEC between C and R
would not change the post-electoral policy set by L. Hence, when only a PEC between
L and C reaches the absolute majority of votes, in equilibrium parties run alone and L
10 It follows from Definition 4.2 that this is the case for ξ < ξ < ξpec.
11 Notice that this would not be true if the realized policy was determined after parliamentary negotia-
tions among all parties. Section 4.3 analyzes this possibility.
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forms a minority government (the case such that Vpeccr,2 > 1/2 is analogous).
The following proposition summarizes the last observation and the previous results
without proof.
Proposition 4.1. PEC Decision and Second-Period Policy Outcome. Suppose that no merger
formed in t = 1. Then, in t = 2 parties form PECs for intermediate realizations of the shock ξ, and
compete alone for extreme ones. In particular, for ξpec < ξ < ξ̂ (ξ̂ < ξ < ξ
pec
), a PEC between C,




lc,2). Conversely, when ξ < ξ
pec (ξ > ξ
pec
), parties run alone and
x̂2 = zl (zr).
The second-period analysis summarized in Proposition 4.1 suggests when we should
expect parties to run alone or to form alliances. One interesting insight that emerges
from the analysis is that parties can join PECs to prevent other parties from obtaining
an absolute majority and control of the policy-making process. In line with this logic,
Hortala-Vallve, Meriläinen and Tukiainen (2021) provide evidence from Finnish munici-
palities that parties join PECs to avoid concentration of power in the hands of the largest
party when this is close to obtaining more than half of the seats. Similarly, Frey, López-
Moctezuma and Montero (2021) document that in Mexican mayoral elections parties form
alliances to remove advantaged incumbent parties from office. Furthermore, taking the
electoral effect as given, Lemma 4.2 suggests that we should expect PECs to be more
likely among ideologically close parties, a result which is widely supported by the em-
pirical literature on pre-electoral coalitions (Golder, 2006, Ibenskas, 2016, Hortala-Vallve,
Meriläinen and Tukiainen, 2021).
Let Ui,2(¬m1) denote the expected second-period payoff of party i, when no merger
formed in the first period. Proposition 4.1 allows us to express Ui,2(¬m1) as a function of
electoral volatility. By the uniform assumption of the shock, the probability of ξ falling
below some threshold x is Pr{ξ < x} = 12+
ψ






















































lc,2) is the expected payoff of party i from the LC coalition platform, which












These expressions will determine the equilibrium in the first period, when parties com-
pare Ui,2(¬m1) to the expected second-period payoff conditional on a merger in t = 1,
which is derived next.
4.2.2 Mergers
The second-period analysis following a merger in t = 1 is more straightforward. Suppose
that a merger between L and C formed. Let ξ̃l be the value of the shock realization such
that a merger between L and C obtains half of the vote share, where ξ̃l = (zmlc+ zr)/2. Then,
for ξ < ξ̃l , the policy outcome is x̂2 = zmlc, otherwise it is x̂2 = zr . Similarly, suppose that a
merger between C and R formed in t = 1. Let ξ̃r be the value of the shock realization such
that a merger between C and R obtains half of the vote share, where ξ̃r = (zl + zmcr)/2. For
ξ > ξ̃r , the policy outcome is x̂2 = zmcr , otherwise it is x̂2 = zl .
Denote by Ui,2(mlc,1) the expected second-period payoff of party i, when a merger be-













































Given these expressions, we can easily compare party C’s expected payoff from merg-
ing with L and R. The expected payoff of party i from a merger between L and C is the
sum of two components: the realized payoff from the merged party policy platform in




lc,1) + δUi,2(mlc), (4.16)
where the realized policy in the first period coincides with the merged party’s platform,
since the merger has the majority of votes in t = 1. The expression for Umi,cr is analogous.
When does C prefer to merge with the closest party L? The payoff that C obtains in the
first period from merging with L is clearly higher than the one following a merger with
R, because the implemented policy resulting from the former is closer to C’s ideal point.
Yet, depending on the probability of winning the election in the second period, C might
prefer to merge with R. The next result shows that as volatility increases C prefers to
merge with the ideologically more distant party (R), which benefits more from a volatile
electorate than L.
Lemma 4.3. Let ∆mc (ψ) = Ui,2(mlc,1) −Ui,2(mcr,1). ∆mc (ψ) is strictly increasing in ψ.
Similarly to the second period analysis over PECs, whether C prefers to merge with
L or R depends on the location of the platforms. Intuitively, as R moves away from C’s
preferred platform, C is more likely to form a merge with L, as shown in the next result.
Lemma 4.4. ∆mc (ψ) is strictly increasing in zr .
It follows from Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.4 that, depending on the value of electoral
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volatility, C might prefer to merge with either L or R. Let ψ̃(zl, zc, zr) be the value of the
shock realization such that ∆mc (ψ̃) = 0, that is, such that party C is indifferent between
proposing a merger to L or R in the first period for any zi.12 Then, C prefers to form a
merger with R (L) when ψ < ψ̃ (ψ > ψ̃).
Figure 4.3 summarizes these observations, plotting the region such that ∆mc (ψ) > 0 as
a function of ψ (x axis) and zr (y axis). Party L and C’s preferred platforms are set to
zl = −0.6 and zc = 0 respectively. Intuitively, when zr is closer to C than L (zr < 0.6), C
prefers to merge with R. As R becomes more extreme than L, which merger is preferred
from C depends on electoral uncertainty: as the support of the shock grows, C can prefer
a merger with R (upper left region), even if the latter is further away from C. In other
words, by affecting the future expected vote share electoral volatility can mute policy
considerations when comparing mergers with different parties in the first period.
Figure 4.3: Merger decision. ∆mc (ψ) as a function of the value of ψ (x axis) and zr (y axis).
The blue region corresponds to the values of ψ, zr such that C prefers to merge with L
rather than with R (∆mc > 0). The other parameters are set to zl = −0.6, zc = 0, a = 1 and
φ = 1.5.
12 The expression for ψ̃(zl, zc, zr ) is presented in the Appendix.
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4.2.3 When are Mergers Sustainable? The Role of Electoral Volatility
It is now possible to describe the equilibrium of the game. The next result shows that there
exists a trade-off between merging and forming a PEC depending on electoral volatility.
The previous section has derived the expected payoff of party i from a merger between
L and C (4.16). This is compared to the expected payoff of party i from a coalition between
L and C, i.e.:
Upeci,lc = u(z
pec
lc,1) + δUi,2(¬m1), (4.17)
where the second component of the RHS is party i’s expected payoff in t = 2 following a
PEC between L and C (4.12). The expressions for Upeci,cr is analogous, where the first-period
realized payoff is ui(z
pec
cr ), and the second period expected payoff is Ui,2(¬m1).
What conditions can sustain an equilibrium in which parties merge? For C to prefer
a merger with L, it must be that (i) Umc,lc > U
m
c,cr , (ii) Umc,lc > U
pec





c .13 Notice that we know from Lemma 4.3 that for high electoral volatility
C prefers to merge with the more extreme party R. Furthermore, we can immediately
compare the expected payoff from the two PECs, because the second period payoff is
the same for both of them (4.12). This leads to the following strict ranking for party C:
Upecc,lc > U
pec
c,cr , which simply follows from comparing the first-period payoffs.14
The next result describes the equilibrium of the baseline game, showing that different
alliance configurations can emerge depending on the electorate’s volatility.
Proposition 4.2. Electoral Volatility and Merger Equilibrium. Let ψ̂ be the value of ψ such
that C is indifferent between merging and forming a PEC with the closest party (L). In the first
period, when electoral volatility is sufficiently low (ψ > ψ̂), C forms a PEC with the closest party
13 Clearly, conditions (i)-(iv) are necessary but not sufficient for a merger between C and L to form in
equilibrium, as the merger must be incentive compatible for L as well.









(L). Mergers emerge for high electoral volatility: when ψ̃ < ψ < ψ̂, C merges with the closest
party (L), and when ψ < ψ̃, C merges with the more extreme party (R).
Proposition 4.2 conveys a simple intuition about parties’ incentives to join different
types of alliances. When the likelihood of large shifts in voters’ preferences is high enough,
in equilibrium the centrist party prefers to merge rather than to form a PEC. By merging,
the centrist party insures itself against large shifts in the electorate’s preferences, at the
cost of losing the opportunity to form a more advantageous coalition in the future. Fur-
thermore, when ψ̃ < ψ < ψ̂, C chooses the ideologically closest party to minimize the
policy cost from the merged party platform. This result is consistent with empirical evi-
dence on the ideological location of constituent parties joining mergers (Ibenskas, 2016).
However, when volatility is extremely high (ψ < ψ̃), electoral considerations might trump
the policy effect, resulting in a merger with more distant allies.
Proposition 4.2 also shows that mergers are not sustainable anymore when voters’
preferences are stable — which can be empirically associated with a highly partisan elec-
torate. In this case, the centrist party values more flexibility, and forms with the closest
party a temporary alliance which does not bind its policy platform in the future. By
forming a PEC in the first period, the centrist party maintains its original platform, pre-
serving its brand for the future election, when more information about voters’ preferences
is available.
Proposition 4.2 suggests that we should expect mergers to be empirically associated
with volatile electorates. In principle, an accurate measure of electoral volatility should
reflect the extent to which personal votes change between subsequent elections. Thus,
individual level data identifying voters’ intentions to vote or party identification across
time represent an accurate measure of volatility.
In the absence of individual level data, empirical analysts have turned to aggregate
measures of volatility (Pedersen, 1979, Bartolini and Mair, 1990, Sikk, 2005, Emanuele,
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2015). The original index of volatility, developed by Pedersen (1979), measures the sum
of the absolute values of vote percentage changes of parties from one election to another
divided by two. This measure presents endogeneity concerns, as mergers alter the config-
uration of the party system thus generating volatility. One solution, as suggested by Sikk
(2005), is to consider the merged parties as one in the election where they ran separately.
This approach is preferred because it does not lead to overestimation of volatility scores.
It is a conservative approach because it assumes that the constituent parties’ voters should
also support the merged party, thus underestimating voter mobility.
4.2.4 Illustration: Equilibrium Alliances and Volatility
Proposition 4.2 shows that a merger between C and L is only sustainable in equilibrium
when Umc,cr > U
pec
c,lc , as in this case a merger is incentive compatible for L. Conversely,
when Umc,cr < U
pec
c,lc , L could reject a merger proposal and the outcome would be a PEC
with C, L’s preferred option. The following example illustrates this point, by deriving the
equilibrium for fixed parties’ preferred platforms and showing each party’s incentives to
form alliances given different values of electoral uncertainty.
Considers parties’ platforms such that the centrist party lies in the middle of the policy
space Z = [−1,1], and the right party is more extreme than the left. Let zl = −0.6, zc = 0
and zr = 0.7, such that no party has a majority in t = 1: Vl,1 = 0.35, Vc,1 = 0.325, Vr,1 = 0.325.
Let’s start by computing parties’ decision in the second period. For high values of the
shock realization (ξ > ξ) R runs alone and the implemented policy is x̂2 = zr . Similarly,
for low values of the shock realization (ξ < ξ) L runs alone and x̂2 = zl . For intermediate
values of the shock realization (ξpec < ξ < ξ
pec
), Vpeclc,2 > 1/2 and V
pec
cr,2 > 1/2. In this case,
both L and R are willing to form an alliance with C, and in t = 2 a PEC is formed.
To decide which PEC to form, C compares the payoff from a PEC with L (4.9) to that of
a PEC with R (4.10). Whether one alliance is preferred to the other depends on the value
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. Figure 4.4 provides a
graphical representation of C’s decision, plotting the region for which ∆pecc (ξ) > 0 as a
function of the shock realization (x axis) and zc (y axis), for zl = −0.6 and zr = 0.7. As the
shock favors R, C’s incentives to form a coalition with L increase because of the policy
effect of an increased weight in the PEC platform.
Figure 4.4: ∆pecc (ξ) as a function of the value of ξ (x axis) and zc (y axis). The blue region
corresponds to the values of ξ, zc such that C prefers a coalition with L than with R (∆
pec
c >
0). The other parameters are set to zl = −0.6, zr = 0.7, a = 1, ψ = 2 and φ = 1.
For these parameter values, the following is the equilibrium second-period outcome
as a function of the shock realization: when ξ < ξ = −0.17, parties run alone and x̂2 = zl ,
when ξ < ξ < ξ̂ (where ξ̂ = −0.03) a PEC among C and R forms and x2 = z
pec
cr,2, when
ξ̂ < ξ < ξ (where ξ = 0.24) a PEC among C and L forms and x̂2 = z
pec
lc,2 , and when ξ > ξ,
parties run alone and x̂2 = zr .
In the first period parties compare the expected values of merging, forming PECs and
running alone as a function of electoral volatility. Figure 4.5 illustrates which types of
alliances emerge in equilibrium as a function of electoral volatility. The orange and gray
regions plot the range of parameters sustaining an equilibrium where parties merge in
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the first period, while the blue region plots the range for which parties form PECs in the
first period, as a function of ψ (x axis) and parties’ discount factor (y axis).
Figure 4.5: Equilibrium featuring mergers (orange region) and PECs (blue region) as a
function of ψ (x axis) and parties’ discount factor δ (y axis). Parties’ bliss points are set to
zl = −0.6, zc = 0, zr = 0.7. Voters bliss points are uniformly distributed in [−1,1].
Which type of alliance between C and L is sustainable in equilibrium, for these param-
eter values? To answer, we need to verify that a merger (or PEC) is incentive compatible
for L for some of the values of volatility for which C wants to merge (or form a PEC) with
L. For the parameter values in this example, L always prefers a PEC to a merger with C.
Hence, when volatility is low (ψ high enough), C proposes a PEC to L, which accepts, and
a PEC forms in equilibrium (blue region).
As electoral volatility increases (ψ decreases), the centrist party’s incentives to merge
increase. Suppose that C proposes a merger to L for ψ̃ < ψ < ψ̂, i.e., for the values of
volatility such that C prefers a merger with L to both a merger with R and to a PEC with
L. If L accepts, its expected payoff is Uml,lc. If L rejects, the outcome depends on C’s ranking




c,cr , knowing C’s ranking L
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rejects the proposal, and in equilibrium a PEC between C and L (i.e., L’s preferred option)




c,lc , L knows that a merger between R and C (its least
preferred option) would form following a rejection. In the latter case, L accepts C’s offer
and a merger between C and L forms.
Finally, when electoral volatility is very high ψ < ψ̃, we know from Lemma 4.3 that
party C prefers to merge with the extreme party R. We also know from Proposition4.2
that party R always accepts a merger proposal, thus a merger between C and R forms
when ψ < ψ̃.15
To summarize, when electoral volatility is low enough (i.e., for ψ high enough, blue
region), C’s best option is to form a PEC with L in t = 1, as this choice ensures the flex-
ibility to form the best alliance in t = 2. Yet, as electoral volatility increases (i.e., as ψ
decreases), the expected cost of being left out from a coalition becomes more important,
and C prefers to form a merger with the closest party to insure itself against such an out-
come (orange region). Finally, when electoral volatility is extremely high, in equilibrium
a merger between C and the more extreme R could emerge (gray region).
4.2.5 Party Ideological Polarization
How does an increase in ideological polarization affect the equilibrium of the game? Gen-
erally, the term ideological polarization might refer to two related, yet distinct, concepts.
The first concept concerns the policy positions of different parties. This is the meaning
adopted by American politics scholars such as McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2016), and
by recent Comparative politics literature (Dalton, 2008, Indridason, 2011). The second
concept relates to voters’ polarization. In what follows I focus on the first concept of
15 Notice that the boundary between the two merger equilibria regions is not exactly vertical. This hap-
pens because a lower discount factor mutes the extent to which less electoral volatility results in a merger
equilibrium with the extreme party.
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party polarization and see how this impacts the equilibrium party system.16
Defining party polarization in multi-party systems is not straightforward, because a
good measure requires to take into account both the ideological position of parties as
well as their vote share. Intuitively, a highly polarized system is one in which big par-
ties (or coalitions of parties) are located at the opposite extremes of the policy spectrum.
The empirical literature on coalition formation has typically operationalized polarization
with “ideological division,” which represents the greatest ideological distance between
any two parties (within the coalition and the opposition). However, as Indridason (2011)
notes, this measure does not satisfy some properties expected in a definition of polariza-
tion, such as responsiveness to moderate parties’ movements.17
For the purpose of this model, I will consider the following working definition: polar-
ization increases if the distance of any party from the policy space center increases.18 The
question then is how an increase in polarization, or parties’ ideological extremism, affects
the sustainability of different alliances in equilibrium.
The next result assumes that the centrist party lies in the middle of the policy space and
studies movements in the location of the right party. An increase in ideological extremism
amounts to an increase in zr , keeping zl fixed.









16 While I do not analyze here the concept of voter polarization, it would be interesting to study how
different distributions of voters’ preferences (e.g., a more extreme electorate) change the supply of parties.
17 For example, suppose that, all else equal, the central party moves to the right. In this case, polariza-
tion should increase because the right becomes more cohesive and the gap between the left and the right
increases. Similarly, suppose that the left and the right parties are equidistant from the center party, and
that their vote share increases without changing their platforms’ location. In this case as well polarization
should increase. Yet, the ideological division measure remains constant in both examples.
18 A limitation of this definition is that by changing the location of parties’ platforms, the relative vote
share of parties changes as well, because in the model voters are uniformly distributed overZ.
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From Proposition 4.2, we know that ∂(Umc,lc−U
pec
c,lc )/∂ψ < 0. That is, C’s incentives to merge
with L increase with electoral volatility. Remark 4.1 shows that the magnitude of this
incentive varies with R’s extremism: the negative cross-partial implies that an increase
in volatility expands the region of the parameter space supporting a merger equilibrium
more when R is closer to the policy space. Conversely, as zr moves away from the center,
the advantage of merging vis-à-vis forming a PEC shrinks.
Figure 4.6 provides an illustration of this result, showing how the equilibrium regions
vary as a function of R’s ideological extremism (y axis) and ψ (x axis), for zc = 0 and zl =
−0.6. When electoral volatility is low enough (ψ is high), C is always better off forming a
PEC regardless of the location of zl (the more extreme party). As ψ decreases, the region
such that a merger emerges in equilibrium (orange region) expands. In particular, as zr
becomes more extreme, the merger region becomes less elastic to changes in electoral
volatility.
Figure 4.6: Equilibrium featuring mergers (orange region) and PECs (blue region) as a
function of ψ (x axis) and zl (y axis). The other parameters are set to zc = 0, zl = −0.6,
δ = 0.8, a = 1 and φ = 1/2.
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4.3 Alternative Power Sharing Arrangements
How do different configurations of inter-party power sharing affect parties’ decision to
organize into different types of alliances? The baseline model assumes that the imple-
mented policy coincides with the preferred platform of the party (or coalition) that wins
the election: i.e., the party with the majority of votes entirely controls the policy-making
process. I refer to this as the centralized-power model. However, we might think of policies
as a compromise among the policy positions of multiple parties composing the legisla-
ture. In consensual democracies, multiple parties typically exercise or have the potential
to exercise significant policy influence (Lijphart, 1984).
This section varies the extent to which government policies reflect power-sharing
among all parties as opposed to being determined by a single party.
Alternatively to the baseline model — and at the other extreme — Section 4.3.1 ana-
lyzes the case where the implemented policy is a compromise among the policy positions
of all the parties composing the parliament, without regard to whether these parties are
in government or opposition, weighted by their seat shares. I refer to this specification as
the parliamentary-mean model of policy (Merrill and Adams, 2007). Proposition 4.3 below
demonstrates that under the parliamentary-mean model no type of pre-electoral alliance
is sustainable (neither PECs nor mergers) and in equilibrium parties always run alone.
In reality, implemented policies do not go entirely to one party or coalition, not are
a pure compromise among all parties in the legislature. Section 4.3.2 takes into account
intermediate configurations of institutional power sharing. Whether the policy-making
process resembles more the centralized-party model or the parliamentary-mean one de-
pends on country-specific power sharing arrangements that vary the extent to which
power is concentrated or shared with minority parties. The analysis of this unified model
shows that pre-electoral alliances (both mergers and PECs) can emerge in equilibrium
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under intermediate power sharing arrangements.
4.3.1 Parliamentary-Mean Model
Let the implemented policy be a function of parties’ platforms (zi) and their legislative
power, measured by seat shares. For simplicity, I assume that parties’ seat shares are
exactly proportional to vote shares, or in other words that the electoral system is perfectly




Vi,t × zi . (4.19)
This formulation reflects the weight each party has in the post-electoral bargaining pro-
cess in the legislature. The next result describes the equilibrium of the game under the
parliamentary-mean assumption of policy outcomes.
Proposition 4.3. Parliamentary-Mean Equilibrium. Let the implemented policy be an average
of all parties’ preferred policies, weighted by parties’ vote shares. In equilibrium, neither mergers
nor PECs are sustainable, and parties run alone in both periods.
Proposition 4.3 shows that institutions that promote compromise and power-sharing
among political parties remove parties’ need to join pre-electoral alliances to have their
platform counted in the implemented policy. In other words, under consensual politi-
cal institutions there is no premium for the winner of the election in terms of legislative
power.
19 The degree to which a PR system resembles perfect proportionality in reality depends on many factors
such as district magnitude (i.e. the number of seats awarded per district) and the existence (or absence)
of electoral thresholds defined in terms of a minimum percentage of the national vote a party must win in
order to guarantee parliamentary representation (Shugart and Taagepera, 1989, Cox, 1997, Lijphart, 2012).
Among the most perfectly proportional systems are those of Israel, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian
countries (Lijphart, 2012).
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To see why no pre-electoral alliances emerge in equilibrium, let us analyze first par-
ties’ decision to form PECs vis-à-vis running alone in the second period. Contrary to the
baseline model, where the implemented policy is determined by the winner of the elec-
tion, the implemented policy under the parliamentary mean model reflects parties’ com-
promise and bargaining taking place after the election. Intuitively, in the second period
PECs are always weakly dominated by the choice of running alone because post-electoral
negotiations can always reach a policy that is obtained with PECs.
The first period decision is not as trivial as the second period’s one because of parties’
uncertainty over the electorate’s volatility. Because the first period payoff from forming
a merger or a PEC is the same,20 we can focus on parties’ comparison of the different
continuation values of each alliance configuration. The Appendix shows that there exist
a parameter configuration such that C prefers to merge rather than running alone when
electoral volatility is high. This result is due to the concavity of parties’ preferences over
policies: by merging, the centrist party could prevent a higher policy cost due to one of
the extreme parties’ policies being weighted more. However, mergers are not incentive
compatible for neither L or R, which always prefer to run alone for any value of electoral
volatility. Thus, in equilibrium no merger forms in the first period and parties compete
alone in both periods.
4.3.2 Intermediate Configurations of Power-Sharing
Let α ∈ [0,1] denote the amount of inter-party power sharing in the electoral environment,






ª®¬ + (1 − α)zw, (4.20)
20 Recall that the policy resulting from a merger and a PEC between the same parties are equivalent in the
same period, while leading to different implemented policies in the subsequent period.
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where zw is the policy preferred by the party (or coalition) with the plurality of votes. The
baseline model assumes that α = 0, whereas the parliamentary mean model introduced
in the previous section assumes that α = 1. Majoritarian democracies concentrate power
in the hands of the winning parties, in such a way that the outcome of the policy making
process coincides with the dominant party’s preferred policy (α = 0). Conversely, in
consensual democracies resources are more evenly shared with minority parties, which
results in implemented policies partly reflecting the minority’s preferences (α = 1).
Empirically, a change in α might refer to a change in the electoral system (e.g., from
winner-take-all to proportional), or to an institutional change holding fixed the elec-
toral system’s proportionality (e.g., from executive dominance to legislative-executive
balance). Factors that disperse power among parties in the legislature (increasing α)
include required supermajorities, bicameral legislatures and provisions for opposition
parties’ participation on important legislative committees. Factors that promote policy
dominance by a single party or by the governing coalition (decreasing α) include restric-
tive legislative procedures (Huber, 1996), unicameral legislatures, and centralized gov-
ernment vis-à-vis federal systems.
We are interested in knowing whether there exists an intermediate level of power
sharing that induces parties to form pre-electoral alliances. In other words, is there an
α ∈ (0,1) such that either mergers or PECs are sustainable in equilibrium? The subsequent
numerical example illustrates parties’ incentives under different values of α.21
Let zl = −0.6, zc = 0 and zr = 0.7, as in the example in Section 4.2.4. Figure 4.7
shows the equilibrium configuration of alliances for different values of α as a function of
electoral volatility. We know from Proposition 4.3 that for α = 1 no merger is possible in
equilibrium, since these are not incentive compatible for either L or R. As α goes down,
21 Unfortunately the complexity of the objective makes an analytic characterization of the equilibrium
difficult.
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the implemented policy weighs more the platform of the dominant party. This in turn
restores the incentives to merge of L and R. In the left panel of Figure 4.7 α is set to 0.3:
for this value, party R is willing to accept a merger proposal from C. As α decreases
further, the advantaged party L is willing to accept C’s merger proposal: the right panel
of Figure 4.7 shows the equilibrium for α = 0.1. As the system converges to the dominant
model of the baseline, both mergers and PECs are sustainable in equilibrium: when α = 0
the parameter region describing the equilibrium is the one in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.7: Equilibrium type as a function of ψ (x axis) and parties’ discount factor δ (y
axis), for α = 0.3 (left panel) and α = 0.1 (right panel). Parties’ bliss points are set to
zl = −0.6, zc = 0, zr = 0.7. Voters bliss points are uniformly distributed in [−1,1].
4.4 Introducing Uncertainty over Platforms’ Location
While each party is associated with a particular policy (its “brand”), zi, parties typi-
cally feature heterogeneous preferences inside them. This heterogeneity is crucial, as the
policy platform that is chosen by each party in a given election might differ from its pol-
icy brand (or, in other words, parties cannot fully pre-commit to policies). This section
formalizes this idea by introducing noise in the location of parties’ platforms.
Let xi,t be the policy platform that is selected by party i in a given election. This plat-
form corresponds to the realization of the random variable Xi,t = zi+ε , where ε ∼ N (0, σ2).
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The smaller ε , the sharpest the message of the party (i.e., the most informative the party
brand). We can interpret the support of Xi as follows. Parties typically gather multiple
candidates who are proponents of different issues, some of which might be very far from
the party brand. Depending on which of these candidates wins the election, the party
policy could differ from the ex-ante party brand.






where εm ∼ N (0, σ2m), and
σ2m = σ
2 +
|zl − zc |
γ
. (4.22)
By creating a new political entity, mergers decreases the informativeness of the con-
stituent parties’ brands: for any distinct pair of platforms zl and zc, σ2m > σ2 for any
γ ∈ R+. The noise that arises from a merger is increasing in the distance between its con-
stituent parties’ bliss points: since voters expect candidates to be drawn from anywhere
between zc and zl , the uncertainty cost increases with the distance among platforms.22
Furthermore, the noise is decreasing in γ: as γ → ∞, σ2m → σ2. As such, γ could be inter-
preted as the amount of trust between the merger’s partners.23 The merged party’s brand
zmlc,1 is a convex combination of the constituent parties’ bliss points, as in the baseline







Differently from mergers, PECs preserve the identity of different parties. Thus, when
two parties form a PEC the noise term is the same as when parties run individually:
22 This assumption is supported by empirical evidence showing that mergers are more likely to form
between ideologically close parties (Ibenskas, 2016).
23 When deciding to merge, a party faces the risk that the other partner would renege on the agreement
by increasing its policy influence above the agreed at the time of the merger. While I leave it exogenous,
it is reasonable to think γ to be positively correlated with the constituent parties’ previous experience of
governing together, which can reduce the uncertainty about partners’ behavior (Franklin and Mackie, 1983,
Martin and Stevenson, 2010).
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ε ∼ N (0, σ2).
Because parties cannot pre-commit to policies, voters do not know the exact policy
each party selects and suffer an uncertainty cost which is captured by the variance of Xi.












where zi = E[Xi] and σ2 = Var[Xi].24
To compute each party’s vote share when parties run alone, we need to identify the
location of the indifferent voter for each pair of parties. Since σ2 is constant across parties,
we can focus on the comparison between pairs of party brands (l, c and c, r), as in the
baseline model.25 The same holds when evaluating a PEC’s vote share, because of the
assumption on the noise term.
The analysis changes when computing the vote share of a merger. Denote by vmlc,r,2 the
voter who is indifferent between party R and a merger between L and C in the second















From the indifference condition (4.24) it is clear that parties sacrifice at least some
of their vote share when deciding to merge (vis-à-vis forming a PEC). This is because
24 The second equality follows from Var[Xi] = E[X2i ] − E[Xi]
2 = σ2, which allows to re-express EUv(Xi) as
EUv(Xi) = −σ2 − E[Xi]2 + 2E[Xi]zv − z2v
= −
(
E[Xi]2 − 2E[Xi]zv + z2v
)
− σ2.
25 For instance, let vlc,2 be the voter who is indifferent between parties l and c in t = 2. Then, vlc,2 solves
the same indifference condition as in the baseline model, because the variance terms σ2 cancel out.
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— when zl and zc differ — voters pay an uncertainty cost when voting for a merged
party. Despite this cost from merging, the next result shows that the trade-off identified
in Proposition 4.2 holds, as long as the uncertainty cost associated to the merger is not too
high.
Proposition 4.4. Equilibrium with Electoral Uncertainty. When γ is high enough, in equilib-
rium parties form mergers when electoral volatility is sufficiently high (low ψ), and PECs for low
electoral volatility (high ψ). When γ is low, in equilibrium C forms a PEC with the closest party
(R).
Intuitively, Proposition 4.4 shows that mergers are only sustainable if they don’t in-
troduce excessive uncertainty about where the party platform stands. This can be the
case for example when the merged party has a clear statute which is credible given the
constituent parties’ histories. Low uncertainty can also be a reasonable assumption if
constituent parties have been former allies or have had previous experience of governing
together. Conversely, Proposition 4.4 shows that when voters’ uncertainty about the new
political party is high, a merger is not a viable alternative to a PEC even when the electorate
is very volatile.
4.5 Conclusion
The majority of multi-party systems are extremely “liquid” (Powell Jr, 2000, Golder, 2006):
parties split, merge, form and leave coalitions at all times, and these movements largely
affect parties’ electoral chances. While the literature typically assumes that each party is
associated to a particular policy platform — highlighting the important role of parties in
producing political brand names (Downs, 1957, Snyder and Ting, 2002) —, in multi-party
systems each party is often associated to different brands depending on the allies chosen.
Thus, in the context of multi-party competition it is unclear “who owns the party
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brand,” given the different alliances parties can form. This is an unfortunate gap because
understanding the different forms of inter-party cooperation is crucial for anticipating
the development of party systems. To fill such void, this paper presents a simple model
of electoral competition in which parties form alliances before elections, and decide how
binding these alliances should be.
The central intuition of the model is that parties’ strategic choice of electoral alliances
crucially depends on the underlying volatility of the electorate. In particular, Proposition
4.2 suggests that stable electorates might incentivize flexible types of coalitions that are
renegotiated in every election. Conversely, unstable electorates might be empirically cor-
related with more binding alliances such as mergers. Recent political developments have
brought attention to the electoral decline of established parties and the burst of electoral
volatility following the Great Recession of 2007 in Europe. The result suggests that this
increased electoral volatility might lead to an increase in the number of binding coalitions
in the future.
The model produces several empirical implications. Results suggest that we should
expect mergers to be empirically associated with volatile electorates. In principle, an ac-
curate measure of electoral volatility should reflect the extent to which personal votes
change between subsequent elections. Thus, individual level data identifying voters’
intentions to vote or party identification across time represent an accurate measure of
volatility.
Results also show that at least some degree of power concentration is needed to trig-
ger mergers and pre-electoral coalitions. Under consensual democracies that share power
among all parties, minority parties do not need to join pre-electoral alliances to have
their voices heard in the policy-making process. As power gets more concentrated in the
hands of the winner of the election, parties need to join forces and both PECs and mergers
can emerge in equilibrium. A decrease in power sharing might refer to a change in the
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electoral system (e.g., from proportional to winner-take-all), or to an institutional change
holding fixed the electoral system’s proportionality (e.g., from legislative-executive bal-
ance to executive dominance).
While identifying future governments in two-party systems such as the United States
is straightforward, it is unusual for almost every other democracy for a single party to
win the majority of votes, making the identity of government more uncertain. By mak-
ing explicit the identity of future governments, pre-electoral alliances (both mergers and
PECs) have the important role of creating mandate conditions in multi-party systems.
These findings contribute to our understanding of party systems. Binding alliances
such as mergers can reduce excessive party system fragmentation by forming stable par-
ties. In the short term, however, mergers can reduce the information value of party la-
bels for voters thus hindering voter representation and accountability. Ultimately, under-
standing the outcomes of party system formation and stabilization is not possible without
considering the role of mergers and pre-electoral coalitions. While this paper only begins
to unpack the incentives behind different forms of pre-electoral alliances, future research
should further investigate how these incentives change with alternative institutional and
non-institutional features of the competitive environment in which parties operate.
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Appendix A: Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Preliminaries
A.1.1 Faction’s Problem





































2 )/2 and p
L = 12 + ψ[−(x







All the other factions solve their respective maximization problem. The first-order
condition associated to L1 is




















and likewise for L2, R1 and R2.
First, notice that the factions’ objective function is concave. The second-order condi-










which is negative for ψ sufficiently small. Hence, the first-order conditions of the factions’
problem identify a maximum.
Lemma A.1. There exists an equilibrium, i.e., a solution to the system of first-order conditions of
each faction. The equilibrium is unique.
135
Proof. Solving the system of four first-order conditions yields a unique closed-form so-
lution for effort exerted by factions in both parties. The solution is symmetric for factions
in the same party, i.e., eL∗1 = e
L∗
2 = e
L∗, and equal to
eL∗ =
[
(γ − 1)(πRd − π
R
v )ψ − 2
] [
2 + (2α − 1)ψ + 2ψ(xL − xR)2
]
+ (γ − 1)(πLv + πLd ) − θ(π
R















(γ − 1)(πLd − π
L
v )ψ − 2
] [
2 + (2α − 1)ψ + 2ψ(xL − xR)2
]
+ (γ − 1)(πRv + πRd ) − θ(π
L






















π(1 − γ) + 2 + 2[(xL)2 − (xR)2] + ψ(1 − 2α) + 2ψ(xL − xR)2
]
,
and has the following properties:
• If γ < 1 (γ > 1), θ(π) is increasing (decreasing) in π,
• If (xL)2 > (xR)2 (i.e., if party L is electorally disadvantaged) and γ < 1, θ(π) is posi-
tive.

Claim 1 (Interior Effort.). The following condition ensures that eL∗ ∈ (0,1):




Proof. (I) Condition for eL∗ < 1.
Using the expression for the faction’s first-order condition (A.2), we can evaluate when
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the first-order condition evaluated at eL∗ = 1 is negative:
ψ
[
(bLv − bLd ) +
1 + (1 − γ)(1 − eL2 )
2


















for which a sufficient condition is




(II) Condition for eL∗ > 0 . Using the expression for the faction’s first-order condition
(A.2) we can evaluate when the first-order condition evaluated at eL∗ = 0 is positive:
ψ
[
(bLv − bLd ) +
1 + (1 − γ)(−eL2 )
2
























Hence, the following is a sufficient condition for campaigning effort to be positive in
equilibrium:




which is again satisfied for ψ small enough.
Since effort is continuous, the conditions identified in (A.4) and (A.5) ensure that the
unique level of effort exerted by factions in equilibrium must be interior. 
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A.1.2 Party Leader’s Problem
Each party leader maximizes the probability of winning the election with respect to
the party’s two premia. By Lemma A.1, we know that when L1, L2 face a symmetric
problem, in equilibrium eL∗1 = e
L∗
2 = e
























− (xL)2 + (xR)2
]
. (A.6)
Since party P’s premia affect the probability of winning only through the effort level of
party P’s factions as well as party Q’s factions, we can re-express the leader’s objective




















Notice that the game between the two party leaders is a zero-sum game, as each leader
wins what the other party loses:





Given Equation A.7, we can define the payoff function of this zero-sum game as ũL(πL, πR) =
u, with ũR(πL, πR) = −u.















































Substituting the values of equilibrium efforts into (A.7), we can express the payoff func-


































where ũL(πL, πR) = u, and ũR(πL, πR) = −u. Hence, L (R) maximizes (minimizes) the payoff
function (A.9) with respect to πL (πR).
Lemma A.2. The payoff function of the game u is
• increasing in πLv for γ < 1
• decreasing in πLv for γ > 1
Proof. Recall that the payoff function of the zero-sum game among party leaders is de-
fined by u = 2eL∗ − 2eR∗. By symmetry across factions in the same party, we can rewrite
the first-order condition of L1, L2 as




















































which follows from the budget constraint assumption on bLv , the fact that ∂pL/∂eL∗ = 2ψ
and that ∂ρL1 /∂π
L










and notice that in equilibrium ρL1 = 1/2. Then, the partial derivative of effort with














where 2eL∗ is the first component of L’s payoff function. Next, we need to characterize























































































































































∈ [0,2α] ⊂ [0,2]. Hence the denominator is positive either
when γ > 1, or for γ < 1 and ψ small enough. When this is the case, the sign of X1 is
driven by the numerator, which is positive when γ < 1 and negative when γ > 1, which
completes the proof. 
Lemma A.3. The payoff function of the game u is
• increasing in πLd for γ < 1
• decreasing in πLd for γ > 1




















































+ 1 − pL
]
− ψ, (A.15)
which is the first component of the payoff function.

















































































































(1 − pL) − ψ.










allows us to evaluate how the payoff function













(1 − pL) − ψ










As in the previous case, the denominator is positive either when γ > 1, or for γ < 1 and ψ
small enough. When this is the case, the sign of X0 is driven by the numerator, which is




A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof. To derive the equilibrium incentive scheme, notice that by Lemma A.2 and Lemma A.3













Thus, in equilibrium L sets πL∗d = (1 − α), π
L∗
v = α. When γ > 1, the inequality is reversed,
therefore the optimal premia are πL∗d = π
L∗
v = 0.
Given the payoff of the game (A.9), the right party faces a problem that is symmetric
to L’s one, i.e., max{πR
d
,πRv }
{−u}. Therefore, R sets in equilibrium πRd = (1 − α), π
R
v = α when
γ < 1, and πRd = π
R
v = 0 when γ > 1.






















































































































+ 1 − 2eL1 = 0,
and likewise for faction L2 in party L and factions R1 and R2 in party R. Solving the system
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[(γ − 1)(πRd − π
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v )ψ − 2][2 + (2α − 1 + 2(xL − xR)2)ψ] + (γ − 1)πLv (1 + ψ)(−2 + (γ − 1)πRv




d + [2α − 1 + 2(xL − xR)
2)ψ)]






v ) − 8
(A.17)
and, analogously, effort chosen by factions in party R is equal to
eR∗ =
[(γ − 1)(πLd − π
L
v )ψ − 2][2 + (2α − 1 + 2(xL − xR)2)ψ] + (γ − 1)πRv (1 + ψ)(−2 + (γ − 1)πLv




d + [2α − 1 + 2(xL − xR)
2)ψ)]






v ) − 8
(A.18)










if γ > 1
5 − γ + 2ψ
(





if γ < 1,
which completes the proof. 
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof. (i) The proof simply follows by inspection of the first-order conditions and by




only increases the external incentive
term.




























πLd + 1 − 2e
L = 0,
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and can be re-expressed as






































where the second equality follows from ∂pL/∂ |xL | = −2ψ |xL |.

























Differentiating (2eL − 2eR) with respect to |xL | yields
∂(2eL − 2eR)
∂ |xL |
= −(1 − γ)ψ |xL |(πLv + πRv − πLd − π
R
d ). (A.20)
In equilibrium, when γ < 1 the optimal contract offered by both leaders is πL∗v = πR∗v = α,
and πL∗d = π
R∗
d = 1 − α. Substituting the optimal contract yields
∂(2eL∗ − 2eR∗)
∂ |xL |
= −2(1 − γ)ψ |xL |(2α − 1),
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which is always negative. That is, the difference in equilibrium efforts (2eL∗ − 2eR∗) de-
creases in L’s ideological extremism. The proof of ∂(2e
R∗−2eL∗)
∂ |xR | < 0 is analogous therefore
omitted.
Finally, when γ > 1, the optimal contract offered by both leaders is πL∗v = πR∗v = πL∗d =
πR∗d = 0, which substituted into (A.20) yields zero for every x
L . 
A.2.3 Proof of Remark 2.1



















= −2ψ |xL | < 0,
which is always negative. 
A.2.4 Proof of Proposition 2.3

























L )2+ (xL1 −xR)2], (A.21)























L )2+ (xL2 − xR)2],
(A.22)
By inspection of the last term of the first-order condition in (A.21) and (A.22), it is clear



























L )2+(xL1 −xR)2−(xL2 −xL )2+(xL2 −xR)2] .
Differentiating eL∗1 + e
L∗














































































































which is positive for γ < 1 and ψ small enough. This implies πL∗v = α. The sign of the
derivative is negative for γ > 1, which implies πL∗v = 0. The proof for πL∗d is analogous
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and therefore omitted. 
A.2.5 Proof of Proposition 2.4
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= bLv + π
L
















































































































































































R)2+ (xR1 −xL )2+ (xR2 −xL )2]+ (1−γ) [πRv +pL(πRd −πRv )],
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) . (A.28)





















When γ > 1, the LHS in (A.29) is always negative, which implies that in equilibrium λ∗ =
1. That is, when sabotage is more effective than campaigning effort it is always optimal to
set a policy concession for the faction ranking higher. Since premia are constrained to be
nonnegative, in this case there is no trade-off between eliciting campaigning and setting
a winning platform.




condition for the denominator of χλ (A.28) to be positive is
2α + (xL2 − x
L
1 )




which requires the distance in factions’ ideological bliss point to be low enough. A suffi-




2(2λ − 1) >
1
ψ(1 − γ)
+ 2(1 − α), (A.31)
which requires the distance in factions’ ideological bliss point to be high enough. That
is, when the ideological distance is high enough and γ < 1, the optimal incentive scheme
sets low powered incentives. When the distance is low enough, the optimal incentive
scheme features high powered incentives.
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v + (xL2 − x
L
1 )2(2λ − 1)
) ] . (A.34)
By inspection, ∂pL/∂πLv < 0 for γ > 1, and ∂pL/∂πLv > 0 for γ < 1 and ψ small enough —
which completes the proof. 
A.3 Extensions
A.3.1 Negative Premia
In the baseline model, the leader is constrained to choose an incentive scheme which
rewards the faction that ranks higher according to internal monitoring device with non-
negative premia. That is, when sabotage is more effective than campaigning to get a high
ranking, the leader cannot “punish” the winning faction by setting a negative premium
(or, alternatively, the losing faction cannot be rewarded). This assumption reflects the fact
that leaders are often constrained by parties’ legal rules and formal procedures, which are
the same for all factions and are decided ex-ante.1
However, from a theoretical standpoint one might argue that the party should rec-
1 The assumption that leaders cannot renege on contracts is supported by the evidence on historical
factions presented in the paper, which shows that these set of rules can even take the form of explicit
contracts, as in the Italian case.
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ognize and avoid such inefficient metrics, and be able to punish factions that mobilize
less. That is, when γ > 1, negative premia should be strictly better than positive ones: by
promising all the electoral spoils to the lower-ranking faction, leaders can ensure higher
campaigning effort. In terms of information inferred from the ranking indicator, if neg-
ative premia are allowed, then having the ranking indicator increasing in mobilization
effort is equivalent to having it increasing in sabotage. The main results of the baseline
model are robust to a specification which allows leaders to punish high ranking factions.
Corollary A.1 (Equilibrium with negative premia). When premia can be negative, the opti-
mal premia offered by L in equilibrium (and, symmetrically, by R) are (πL∗d , π
L∗
v ) = (α − 1,−α) if
γ > 1, and (πL∗d , π
L∗
v ) = (1 − α,α) if γ < 1.
Proof. The proof directly follows from Lemma A.2 and A.3, which show that the leader’s
expected payoff is strictly increasing (decreasing) in both premia when γ < 1 (γ > 1). 
Intuitively, the highest incentive to invest in campaigning effort coincides with a pun-
ishment for ranking higher when γ > 1. When the factions’ incentives are aligned to those
of the leader (γ < 1), high powered incentives are optimal, as in the baseline model.
How does allowing for negative premia change the equilibrium investment decision
of factions? The baseline model shows that factions in extreme parties campaign less
than factions in moderate parties when γ < 1. Extending the analysis to negative premia







Since it is equivalent to have the internal ranking determined by sabotage or campaign-
ing, the effect of polarization on campaigning effort is the same whether γ > 1 or γ < 1.
The baseline model also shows that, when factions are heterogeneous, rewarding sab-
otage with a positive premium contingent on electoral victory increases the moderate
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faction’s campaigning. This result is robust to a specification that allows for negative pre-
mia. In particular, in this case the difference between total effort in party L and total effort
in party R is decreasing in the value of the extreme faction’s preferred policy, |xLi |.
Finally, the result on policy concessions is also robust to a specification allowing for
negative premia. In particular, when γ > 1 and the extreme faction’s preferred policy is
extreme enough, the leader sets λ∗ = 1, thus rewarding the moderate faction with a policy
concession.
A.3.2 Non-binding Resource Constraint
The baseline model assumes aLi +e
L
i = 1 — that is, effort (e
L
i ) and sabotage (a
L
i ) exhaust
the faction’s unitary budget of resources. In what follows I analyze the general case aLi +
eLi ≤ 1. I show that in equilibrium (i) effort must be positive, (ii) sabotage is either positive
or zero. That is, both aL∗i > 0, e
L∗
i > 0 and a
L∗
i = 0, e
L∗
i > 0 are possible in equilibrium.
Consider the decision of faction L1 in party L. There is a total budget normalized to 1,
and the following condition must hold: aLi + e
L
i ≤ 1, that is, doing nothing is an option for




































where pL = 12 + ψ
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simplicity, but without loss of generality, let xL = −xR (no party has an ex-ante electoral
advantage).
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The Lagrangean associated with L1’s problem can be expressed as
L(eL1 ,a
L
1 ) = p
L [bLv + ρL1 πLv ] + (1 − pL)[bLd + ρL1 πLd − (xL − xR)2] − (eL1 )22 − (aL1 )22
− λ1(aL1 + e
L
1 − 1) + λ2(e
L
1 ) + λ3(a
L
1 )
The optimization problem satisfies the constraint qualifications, hence we know that the



















pLπLv + (1 − pL)πLd
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pLπLv + (1 − pL)πLd
]
− aL1 − λ1 + λ3 = 0
(3) aL1 + e
L

















(6) λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, λ3 ≥ 0.
where conditions (1) and (2) are the first order conditions with respect to eL1 and a
L
1 .
Before proceeding with the cases to evaluate, notice that the following holds in equi-
librium:






2 , which implies ρ
L
1 = 1/2






2 ) = 1/2
Given the inequality constraint, there are four cases to consider.
(I) aL1 > 0, e
L
1 > 0. Then, λ2 = λ3 = 0 from conditions (4) and (5). We can find the
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pLπLv + (1 − pL)πLd
]
.
In equilibrium, effort is increasing (decreasing) in both premia when γ < 1 (γ > 1), hence
premia are set to (πL∗d = 1 − α, π
L∗
v = α) when γ < 1, and to (πL∗d = π
L∗
v = 0) when γ > 1.
Substituting in (πL∗d , π
L∗








+ (xL − xR)2
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which substituted into condition (1) yields








+ (xL − xR)2
]
− eL∗i ,
where the first two terms are nonnegative because φ > 0, ψ > 0, α ≥ 1/2. We can then find
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(II) aL1 > 0, e
L






pLπLv + (1 − pL)πLd
]
− aL1 = λ1.


















pLπLv + (1 − pL)πLd
]
+ aL1 + λ2 = 0
which clearly contradicts λ2 ≥ 0.
(III) aL1 = 0, e
L



















pLπLv + (1 − pL)πLd
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− eL1 = λ1,

















d ) + (x
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− eL∗1 . (A.36)












which becomes harder to satisfy as γ increases.
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(IV) aL1 = e
L


















pLπLv + (1 − pL)πLd
]





pLπLv + (1 − pL)πLd
]
+ λ3 ≤ 0,
which again contradicts λ2 ≥ 0 and λ3 ≥ 0.
A.3.3 Two Separate Actions - Different Cost Functions
The baseline model assumes (i) aL1 = 1 − e
L
1 and (ii) separate quadratic costs for both
actions. These assumptions imply that in equilibrium there is always a positive amount
of sabotage (as equilibrium effort is interior) to minimize costs, even when γ < 1 — that is,
even when sabotage is less effective than campaigning to achieve a high internal ranking.
While Subsection A.3.2 relaxes (i) by analyzing the case aL1 + e
L
1 ≤ 1, this section extends
the analysis to consider two separate actions, eL1 ∈ [0,1] and a
L
1 ∈ [0,1], and different
convex cost functions.
(I) Separate Quadratic Costs. Using the baseline model’s cost function, faction L1’s
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We start the analysis with the following observations.
Remark A.1. Factions do not invest in sabotage (aL∗i = 0) if and only if both premia are set to
zero. When πLv > 0 and/or πLd > 0, in equilibrium factions exert some positive level of sabotage.
157







pLπLv + (1 − pL)πLd
]
− 2aL1 , (A.37)
where ∂UL1 /∂a
L
1 ≤ 0 for every a
L




d = 0. Hence, when premia are set
to zero, aL∗i = 0.
To show the second part of the claim, notice that when either premia is positive ∂UL1 /∂a
L
1 ≥
0 at aL1 = 0, implying a
L∗
i > 0. 
Remark A.2. Factions always exert positive effort in equilibrium.




















pLπLv + (1 − pL)πLd
]
− 2eL1 , (A.38)
which is positive at eL1 = 0 for every value of the premia. 
Given these observations it follows that factions invest in sabotage in equilibrium for
any incentive scheme which features non-negative premia. The following result derives
the equilibrium incentive scheme, which always features positive premia. Given this
result, it is always true that factions exert positive sabotage in equilibrium with separate
quadratic cost of sabotage and effort.
Lemma A.4. L’s objective function is always increasing in both premia, implying πL∗v = α,
πL∗d = 1 − α.












































































































(πRv − πRd )
]
,






































which is positive for φ large enough. This implies πL∗v = α. The proof for πL∗d = 1 − α is
analogous and therefore omitted. 
Hence with this functional form assumption, the optimal premia do not depend on
γ and are always set at the maximum. Premia are independent of γ because L does not
internalize the cost of sabotage: with separate actions and separate costs for both actions,
sabotage does not imply a lower investment in campaigning activities. The next cost
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function restores this property of the model while keeping the two actions separate.
(II) Campaigning and Sabotage as Substitutes. Consider the following cost function
C(eL1 ,a
L






which preserves the crucial property of decreasing return of both activities, and that more
investment in one activity increases the marginal cost of the other. The latter property
is the fundamental reason why the leader might want to disincentivize sabotage in this
setup: higher sabotage increases campaigning effort’s marginal cost, thereby reducing the
amount of equilibrium effort, which is what the leader seeks to maximize in order to win
the election.


















pLπLv + (1 − pL)πLd
]





pLπLv + (1 − pL)πLd
]
− 2eL1 ,
from which we can conclude that eL∗1 = a
L∗
1 = 0 is never a solution. This simply follows by
inspection of ∂UL1 /∂e
L




i = 0. Similarly, when γ < 1,
effort must be positive as the next result shows.
Claim 2. If γ < 1, eL∗1 = 0, a
L∗
1 > 0 is not a solution.
Proof. Since aL∗1 > 0, we can replace a
L∗






















pLπLv + (1 − pL)πLd
]
,
which is clearly positive, hence eL∗1 > 0. 
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On the other hand, it is possible to have eL∗1 > 0, a
L∗
1 = 0. This happens in equilibrium
when sabotage is less effective than effort, as the next result shows.
Claim 3. If γ < 1, aL∗1 = 0.
Proof. Suppose aL1 = 0. Because of the budget constraint assumption and the fact that in



















pLπLv + (1 − pL)πLd
]
,
which substituted into ∂UL1 /∂a
L
1 |aL1 =0











+ (xL − xR)2
]
< 0. (A.42)




< 0 to hold is γ < 1, but it is not necessary: the condition also holds when
both premia are zero or when the first term of the LHS is sufficiently low. 
The case left to establish is whether eL∗1 > 0, a
L∗
1 > 0 can be true in equilibrium. In order
to prove it, it is first necessary to show what the optimal incentive scheme is. This is not
straightforward: on the one hand, high powered incentives always elicit campaigning
effort, on the other, when sabotage is highly effective high powered incentives might
reduce campaigning via an increase in the marginal cost of effort. Finding the optimal
incentive scheme when eL1 > 0, a
L
1 > 0 is not tractable because of the elevated number of
first order conditions (8) that depend on each other. However, the next result shows that
factions exert positive effort in equilibrium when πL∗v = α and γ is large enough. The proof
is organized as follows. I begin by assuming that eL1 > 0, and a
L
1 = 0. The proof shows that
the equilibrium incentive conditional on an electoral victory is always πL∗v = α. Then, the





to prove that, when γ is high enough, the sign
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of the derivative is positive for every πLd , which implies that a
L∗
1 > 0. Intuitively, when
γ is large the return from sabotage is high and factions invest in sabotage in equilibrium
when incentives are high powered.
Claim 4. When πL∗v = α and γ is large enough, eL∗1 > 0, a
L∗
1 > 0.
Proof. Consider the case eL1 > 0, a
L








2 , and by the budget
constraint assumption bLv + πLv /2 = α/2 and bLd + π
L
d /2 = (1− α)/2, the first-order condition












pLπLv + (1 − pL)πLd
]
(A.43)
To find the optimal value of πLv , plug in the expression for pL , and consider the symmetric
















































(πRv − πRd )
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which is increasing in πLv : in the numerator πLv is pre-multiplied by the probability of
victory of the left, and as πLv increases the negative term in the denominator becomes
smaller. This is intuitive: increasing the power of the incentives increases equilibrium
162
campaigning effort, which is what the leader wants to maximize. Hence in equilibrium
πL∗v = α. Substituting πL∗v into ∂UL1 /∂e
L












pLα + (1 − pL)πL∗d
]
,








pLπLv + (1 − pL)πLd
]
− 2eL1 . (A.44)





can be positive. To find a sufficient condition, consider














which is clearly positive for γ high enough. Hence it must be that, for γ > φψ/2, in
equilibrium aL∗1 > 0. 
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A.4 Portfolio Allocation in Historical DC: From the Original Manual
Figure A.1: Portfolio Allocation Rule in Italian Christian Democracy (1973) Factional di-
vision of seats following the method in the Cencelli manual. The left column displays the
names of the different factions composing the DC in 1973. The second column displays
the total number of elected members of each faction, as a function of the total percentage
obtained in the party congress (last column on the right).
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Appendix B: Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Logit of Electoral Loss on Political Investigations - Party Fixed Effects
B.2 Logit of Electoral Loss on Political Investigations - Party & District Fixed Effects
B.3 OLS of Political Investigations and Time Elapsed from Crime - Party Fixed Effects
B.4 OLS of Political Investigations and Time Elapsed from Crime, Interaction with
Days to Election - Party Fixed Effects
B.5 Marginal effects of time elapsed from crime in days - Corruption & Opinion
crimes
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Table B.1: The Impact of Electoral Loss on Investigations Driven by a Political Leaker -
with Party Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Electoral Loss 0.050** 0.049** 0.049**
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
Opinion Crime 0.977*** 0.982*** 0.980***
[0.201] [0.204] [0.204]
Electoral Loss × Opinion Crime -0.059* -0.069** -0.069**
[0.033] [0.034] [0.034]








Legislative Terms FE Yes Yes Yes
Party FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 949 949 949
Notes: Logit estimations; coefficients reported. Dependent variable: dummy equal to one if the
member of Parliament received a request for removal of parliamentary immunity initiated by
another politician. Electoral Loss is measured as the difference in the vote share of the MP’s party
with respect to the previous election. Standard errors are indicated in brackets. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.2: The Impact of Electoral Loss on Investigations Driven by a Political Leaker -
with Party Fixed Effects and District Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Electoral Loss 0.062** 0.061** 0.060**
[0.026] [0.027] [0.027]
Opinion Crime 1.291*** 1.306*** 1.306***
[0.232] [0.236] [0.236]
Electoral Loss × Opinion Crime -0.069* -0.081** -0.082**
[0.036] [0.037] [0.037]








Legislative Terms FE Yes Yes Yes
Party FE Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 949 949 949
Notes: Logit estimations; coefficients reported. Dependent variable: dummy equal to one if the
member of Parliament received a request for removal of parliamentary immunity initiated by
another politician. Electoral Loss is measured as the difference in the vote share of the MP’s party
with respect to the previous election. Standard errors are indicated in brackets. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.3: Political Investigations and Time Elapsed from Crime - with Party Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Political Leaker 435.678*** 435.732*** 433.441***
[84.586] [84.648] [84.634]
Opinion Crime -1,020.582*** -1,012.189*** -1,012.211***
[98.214] [98.894] [98.856]
Political Leaker × Opinion Crime -375.112*** -372.702*** -364.518***
[129.099] [129.173] [129.279]
Electoral Loss -12.171 -13.124 -12.247
[8.301] [8.492] [8.516]








Legislative Terms FE Yes Yes Yes
Party FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 907 907 907
Notes: OLS estimations; coefficients reported. Dependent variable: time elapsed between (alleged)
crime and RAP. Standard errors are indicated in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.4: Political Investigations and Time Elapsed from Crime, Interacted with Days to
Election - with Party Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Political Leaker 674.741*** 704.691*** 696.966***
[144.712] [146.506] [146.715]
Days to Election -0.093 -0.005 0.026
[0.142] [0.151] [0.155]
Political Leaker × Days to Election -0.569** -0.634** -0.621**
[0.275] [0.279] [0.280]
Opinion Crime -1,058.333*** -1,041.807*** -1,036.235***
[147.602] [161.843] [161.943]
Political Leaker × Opinion Crime -658.026*** -674.655*** -652.442***
[209.989] [233.996] [235.074]
Opinion Crime × Days to Election 0.055 -0.028 -0.035
[0.176] [0.194] [0.194]
Political Leaker × Opinion Crime 0.604* 0.683** 0.657*
[0.315] [0.334] [0.335]
Electoral Loss -8.933 -8.465
[8.740] [8.753]








Legislative Terms FE Yes Yes Yes
Party FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 998 892 892
Notes: OLS estimations; coefficients reported. Dependent variable: time elapsed between (alleged)
crime and RAP. Standard errors are indicated in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure B.1: Marginal effects of time elapsed from crime in days, for both corruption and
opinion crimes.
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B.6 Example of Request of Authorization to Proceed
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Appendix C: Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1








(zc − zr)2[φ(zc − zr − 2(ξ + zr))
− 2a(φ + 1)]2 − (zc − zl)2[2a(φ + 1) + φ(zc − zr + 2(zl − ξ)]2
16a2
.
Differentiating ∆c with respect to ξ yields
(1 + φ)
(




+ φ(zl − zr)
(




which is always negative. 
C.2 Proof of Lemma 4.2
Proof. Differentiating ∆c with respect to zr yields





+ φ2(−ξ(z2c − 2zr(3zc + zl) + z2l + 6z
2
r ) − 2z2c zr + 4zczl zr − 3zcz2r + 2ξ2(zr − zc))
4a2
,
which is always positive. 
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C.3 Proof of Lemma 4.3
Proof. Let ∆mc (ψ) = uc(zmlc,2) − uc(z
m






ψzl(zrφ + 4) − 2ψz2r φ + 2ψzr(φ + 1) + 8
)








































zr(φ(zl − 2zr + 2) + 2) + zl
)]
.




z3l (φ(2zl − zr + 2) + 2)
3 − z2l zr(φ(2zl − zr + 2) + 2)
2 + 4z2l zr(φ(zl − 2zr + 2) + 2)
+ 16z3l − zl z
2




z3r (φ(zl − 2zr + 2) + 2)3 + 16z3r
which is always negative. 
1 The result does not depend on C being located in the middle of the policy space. The expressions for
general zc are available upon request.
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C.4 Proof of Lemma 4.4
Proof. Differentiating ∆mc (ψ) with respect to zr yields
2z2l
(




− 28δψ + δψ
(




4δ(3ψ + 8) − 3δψz2l − 4zl(δ(ψ − 4) − 8) + 64
)






− 3ψz3l (zl + 1)φ
3 + φ2(3ψz3l − 8(ψ − 2)zl
+ 16) + 8(ψzl − 6) + 16(zl + 2)φ
)
+ 64(φ + 1)(zlφ + φ + 1)
)
+ 24δψz5r φ3
− 30δψz4r φ2((zl + 2)φ + 2) + 4z3r φ
(
12δψ + 3δψ(zl + 2)2φ2 + 4φ(δ(ψ(zl + 6) + 4) + 8)
)
,
which is always positive. 
C.5 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof. The proof proceeds as follows. First, I show that the difference Umc,lc − U
pec
c,lc is de-
creasing in ψ: that is, as volatility decreases (ψ increases), C prefers a coalition to a merger
with the closest party L.
Next, I consider the following equilibrium candidate: C proposes a PEC to L for ψ > ψ̂,
where ψ̂ solves Umc,lc = U
pec
c,lc , and show that this is incentive compatible for L. Then, I verify
that a merger with L is incentive-compatible for L when ψ < ψ̂.
Finally, I derive ψ̃, defined as the value of ψ such that Umc,cr = Umc,lc. Because of Lemma
4.3, we have Umc,cr > Umc,lc for ψ < ψ̃. Then, I verify that a merger is incentive-compatible
for R for this range of electoral volatility.
For ease of exposition, let a = 1 and zc be located at the center of the policy space:
zc = 0 (these assumption only simplify the following expressions but are without loss



























Subtracting ∂Upecc,lc /∂ψ from Equation C.1 produces
8φ
(
4z2l (zl + 1) + (4 − 3zl)z
2







3(−3zl + 3zr − 4) + 4zl zrφ2
(
z2l + zl(2 − 3zr) + (zr − 2)zr
)
+ 32(zl + zr)2
)
ψ2(zlφ + 4)(zrφ − 4)
(C.2)
+
3z2l (φ(2zl − zr + 2) + 2)
2
(
zl zrφ2(3zl − 3zr + 4) + 8(zl + zr) + 8zl(zl + 1)φ
)
φ(zl − zr)(zlφ + 4)
+
48z2l (zrφ(zl − 2zr + 2) + 2(2zl + zr))
zrφ − 4
+






3z2r (φ(zl − 2zr + 2) + 2)2
(
zl zrφ2(−3zl + 3zr − 4) + 8(zl + zr) + 4zl(zl + 2)φ
)
φ(zl − zr)(zrφ − 4)
,
which under the assumptions is always negative.
Let ψ̂ be the value of ψ such that Umc,lc = U
pec
c,lc (the expression for ψ̂ is lengthy therefore
omitted). It follows from Equation C.2 that for ψ > ψ̂, Upecc,lc > U
m
c,lc. Suppose that for this
range of volatility C proposes a PEC to L. L accepts because Upecl,lc > U
m
l,lc for, since L is
closer to C than R is and has an electoral advantage. Hence, for ψ > ψ̂, in equilibrium a
PEC between C and L forms in t = 1.
For ψ < ψ̂, C prefers to form a merger with L. Suppose that C proposes a PEC to L.
If L accepts, its expected payoff is Uml,lc. If L rejects, the outcome depends on C’s ranking




c,cr , knowing C’s ranking
L rejects the proposal, and in equilibrium a merger between C and L (i.e., L’s preferred
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c,lc , L knows that a merger between R and C (its
least preferred option) would form following a rejection. In the latter case, L accepts C’s
offer and a merger between C and L forms.
We are left to check whether a merger between C and R can form for some ψ. Let ψ̃ be
the value of ψ such that Umc,lc = U
m




l (φ(2zl − zr + 2) + 2 − 16δ)
2 + 2z2l (φ(2zl − zr + 2) + 2)
2








r φ + 8z2l zr(φ + 1) − z
2
l (φ(2zl − zr + 2) + 2)
2 ( 1




4 zl(φ(2zl − zr + 2) + 2) + zr
)
− z2r (φ(zl − 2zr + 2) + 2)2
( 1
4 zr(φ(zl − 2zr + 2)
) ) .
It follows from Lemma 4.3 that Umc,cr > Umc,lc for ψ < ψ̃.
Finally, let us analyze the incentive compatibility constraint of party R. It is easy to





z2r (φ(zl − 2zr + 2) − 2)2(ψzl(zrφ + 4) + 2ψzr(−zrφ + φ + 1) − 8)
256
−
z2r (φ(zl − 2zr + 2) − 2)2
16
+


















zl(φ(−2zl + zr − 2) − 2) + zr
)2
which under the assumptions is always positive. This in turn implies, from the previous
step of the proof, that in equilibrium a merger between C and R forms for ψ < ψ̃ and a
PEC between C and L forms for ψ > ψ̂. When ψ̃ < ψ < ψ̂, a merger between C and L forms









which completes the proof. 
177
C.6 Proof of Remark 4.1
Proof. Let zr = −zl + κ, where κ > 0. The proof simply follows from differentiating
Equation C.1 with respect to κ, which is always negative for κ > 0. 
C.7 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Proof. Denote by Ui(¬m1) party i’s second period expected payoff if parties do not merge
in t = 1. Because of the parliamentary-mean assumption over the implemented policy,






















and analogously for parties L and R. Party C compares Uc(¬m1) with Ui,2(mlc,1) and
Ui,2(mcr,1) in the first period, when deciding whether to propose a merger to any party.






− 4a2(φ − 1)(zc(−φ) + zc + zl(φ + 3) − 4zr)




which is always negative under the assumptions. Furthermore, there exists a value ψ̂lc
such that ∆lc,2c (ψ̂lc) = 0 (the expression is long therefore omitted). Hence, C prefers to
merge with L for ψ < ψ̂lc, while it prefers the continuation value from a PEC for ψ > ψ̂lc.
Analogously, we have that ∂∆cr,2c /∂ψ < 0 and that there exists ψ̂cr such that ∆cr,2c (ψ̂cr) =
0. Hence, C prefers to merge with R for ψ < ψ̂cr , while it prefers the continuation value
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from a PEC for ψ > ψ̂cr .
It is left to show that a merger is not incentive compatible neither for L nor for R. For








3z2l + 6zl(zr − 2) + 3z
2




(φ(zc − zl)(zc + 2zl − zr) − 2(zc(−φ) + zc + zlφ + zl − 2zr))
[
((φ(zc − zl)(zc + 2zl − zr)
− 2(zc(−φ) + zc + zlφ + zl))(−(φ(zc − zl)(zc + 2zl − zr))
+ 2(zc(−φ) + zc + zlφ + zl + 2zr + 4) + 8)
− 4zr(φ(zc − zl)(zc + 2zl − zr) − 2((1 − φ)zc + (1 + φ)zl + 2zr) + 8) + 64zl)3
− ((φ(zc − zl)(zc + 2zl − zr) − 2((1 − φ)zc + zlφ + zl))(−(φ(zc − zl)(zc + 2zl − zr))
− 2((1 − φ)zc + (1 + φ)zl + 2zr − 4) + 8) + 64zl)3
+ 2(zc(−φ) + zc + zlφ + zl + 2zr − 4) + 8) − 4zr(φ(zc − zl)(zc + 2zl − zr)
]
,
which is always negative under the assumptions. It follows that L rejects a merger pro-
posal by C. Similarly, ∆cr,2r < 0, and R rejects a merger proposal by C.
Since mergers are always dominated for both L and R, in equilibrium no alliance forms
in t = 1, and the unique equilibrium for all parameter values is that all parties run alone.

C.8 Proof of Proposition 4.4
Proof. The analysis of t = 2 is analogous to the baseline model. First, suppose that no
merger formed in t = 1. Because σ2m > σ2, mergers are dominated in the second period,
and both voters’ and parties’ decision are identical to the baseline model.
Suppose instead that a merger between C and R formed in t = 1. By assumption, the
merger persists and faces party L. Notice that the probability that the merged party gets
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the majority in t = 2 is Pr{ξ > ξ̃r} = 1 − F(ξ̃r) (the same as in the baseline), because the
informational cost is only paid by voters in t = 1 when the merger is formed. Hence, the
expected second period payoff from merging (4.14) is the same as in the baseline model.
In t = 1, policy uncertainty introduced by mergers changes how vote shares are com-
puted. Let vml,cr,2 denote the voter who is indifferent between voting for party L and for a



























− 4γz2l + γz
2
r (φ + 1)2 + 4zr
)
−
4γaφ(zc − zr)(zc − zl + 2zr)(zc(φ − 1) − zr(φ + 1)) + γφ2(zc − zr)2(zc − zl + 2zr)2
8aγ(2a(zc(φ − 1) + 2zl − zr(φ + 1)) − φ(zc − zr)(zc − zl + 2zr))
.
(C.5)
Using this expression, it is straightforward to compute the vote share of the merged party






γ(φ(zc − zr)(2a − zc + zl − 2zr) − 2a(zc − 2zl + zr))
−
zc + 2zl + zr
8a
+
φ(zc − zr)(2a − zc + zl − 2zr)
16a2
Differentiating Vmcr,1 with respect to γ yields
zc − zr
γ2(2a(zc(φ − 1) + 2zl − zr(φ + 1)) − φ(zc − zr)(zc − zl + 2zr))
, (C.6)
which is always positive: as γ increases, the uncertainty paid by voter is reduced and the
vote share of the merger increases.
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Finally, we check if there exists a positive γ such that Vmcr,1 = 1/2. Solving for γ yields
γ̂ =
16a2(zc − zr)
4a2((zc + zr)2 − 4z2l ) + φ2(zc − zr)2(2a − zc + zl − 2zr)2 − 4aφ(z
2
c − z2r )
, (C.7)
which is a positive real root. It follows that for γ > γ̂, Vmcr,1 > 1/2 and the analysis is
analogous to the proof of Proposition 4.2. In particular, let ∆c,cr ≡ Umc,cr −U
pec
c,lc , where
Umc,cr = −(zmcr,1 − zc)
2 − σ2 −







2 − σ2 + δUi,2(¬m).
Because uncertainty only affects ∆c,cr via the term
|zc−zr |





is always negative, analogously to Equation C.2. Furthermore, for γ big enough, there
exists a value of ψ such that Umc,cr = U
pec
c,lc , and the result in Proposition 4.2 continues to
hold.
It is left to show that for γ small enough no mergers are sustainable in equilibrium.
When γ < γ̂, Vmcr,1 < 1/2. In this case we have
Umc,cr = −(zmcr,1 − zc)
2 − σ2 −
|zc − zr |
γ
+ δUi,2(mcr),




′) = 0 has no solution. In particular, we have Upecc,lc (γ
′) > Umi,cr(γ
′) for all ψ. The
analysis for a merger between C and L is analogous therefore omitted. 
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